Initial Access
Initial Access Files in the context of a Red Team exercise refer to the set of files, scripts, executables, or documents used by the Red Team to initially infiltrate the target system or network. These files often contain malicious payloads or are designed to exploit specific vulnerabilities in order to establish a foothold in the target environment.
Summary
Complex Chains
DELIVERY(CONTAINER(TRIGGER + PAYLOAD + DECOY))
- DELIVERY: means to deliver a pack full of files
- HTML Smuggling, SVG Smuggling, Attachments
- CONTAINER: archive bundling all infection dependencies
- ISO/IMG, ZIP, WIM
- TRIGGER: some way to run the payload
- LNK, CHM, ClickOnce applications
- PAYLOAD: the malware
- Binary Files
- Code Execution Files
- Embedded Files
- DECOY: used to continue pretext narration after detonating malware
- Typically open PDF files
Examples: * HTML SMUGGLING(PASSWORD PROTECTED ZIP + ISO(LNK + IcedID + PNG)) used by TA551/Storm-0303
Container
- ISO/IMG - can contain hidden files, gets automounted giving easy access to contained files (
powershell –c .\malware.exe
) - ZIP - can contain hidden files (locate ZIP + unpack it + change dir + run Malware)
- WIM - Windows Image, builtin format used to deploy system features
- 7-zip, RAR, GZ - should get a native support on Windows 11
Trigger
- LNK
- CHM
- ClickOnce
Payload
Binary Files
These files can be executed directly on the system without any third party.
- .exe file, executable file can be run with a click
- .dll file, execute with
rundll32 main.dll,DllMain
#define WIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN #include <windows.h> extern "C" __declspec(dllexport) DWORD WINAPI MessageBoxThread(LPVOID lpParam) { MessageBox(NULL, "Hello world!", "Hello World!", NULL); return 0; } extern "C" __declspec(dllexport) BOOL APIENTRY DllMain(HMODULE hModule, DWORD ul_reason_for_call, LPVOID lpReserved) { switch (ul_reason_for_call) { case DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH: CreateThread(NULL, NULL, MessageBoxThread, NULL, NULL, NULL); break; case DLL_THREAD_ATTACH: case DLL_THREAD_DETACH: case DLL_PROCESS_DETACH: break; } return TRUE; }
- .cpl file, same as a .dll file with Cplapplet export
#include "stdafx.h" #include <Windows.h> extern "C" __declspec(dllexport) LONG Cplapplet( HWND hwndCpl, UINT msg, LPARAM lParam1, LPARAM lParam2 ) { MessageBoxA(NULL, "Hey there, I am now your control panel item you know.", "Control Panel", 0); return 1; } BOOL APIENTRY DllMain( HMODULE hModule, DWORD ul_reason_for_call, LPVOID lpReserved ) { switch (ul_reason_for_call) { case DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH: { Cplapplet(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); } case DLL_THREAD_ATTACH: case DLL_THREAD_DETACH: case DLL_PROCESS_DETACH: break; } return TRUE; }
Code Execution Files
- Word with Macro (.doc, .docm)
- Excel library (.xll)
- Excel macro-enabled add-in file (.xlam)
- WSF files (.wsf)
- MSI installers (.msi)
- MSIX/APPX app package (.msix, .appx)
- ClickOnce (.application, .vsto, .appref-ms)
- Powershell scripts (.ps1)
- Windows Script Host scripts (.wsh, .vbs)
Embedded Files
- ICS Calendar Invites with Embedded Files
Code Signing
Certificate can be Expired, Revoked, Valid.
Many certificates leaked on the Internet and got re-used by Threat Actor.
Some of them can be found on VirusTotal, with the query : content:{02 01 03 30}@4 AND NOT tag:peexe
In 2022, LAPSUS$ claimed responsibility for a cyberattack on NVIDIA, a major graphics card and AI technology manufacturer. As part of this attack, LAPSUS$ allegedly stole proprietary data from NVIDIA and threatened to leak it. The leak contained
- Certificates can be password protected. Use pfx2john.py
- Sign a binary with a certificate.
- The following files can be signed with a certificate
- executables: .exe, .dll, .ocx, .xll, .wll
- scripts: .vbs, .js, .ps1
- installers: .msi, .msix, .appx, .msixbundle, .appxbundle
- drivers: .sys
- cabinets: .cab
- ClickOnce: .application, .manifest, .vsto
References
- Top 10 Payloads: Highlighting Notable and Trending Techniques - delivr.to
- Executing Code as a Control Panel Item through an Exported Cplapplet Function - @spotheplanet
- Desperate Infection Chains - Multi-Step Initial Access Strategies by Mariusz Banach - x33fcon Youtube
- Desperate Infection Chains - Multi-Step Initial Access Strategies by Mariusz Banach - x33fcon PDF
- Red Macros Factory - https://binary-offensive.com/